by Clint

Zawahiri and al Qaeda Central out of the loop in Iraq & Syria

Last week, documents from the Sahel revealed the infighting inside al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Will McCants at Jihadica then discussed similar problems of dystfunction between al Qaeda affiliates in Syria.  Yesterday, al Jazeera confirmed McCant’s discussion by releasing more internal AQ documents showing the messy bickering inside al Qaeda by posting a letter from al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to the leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, aka AQ in Iraq) and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria annulling AQ in Iraq’s annexation of al-Nusra in Syria.  Zawahiri was not in the loop at all with regards to what Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (AQ in Iraq/ISI) was up to in his attempts to consolidate more power in the Levant.

Screen Shot 2013-06-10 at 8.21.33 AM

This doesn’t appear to be the first time that AQ in Iraq (ISI) have been on their own with regards to taking orders from AQ Central.  Zarqawi was scolded years ago for being off the reservation targeting Shia in Iraq. The gradual ‘Iraqification’ of the ISI has likely led to a more insular and self-directed AQ in Iraq.  The Abbottabad documents from the Bin Laden raid suggest that AQ in Iraq may have been the most distant AQ affiliate at the time of Bin Laden’s death.  As seen here in this quote from Bin Laden’s note to Attiya in April 2011:

SOCOM-2012-0000010-HT - Regarding the communications with the brothers in Iraq, please inform us on its progress and the reason for its scarcity.

So why would Baghdadi want to annex al-Nusra? Straight up, power & money. I assume Baghdadi recognized the rise of Nusra as a threat to his regional dominance in AQ ranks.  Likewise, forcing Nusra under AQ in Iraq’s wing would bring the best resourced AQ affiliate garnering the most international attention under his control.  I imagine far fewer Gulf donors want to pump money and weapons into Iraq as compared to Syria. Baghdadi was thinking about keeping his stake in a post-Zawahiri world. According to al Jazeera, Baghdadi’s preemptive power grab harmed Nusra in Syria.

 after Baghdadi released a video in April declaring the formation of the ISIL, many of al-Nusra’s fighters, especially non-Syrians, left to join the new umbrella group. ”This was the most dangerous development in the history of global jihad,” an al-Nusra source inside Syria told Al Jazeera on Saturday. One al-Nusra fighter estimated that 70 percent of the group’s members left for the ISIL in Idlib province, with even higher defection rates in the Syria’s eastern regions. Aleppo, the bastion of al-Nusra, saw the least defections from its ranks, fighters said. But even then the city suffered from the divisions within the group.

So we now see Zawahiri scolding his regional Emirs.

Screen Shot 2013-06-10 at 8.07.19 AM

I’m guessing a Nusra dude must have passed this along to Al Jazeera to get word out to everyone that the two groups are separate, just in case Baghdadi doesn’t want to comply.  Poor Ayman, why won’t ISI (AQ in Iraq) listen to you? Why are they not consulting you?  I’m guessing several reasons.

  • AQ in Iraq has always been “On Your Own” (O.Y.O.) with respect to Zawahiri.  AQ Central has always been critical of the group’s conduct (See Attiya letter & Abbottabad doc SOCOM-2012-0000017) , so why listen to the grump if all he wants to do is play arm chair quarterback from Pakistan?
  • AQ in Iraq probably has its own resource pipeline:  Having fought for years in Iraq, they have cemented their own weapons and money pipelines from the Gulf years ago and sustain their own illicit mechanisms in country.  What does AQ Central provide them at this point?
  • Zawahiri doesn’t have good mechanisms to communicate with AQ in Iraq and the ISI.  The Abbottabad documents suggest there were many intermediaries trying to reach them.  Here again we see the regional affiliates not having routine contact with Zawahiri.

Another really interesting aspect of this is the naivety of al Qaeda foreign fighters.  Just a few months back, Omar Hammami was talking about the glory and just path of jihad in Syria where things are resolved appropriately.Screen Shot 2013-01-15 at 10.15.41 AM

Yet, we now see that al-Baghdadi with AQ in Iraq (ISI) is pulling the same stunt as Hammami’s Shabaab nemesis Ahmed Godane – trying to seize more power by controlling a command relationship with Zawahiri and AQ Central.  Ahh Omar, it appears jihad is the same everywhere, this is what happens when you approach age 30, whether its jihad or office work you figure out its all – “same shit, different day.”  Even though al Qaeda doesn’t support Omar, at least his parents still do.

From a counterterrorism perspective, I see both some concerns and some opportunities.  If anything, I would imagine now more than maybe anytime since Bin Laden’s death, Zawahiri is desperately trying to plot his strategy and an attack to re-establish his prominence, authority and control over al Qaeda.  Zawahiri still has control in places I’m sure, but without a “quick win” where he can regain some clout his relevance to AQ affiliates will continue to wane.  Likewise, for the West, this internal al Qaeda fracturing is helpful as it prevents the groups from advancing forward productively.  However, it requires analysts to independently evaluate every aspect of many different groups.  Used to an established AQ playbook the past decade, analysts have likely gotten comfortable with how AQ would operate.  Now, the landscape is quite dynamic and much harder to anticipate as the regional and local aspects influencing each group vary so much – a significant challenge for the West.

by Clint

Syria’s Foreign Fighters: Dissecting The Next Decade of Conflict

Two weeks ago, I did a short post at FPRI on “Syria: Suffering the effects of the 2nd Foreign Fighter Glut“.  The crux of the discussion centered on how Syria has become the next epicenter for a routine pattern of foreign fighter mobilization and integration into jihadi conflicts.  I used the diagrams from a 2009 paper (Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut) to illustrate how this cycle perpetuates itself (See Figure 1 below) and why Syria will be the catalyst for a decade of conflict.

The longer the Syrian civil war goes on, the more foreign fighters will descend on the country. Western inaction in Syria will not only sustain foreign fighter flows to Syria, but will sustain a decades long jihadi foreign fighter recruitment cycle and likely produce a third foreign fighter glut fostering conflict for the next decade.

Analysis of foreign fighters to Iraq in 2008 and 2009 signaled how al Qaeda affiliates would regenerate in the future.  Slide2Here is an excerpt Countering Terrorism From The Second Foreign Fighter Glut written in 2008 and published in 2009 discussing the implications of former foreign fighters returning to their home countries as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq wind down and what we’ve seen the past couple of years.

2009 – Policy Implication: Fight the next terrorist threat, not the last one. 

Western CT efforts should avoid the tendency to protect against the last terrorist attack rather than preventing the next one. While protecting mass transit systems and thwarting WMD proliferation remains important, the more probable next generation of attacks will be against Westerners in MENA and South Asia. Former foreign fighters from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut will lead future attacks, and they may maintain only minimal connections to core AQ. As targets and access diminish in Iraq and Afghanistan, former foreign fighters will continue to recruit locally in flashpoint cities and then create their own safe havens regionally. The end result will be upstart regional groups that share some of AQ’s ideology, try to pull from larger AQ resources, and then use former foreign fighter knowledge to spearhead attacks closer to home. With limited operational space, resources and size, the scope of terrorist operations will temporarily decrease. Instead of massive, high tech, large-scale 9/11 operations, one may expect smaller scale, conventional attacks perpetrated by smaller Jihadi groups. These smaller Jihadi elements will begin with attacks on local Western targets and MENA governments in an attempt to build their popular support, gain resources and grow their capacity to execute more spectacular attacks in Europe and the United States.

Analysts might consider altering their focus to concentrate on regional nodes rather than working to link all actions back to core AQ. The North African node may be led by former foreign fighters from Algeria, recruiting from North African flashpoint cities in Tunisia and new militant enclaves in Mauritania, seeking safe haven in the trans-Sahara (Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Libya) and conducting attacks on Westerners in Tunis, Casablanca or Niamey. The Middle Eastern node might consist of new cells led by Yemeni and Saudi former foreign fighters finding operational space in Yemen and Palestinian camps in Lebanon and attacking Western and Israeli economic and diplomatic targets. South Asia (not supported by data in this study but extremely significant) would likely see a host of Pakistani and Central Asian militant groups, holed up in tribal areas and Central Asian safe havens and conducting attacks throughout Asia.

Today, we know that Syria, much like Iraq a few years back, will be the center of gravity for future Salafi-jihadi foreign fighter violence. This is occurring for several reasons:

  1. It’s gone on way too long – The longer the Syrian civil war goes on, the more foreign fighters there will be mobilized to the battlefield.
  2. The West won’t do anything to stop fighting in Syria – Foreign fighter recruits may be a bit crazy but they are not stupid.  One of the bigger deterrents of joining an al Qaeda affiliate or an emerging militant group is whether the recruit thinks the fight they are joining has a chance to succeed.  Despite all their macho bravado, no foreign fighter wants to join a fight where al Qaeda is getting its ass kicked.  That’s why foreign fighter flows to Iraq decreased around 2008 and will slow to places like Mali where the French have intervened.  BLUF: Foreign fighters are fickle, and aside from the occasional oddball, they want to play for a winner.  For example, Omar Hammami in Somalia was whining about moving to Syria from Somalia months ago.  For a jihadi, going to fight in Syria is the equivalent of buying a Miami Heat jersey if your an NBA fan or a Yankees jersey if you are baseball fan: you don’t know if you’ll win the championship, but you’ve got a much better chance of winning if you support that team.
  3. Lots of money and weapons - Unlike other conflicts, the Syrian civil war has received substantial and sustained resources from the Gulf and now the West as well as resources from Russia and Iran on the Assad regime side.  There is plenty of fuel to keep this thing going.
  4.  Recruitment pipelines – The fighting in Syria is occurring in the exact location of foreign fighter pipelines to Iraq circa 2006-2007.  These foreign fighter recruitment networks have been easily reactivated and there is far less for recruits to resolve logistically to make their way to the battlefield in Syria.

Aaron Zelin published an excellent set of data this week on foreign fighters to Syria.  From martyr biographies found on social media, Aaron found that Libyans and Tunisians dominated the ranks.  Remember when everyone was freaking out about al Qaeda building a stronghold in Libya?  I’m sure there is an al Qaeda or al Qaeda like presence in Libya, but if hundreds of fighters from Libya are heading to Syria, we shouldn’t worry so much about an al Qaeda being resurgent in Libya.  More important for me is Tunisia.  The high numbers of Tunisians, I imagine, comes as much from the historical recruitment networks identified in the Sinjar records as much as anything going on currently.  The best recruiter of a new foreign fighter is a former foreign fighter, and Tunisia had a solid network for getting people to Iraq a few years back. To figure out the pattern of recruitment to Syria and to anticipate the implications of the 3rd generation of foreign fighters coming out of Syria, I’m going to start looking at several things below with regards to Syria’s foreign fighters.  I’m working on a couple concepts I’ll share here in the coming weeks which I think might help with some of these research issues.

  • Need more data - Aaron on his own has captured an excellent data set that is approaching 300.  But, its not nearly enough to understand the dynamics of recruitment to the Syrian conflict.  Just yesterday there were reports of 200 Islamists from Russia in Syria.  There are now thousands of foreign fighters in Syria speaking a variety of languages and communicating on a host of media.  To properly understand the foreign fighter flow to Syria, there needs to be a team of researchers speaking many different languages looking at data online and on the ground.  This is a big challenge that comes at a time when resources and interest in studying terrorism are on the decline; not an insurmountable challenge but one that will require some alternative solutions.  Additionally, if we only capture martyrdom biographies, we may be getting a snapshot of the least effective fighters or those with more of an inclination towards martyrdom.  What country’s fighters are the most talented and more inclined to stay alive and later come back home? 
  • Need to know the hometowns of recruits – Most news stories I read on foreign fighters speak only to countries. “FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO AL QAEDA ARE FROM SAUDI ARABIA/LIBYA/ETC.!”  This is meaningless.  It’s the equivalent of saying people from the East Coast are rude, the West Coast is lazy or the South is racist (All are 100% true by the way-did I get everybody angry this morning?).  Foreign fighter recruitment is a very local phenomena. To understand the dynamics that produce recruits and what can be done to mitigate recruitment requires much more micro-level data.  We need to know the hometowns of recruits, not their countries of origin.  Just looking at Aaron’s data, I’m guessing there are some important local dynamics at play in the recruitment numbers – see my circles below on Aaron’s table.  While these records report deaths, fighters from the same places often stick together, and in Syria probably die together.
  • Who is heading back home? – It appears that many of the fighters to Syria are getting killed.  But, which ones will return home? This is probably the more important point for understanding where this goes in the future.  Maybe they’ll stay in Syria, who knows, but we need to figure it out.
  • Are they joining “al Qaeda” or something “al Qaeda-like”? –  What the U.S. media is calling “al Qaeda” is a broad term that likely misses the essence of what is going on in Syria.  What if we are entering a post al-Qaeda age where things are similar at times to al Qaeda but in reality are turning into something new?  While Ayman al-Zawahiri has rightly tried to jump on the success of jihadis in Syria, Aaron’s data shows there are many jihadi groups receiving fighters and Will McCants discussed in his “Office Space” post that there are fractures in the Syrian jihadi groups similar to what has been seen with AQIM.  In the aftermath of Afghanistan 1980s, the mujahideen manifested into a threat called “al Qaeda”.  But after Syria, will we talking about a threat called “al Qaeda”? Or will it instead be morphing into a new threat known as “al-Nusra” with some of al Qaeda’s ideological goals plus some new ones? If al-Nusra focuses on fighting Hezballah after the Assad regime falls, we might not care too much.  But if al-Nusra turns its sites on Israel, well, I think there is a huge mess on the horizon.

Screen Shot 2013-06-07 at 7.59.51 AM

Screen Shot 2013-06-07 at 7.39.24 AM

by Clint

From AQIM in the Sahel to Shabaab in the Horn, al Qaeda Affiliates Squabble & Fracture

Well, it seems al Qaeda has found some cracks in its foundation.  For those that believe al Qaeda’s ideology is all powerful, please read below.

The Associated Press released yet another internal document from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.  This document dated October 3, 2012 details the break off of Moktar Belmoktar. Yet again, we see another Al Qaeda affiliate crumbling from internal disputes. Just like Omar Hammami’s complaints about Shabaab’s taxation policy with regards to qat, AQIM and Belmoktar quibbled about ransoms and money.  With respect to Belmoktar (aka Abu Abbas in the letter), AQIM’s Shura Council has many sharp words and accusations, noting:
The man, based on the loftiness of his ability, his precedence in jihad and his prowess, remained for more than a decade independent in opinion and autonomous in decisionmaking, linked to the organization’s leadership only by slogan. He paid no mind, gave no consideration, did not abide by and did not adhere to the principle of “hear and obey,” nor did he stick to the directives or work by the orders coming from the emirate….all tho is testimony to the fact that Abu Abbas is not willing to follow anyone, and that he is satisfied only when followed and obeyed.
Essentially, Belmoktar never really was a team player.  It seems Belmoktar followed the O.Y.O. (On Your Own) way of business I suggested last year.
The organization paid particular attention to this abduction because of the nature of the Canadian captives – one of them was the personal representative of the U.N. Secretary General.  We strove to give htis case an international dimension.  We tried to coordinate with the leadership in Khorasan [Afghanistan/Pakistan - (AQ Central)]. But unfortunately, we met the obstacle of Khaled.  Rather than walking with us in the plan we outlined, he managed the case however he liked, despite our repeated insistence that the case should be under the administration of the organization.  He chose to step outside the organization and reach an agreement in his own way, he did not follow the organization’s instructions.
Moktar Belmoktar

Moktar Belmoktar

So AQIM was trying to coordinate the high level Canadian kidnapping with AQ Central. Not only did Belmohtar blow off AQIM, he ransomed too low in the eyes of the AQIM leadership. After this, AQIM accuses Belmoktar of not pulling off any high visibility attacks.  I think the An Amenas gas plant and now Niger suicide bombings must make up for that.  I guess Belmokhtar got the message and maybe this letter motivated him.

It also seems that Belmokhtar is a “Don’t call me, I’ll call you” kind of guy.

Why do you only turn on your phone with the Emirate when you need it, while your communication with some media is almost never ending!

And Belmokhtar didn’t turn his TPS reports in on time!
We ask you also: How many administrative and financial reports have you sent up to your Emirate?

More importantly, this letter suggests 1) Belmokhtar desired to setup a separate and independent communications channel with AQ Central- Zawahiri and certain al Qaeda web forums (Maybe he did?!) and 2) AQIM struggled to maintain contact and receive guidance from a bottled up AQ Central in AFPAK (Presumably getting droned to death).

Our dear brothers, we find it a strange contradiction in your message, that idea of separating from the leadership of the Islamic Maghreb and instead connecting with the leadership in Khorasan [Afghanistan/Pakistan]. The great obstacles between us and the central leadership are not unknown to you.  They are far greater than any obstacles imaginable with the closer, local leadership that borders you.  For example, since we vowed our allegiance up until this very day, we have only gotten a few messages from our emirs in Khorasan, the two sheikhs, bin Laden (God rest his soul) and Ayman (God preserve him). From time to time, we also received messages from the two sheikhs Attiyat Ullah (Attiyah) and Abu Yahia al-Libi (God rest their souls). All this, despite our multiple letters to them for them to deal with us effectively in managing jihad here.

Last year, I noted that:

Jihadi militant group leaders have now entered the “O.Y.O.” era – On Your Own.  Militant groups are rebuilding, consolidating, finding new bases of support and new financial backers. …An upstart militant group leader .. competing for funding and popular support amongst a sea of militant groups has no reason to wait for a far off al Qaeda leader (Zawahiri for example), whom they likely don’t even know nor receive any funding from, to issue orders about who to attack.

Well, this AQIM letter confirms some of the challenges the group faced during its height noted in the first AP letter published a few months back.

We only bring this up so that our brothers understand that the idea of adhering to the central leadership rather than the local leadership is not realistic.

One more key note, the letter does confirm that there were, at a minimum, some loose connections between AQIM and other militant groups in Libya.

Two others were formed in the Sahara, under the Tareq bin Zayed Brigade.  They were able to enter Libyan territory and lay the first practical bricks there.  Their projects are still active to this day.

It seems like Belmokhtar tried to set up his own links in Libya separate from those of AQIM.  Again, I always caution, don’t overstate “links”. It seems both Belhmoktar and AQIM wanted to bring the AQ militant elements in Libya under their influence.  But, maybe the Libyan groups didn’t/don’t want to be subordinate to AQIM? Maybe they, like Belmokhtar, would like to have their own channel to AQ Central? If you are Ansar al-Sharia or some other element in Libya, why fall under the direction of AQIM; a group that is already struggling to stay in touch with AQ central?

Last quote, can’t resist this one.  It seems Belmokhtar didn’t like the restructuring of AQIM in 2006.  But AQIM noted this restructuring was because of:

the lowering number of mujahedeen and the widening territory in the north.

So when you see al Qaeda in more places or spread out geographically, it doesn’t always mean they are growing in strength.  It could mean the opposite.  And this may further illuminate the group’s decision to transform from GSPC and formally join al Qaeda – recruitment was down.

The entire letter is a fascinating primary document and again, like the earlier AP release of an AQIM letter, important for understanding what a post-Bin Laden al Qaeda looks like. The letter brings up several points for evaluating how terrorism may work in the future and what might happen “If there is no al Qaeda“.

  • The value of Bin Laden to al Qaeda:  For the second time in two years, we can see the value Bin Laden provided the Al Qaeda organization up until his death.  Bin Laden was hesitant, for good reasons, in having a formal relationship with Shabaab in Somalia.  After his death, Zawahiri pushed Al Qaeda into a formal alliance with Shabaab in 2012.  Al Qaeda Central now has an embarrassing affiliate with different factions fighting each other in the Horn Africa while also being on the retreat from Allied forces.  Ibrahim al-Afghani published an open plea to Zawahiri on a web page requesting the removal of Shabaab’s leader Godane – Zawahiri must be kicking himself.  Meanwhile, in the Sahara, we see another Al Qaeda affiliate where different leaders compete and quarrel over resources, strategic direction and access to AQ’s senior leader.  A Bin Laden led al Qaeda would not have this kind of public fracturing going on.  Bin Laden would have sent a message to these troubled subordinates – “Enough”.  And the affiliates would have listened because 1) Bin Laden maintained sustained communications up until his death 2) Bin Laden was central to the distribution of resources and 3) Bin Laden was respected for his successes.  This all leads to the next question…..
  • Is there really an al Qaeda Central and is Zawahiri really leading all these different groups?: I don’t doubt that Zawahiri still maintains public respect and that al Qaeda members will say they are loyal to him.  I also think Zawahiri has a command relationship in certain locales where he maintains physical relationships with old al Qaeda members, namely Egypt, possibly Yemen and some in Libya (Longer paper coming out on this in a while). But, if you are a young jihadi commander and, 1) you haven’t had any communication with Zawahiri in months, 2) you don’t receive any resources from AQ Central and you are entirely self-funded and 3) you only get guidance from AQ Central through intermediaries that you believe are incompetent, corrupt or both, why would you continue to wait on al Qaeda?  You probably wouldn’t! And I think that is what we see happening today in both the Sahel and Somalia.  Belmoktar has seized an opportunity to pursue his own “al Qaeda” vision and in Somalia we see Omar Hammami publicly and Ibrahim al-Afghani and Hassan Aweys more politically striking out on their own path.  Omar Hammami represents this confusion best, he wants to support AQ but he hates the local AQ leader (Godane) that he is supposed to follow. Screen Shot 2013-05-29 at 9.07.53 AMScreen Shot 2013-05-29 at 9.11.02 AM
  • Resources can easily undermine ideology: In Africa, there’s more competition for resources and I’m not surprised this is where we see ideology being undermined by resource competition. In Somalia, there’s constant competition for resources, turf and control. Today, in Shabaab, Godane, Robow, Aweys and Afghani each try to morph al Qaeda’s ideology and brand to their advantage.  In the Sahara, we see something slightly different where kidnapping royalties and illicit smuggling revenues controlled by a leader like Belmoktar can increase his power vis-a-vis AQIM’s leadership.
  • Distance and limited communication breed mistrust: As the distance between al Qaeda’s affiliates and AQ’s central leadership increases and communication decreases, mistrust ensues.  Likewise, even the decentralized “Starfish” organization of al Qaeda needs leadership to achieve lasting gains.  Today, Belmoktar has solved al Qaeda’s “put up or shut up” problem.  With each spectacular attack, his influence grows.  Likewise, I would look to Jabhat al-Nusra today.  The most prolific leaders of the Syrian jihad will be the next leaders of Salafi-Jihadi militancy – something that looks “al Qaeda like” at times, but may be called something entirely different.
  • Is a live Zawahiri better than a dead Zawahiri?: Let me be clear, at the first available opportunity, I think the U.S. should kill or capture Zawahiri.  No doubt about it.  However, Zawahiri, despite being respected internationally for being a strategic thinker, might actually be preventing the emergence of the next, more effective version of al Qaeda.  Again, I don’t believe that Zawahiri is keeping a lid on violence, he needs an attack on the West in a big way in order to reassert his authority.  But, his intermittent and erratic communication with affiliates, loss of affiliate control and opportunistic piggy-backing on Jabhat al-Nusra’s success may actually be doing al Qaeda more harm than good.  I would imagine Zawahiri is plotting an attack on the West this minute and building a strategy to re-energize al Qaeda through Syria. But, his persistent involvement may actually be slowing the development of the next wave of Salafi-Jihadi militancy.
by Clint

Drone Week 2013: New ICG Report, AG Acknowledgement & POTUS CT Address

Well, it’s May, and it seems like every year about this time (2011, 2012, 2013) I end up writing more about drones.  I didn’t see this being a heavy week on the discussion of drones, but what else should I do but continue to drone on…..

First, the International Crisis Group (ICG) released one of the more extensive research efforts into the use of armed drones in counterterrorism.  The report ”Drones: Myths and Realities in Pakistan” provides a comprehensive analysis and lots of references.  I’m still reading it now, but I’ve already found many interesting points in “Section IV:  Drones and Counterterrorism” starting on page 22.  I’ll note some interesting quotes here in this post which mirror discussions I’ve had in previous posts on drones here at this blog.

On page 24, the section entitled “Winning Hearts and Minds or Losing Allies?” starts off with hosts this paragraph.

In debates on the drone issue, the argument is commonly put forward that drones produce more terrorists than they kill: militant groups exploit real and fabricated accounts of civilian deaths to enlist fresh recruits, including the relatives of drone strike victims, for jihad against the U.S. and its allies.133  The actual benefit to extremist groups, including in terms of recruitment, appears, however, minimal. A local analyst who has extensively researched security and governance in FATA notes that while anti-drone rhetoric does draw some converts, “the loss of a Baitullah Mehsud or a Qari Hussain is much more damaging than the recruitment of a few dozen foot soldiers”.134

As I noted in my previous post, the reasons for joining an extremist group vary significantly from place to place and person to person.  In all cases, I believe the local socioeconomic dynamics surrounding the recruit play the greatest role.  In this report, ICG notes:

Moreover, militant recruitment is a complex process, achieved more often on economic than ideological grounds. The main causes for the spread of militancy in FATA are not drone strikes but domestic factors. These include the absence of the state and insecurity due to the resulting political, legal and economic vacuum; and the military’s support of, provision of sanctuaries to, and peace deals with militant groups.

As noted earlier this week, Christine Fair described the same root causes in 2010. The ICG report goes on to explain why public opinion polling reference drone use in FATA is essentially worthless.  In my opinion, the closer one polls to where the drone strike occurs, the less people will like drone strikes.  This isn’t rocket science (well, maybe it is a little bit, drones fire rockets).  One final quote from the paper comes from a researcher who compares drone strikes to other options:

 said a researcher. “You had military operations and militancy on one side, which destroyed towns and villages, and you had drones on the other, which were more precise.”

The article concludes that drones are not the solution or a long-run solution. I think almost everyone agrees on this.  The article says the solution is for Pakistan and the West to establish “Rule of Law”.  OK, well, Pakistan and other nations have only tried to govern this area for a few centuries, right, so maybe we can tackle this challenge ……uhhh, next fiscal year?  Not likely.

Second, Attorney General Eric Holder revealed one of the biggest non-secrets in American history: the U.S. uses drones and these drones have killed Americans.

Holder’s letter offered a detailed justification for the CIA’S killing of Awlaki, who Holder said had “repeatedly made clear his intent to attack U.S. persons and his hope that these attacks would take American lives.”

Transparency, I like it.  I wish they did this after every drone strike.  But then again, would we expect this sort of transparency after every infantry squad engagement?  Probably not! And are Americans sufficiently informed to understand what they would even be reading?  Would they care?  I don’t know, but I guess Holder’s prelude is set up for…..wait for it…..

Third, President Obama will provide an address on his counterterrorism policy on Thursday. Supposedly this address will go over everything: GITMO, drones, disposition matrix kind of stuff maybe.  It sounds like the President will be addressing all the CT stuff I was complaining about last year in the post “Counterterrorism 2012: No Drones, No Detention, No Intervention“. The NY Times article “Debate Aside, Number of Drone Strikes Drops Sharply”  shows how drone use has decreased ( I posted their table from Long War Journal below).  The article notes:

Screen Shot 2013-05-22 at 8.48.00 PM

Mr. Obama, who insisted early in his presidency on a personal role in many strike decisions, may also shed light on the declining use of drone strikes. Current and former officials say the reasons include a shrinking list of important Qaeda targets, a result of the success of past strikes, and transient factors ranging from bad weather to diplomatic strains. But more broadly, the decline may reflect a changing calculation of the long-term costs and benefits of targeted killings.

So, after all the complaints the past year about transparency and CT strategy, all the bashing on both political sides about the threat of terrorism and how counterterrorism should be conducted, the President seems to be giving everyone what they want right; information and a strategy.  And what will likely happen? Both sides will probably crucify him for it. The President will attempt to do exactly what some of the American public has asked for, and Friday morning on Twitter, there will be nothing but bitching, moaning and sharpshooting.  Well, I think we should close GITMO, I think we should keep using drones, and I have a feeling, for the most part, I’ll be happy with most of what the President outlines that the USG is doing in counterterrorism.  If anything, I think we could maybe do less in some areas.   In retrospect, for me, U.S. counterterrorism makes a lot more sense in 2013 than it did in 2003.   In conclusion, for my take on what modifications could be made to the drone program, see this post (Americans: If you don’t want to get killed by a drone avoid these four things!) and this post (After Brennan, Implementing Curbs on Drone Targeting).

by Clint

Interview on radicalization and recruitment at Loopcast

Today, I had the opportunity to do an interview on extremist radicalization and recruitment with @cldaymon at the Loopcast.  The interview was fun and I talked way too long.  I also discussed a mix of different things I’ve researched with regards to radicalization and recruitment as well as social media.  So in follow up, if anyone is interested in where my mumblings come from, here are links to the different publications.

Lastly, I discussed the differences in incentives for recruits to join al Qaeda based on their role in the organization or based on their geographical location. I noted that I thought Westerners tended to join for more ideological reasons than recruits from Africa for example.  Here are two posts I wrote here at this blog related to that theoretical framework and below each post link I’ll paste the two graphs of how I thought the incentives might vary (theoretically) depending on the individual recruit.

Countering Violent Extremism of Terror Cell Recruits (And graph below)

LEcon Job opening

 

Countering Violent Extremism Around The Globe (And Graph Below)

Slide1

 

by Clint

Will there be “blowback” from U.S. drone use?

After a few weeks of quiet, the drone debate has surfaced again in the U.S.

The past week has seen at least two drone strikes in Yemen.  One reportedly killed the Ansar al-Sharia leader of Abyan province and the Long War Journal claims the latest attack , launched missiles at,

“two fighters “as they left a farm on a motorbike” in the Khobza area of Baydah province”

A year ago, all the talk of terrorism, counterterrorism and drones centered on Yemen.  The media has lost interest in Yemen over the past year and while the pace of drone strikes appears to have decreased; their use has not gone away.

More interesting, an article from the Huffington Post I read yesterday that was published in 2010 entitled “Drones over Pakistan: Menace or Best Viable Option?”. This article is a must read.  Dr. C. Christine Fair had spent months in Pakistan researching the drone issue and, similar to Christopher Swift’s take on Yemen last year, found a very different perspective on the drone debate inside Pakistan.  She spoke with a senior Pakistani officer and:

This senior officer himself attested to Pakistan’s own inability to eliminate key threats and the necessity of the drones to eliminate terrorists in a way that most effectively minimizes the loss of innocent lives.

As for those stories that recount the psychological damage placed on populations by the buzz of drones, Fair contrasts with this anecdote:

“Another interlocutor explained that when children hear the buzz of the drones, they go their roofs to watch the spectacle of precision rather than cowering in fear of random “death from above.”

While I’m sure there have been mistakes in the use of drones in Pakistan, Fair says in Pakistan,

This antipathy towards the program is due in large measure to the collaboration of Pakistan’s media to sustain tenacious criticism of the program by spreading suspect civilian casualty reports planted by the militants themselves or various “agencies.”

Well, what should we think? As readers of this blog, you likely know my stance, “Go Drone With Some Modifications” (See here and here). However, the debate often centers around one’s perception of innocence and a which is more noble: means or ends. This is where it all gets really tricky.

COIN proponents like the notion of winning “hearts and minds” and this sells well to the public as the means ‘feel’ just. But in actuality, COIN in Pakistan means Pakistani army and militia invasion, which creates immeasurable casualties over time.  Drones, on the other hand, ‘feel’ evil, but I believe kill more precisely than any other tool and if I had to choose between a drone strike or sending in a tribal militia – I’ll go drone every time. (Did you see above, we just hit two dudes on a motorbike! it doesn’t get much more precise than that.) Again, both parties, drone critics and drone advocates, will swing the number of civilian casualties in their favor because there is no clear definition of the enemy and the U.S. isn’t overly clear about its use of the tool.  Would Osama Bin Laden’s wife be considered a militant or a civilian? Were the people in an AQAP member’s house hit by a drone strike militants or civilians? What about the house across the street from where the missile strikes, militants or civilians?

Drone critics have made some progress, I believe, in curbing the use of drones.  The pace of attacks has decreased overall it seems.  I assume this is either due to public pressure or that the U.S. may be running out of targets.  However, critics of drones are unlikely to make much more progress in reducing drone use unless they can provide a viable counterterrorism alternative to drones – America’s most effective and Slide1efficient counterterrorism tool.  While critics protested publicly during the hearings, I’ve heard little from them since Brennan’s confirmation. If drone critics remain concerned about their use, they must sustain a real campaign against their use and provide plausible alternatives.  The truth is: both political parties and most Americans are big fans of drones as long as they aren’t aimed at them.

The mantra I’ve seen repeated amongst drone critics has been that the U.S. use of drones will result in “blowback” against the U.S. While I agree this is conceivable, this repeated “you just wait, this is going to come back to haunt you” argument needs to come with some specific predictions if it is to be treated seriously.  I’ve listened to this argument against drone use for more than two years now.  (See here and here) If there is going to be “blowback” for the U.S. use of drones, when will there be “blowback” and where will there be “blowback”?  Be specific. To say there will be a terrorist attack from Yemen again, or from Pakistan again, will surely be correct, but these attacks may have only some or no relation to U.S. drone use.

Conversely, the option “to not use drones” over the past several years must be discussed by those that criticize drone use.  For example, I believe if the U.S. had not developed and implemented the use of drones in Pakistan, al Qaeda would be stronger today than it currently is, the U.S. would be further engaged in Afghanistan providing more troops for a longer period, and the TTP and al Qaeda would maintain a strong foothold in Pakistan’s frontier that would further destabilize Pakistan and yield more terrorist attacks against the West. Likewise, I also believe the success of drones in Pakistan has sent al Qaeda to seek alternative safe havens – one of which is Yemen.  In Yemen, without the use of drones, I believe the U.S. would be committed to a larger ground presence and further entanglement with dubious allies in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.  Additionally, I believe the U.S. would have suffered more attacks from an AQAP whose external operations, led by Awlaki, would have continued, increased and improved with time.  While my assessment, due to the course of history, cannot be proven right or wrong, I can see the logic for why the U.S. chose to pursue drone strikes and I believe it outweighs the arguments for not using drones.  For drone critics, they must qualify their prophecy about the long-run effects of drone use.  I’ve heard the drone “blowback” argument for at least three consecutive years now and, while I respect it, I’m not convinced.

 

by Clint

Successful Recruitment Processes for Ideological Causes

This past week, I finished Lawrence Wright’s latest book Going Clear: Scientology, Hollywood and the Prison of Belief.  It is one of the most fascinating books I’ve read in a long time; a truly amazing story of modern America that is exceptionally researched.  The book provides a contemporary accounting of how a religion is formed and in these descriptions I found many parallels to what is described in the recruitment processes of other ideological groups like al Qaeda and how they recruit new members.  (Note: I do not think Scientology is a terror group nor do I have anything against Scientologists with the exception of those described in the book that senselessly beat subordinate members and imprison them in dark basements. (Read the book, you’ll be amazed!) I don’t care what anyone believes as long as you don’t use it to justify killing other people or restricting others’ freedoms.)

In the book, Wright describes how writer/director Paul Haggis was recruited into Scientology.  On page 4, of Going Clear, I’ve done a short paraphrasing of Wright’s description of the Scientology playbook:

“Although he didn’t realize it, Haggis was being drawn into the church through a classic four-step “dissemination drill” that recruiters are carefully trained to follow.  The first step is to make contact…The second step is to disarm any antagonism the individual may have toward Scientology. Once that’s done, the task it to “find the ruin” — that is, the problem most on the mind of the potential recruit…The fourth step is to convince the Subject that Scientology has the answer.”

This description sounded so familiar to what I’ve seen and studied with regards to groups like al Qaeda.  But in reality, this approach can be seen in most all religions.  Wright does a great comparison of Scientology with other religions in the final chapter of the book, one that is both fair and instructive of Scientology’s parallels with more ancient religious traditions.

As I discussed in a recent post on Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s recruitment to extremism, the ability for one to be susceptible to a recruitment strategy is an emotional trigger; or as described in Going Clear as “finding the ruin”. If one is primed by one or more emotional triggers, for example, the loss of a family member (family), a struggle for employment (financial), a mental condition (psychological) or the failure to achieve a goal (professional), the “ruin” can send one seeking an answer and an ideology can easily be a solution to solve all problems.  It’s not a coincidence that those sentenced to prisons (a “ruin”) often quickly find either God, a gang or both.

While Scientology is thankfully not a violent organization, at least not externally anyways, the process by which they “find the ruin” mirrors many extreme groups.  Wright’s description reminds me of on of my favorite articles on radicalization and recruitment – an article by TJ Leydon, a former white supremacist, who wrote a response to the Wade Michael Page massacre last year entitled ”What I Might Have Told Wade Michael Page“. Leydon explains how he targeted people for recruitment.

“Treat someone normal like a winner and he’ll fight for you, but treat a loser like a winner and he’ll kill for you” became a phrase that I took to heart in recruiting others. As the years passed, I started to care more about the power of being high in the hierarchy of the white supremacy movement, so I started to go along with the ideology, even ideals I didn’t believe in or care about, such as Holocaust denial.”

Leydon’s conclusion also provides another contrasting perspective as to why people join different ideologies; extreme or otherwise.  The ideology provides the answer to all problems and a way to pursue both group and individual goals whether they be enlightenment, enrichment or power.  It’s striking how this thinking (the ideology is the solution to everything if its applied in such a way that it suits my needs) still provides comfort to those like Omar Hammami who routinely speak in the same narratives of  ideological panacea as the solution to solve their ruin and all problems.

by Clint

Looking Back At Perceptions Of Terrorism and Bin Laden

Two weeks ago, I launched the two year follow up to the Post Bin Laden survey to capture the collective assessment of al Qaeda and terrorism two years after the death of al Qaeda’s founder.  Thanks to all that have already voted and the polls are still open for anyone that would like to cast their vote. The more votes the better and your contributions will strengthen the analysis of they survey.  If interested, visit this link to vote and please forward to anyone that you think might be interested in voting.

Meanwhile, those new to the “Post Bin  Laden” surveys were curious what the results of past iterations looks like.  So, I decided to post a compilation of links to the results from the 1st Post-Bin Laden poll, the AQ Strategy 2011-2012 survey, the 2nd Post-Bin Laden poll, and the One Year After Bin Laden survey.

Here are the links to each of the results of these four surveys and I’ll be comparing the results of these previous iterations with the upcoming results of the “2 Years After Bin Laden” survey going on now.  Thanks for voting and here are the results from 2011-2012.

Results from the Bin Laden survey initiated on January 2, 2011:

Does Bin Laden Matter? (Jan. 2011)

Does Bin Laden Matter? Poll Results Part #1

Bin Laden Poll Analysis, Part 1b

Does Bin Laden Matter? Poll Results Part #2

Future AQ Attacks? More or Less

Results from two years ago, surveys launched immediately prior (al Qaeda Strategy 2011-2012 –  April 2011) and immediately after UBL’s death (May 2, 2011):

▪   AQ Strategy & Post UBL Poll Overview (Background Summary on Voters)

▪   Voters say Zawahiri 1 to 2 years from capture

▪   Chief Consequence of UBL’s Death

▪   AQ Leadership After Bin Laden

▪   Financial Impact on AQ Post Bin Laden

▪   AQ Donor Support Before & After UBL

▪   UBL’s Death & The Afghanistan Mission

▪   AQ Affiliates After Bin Laden

▪   AQ Affiliate Targeting Focus

▪   Crowd Considered AQ Central Top Affiliate After UBL’s Death

▪   Will AQ foreign fighters return home to fight?

▪   What will al Qaeda do?

▪   Keys to AQ’s Survival & Resurgence

▪   Western CT Main Efforts Against AQ

▪   Academics are confident – before & after Bin Laden’s death

▪   International Perspectives Increase Confidence

▪   Listen To Your Friends, Read Academic Publications, Build Your Confidence

▪  The Strength of al Qaeda’s Name: Stronger or Weaker?

Results from the “1 Year After Bin Laden” Poll initiated on May 2, 2012:

 

by Clint

Is Omar Hammami dead in Somalia? – Evaluating Information Sources

Yesterday afternoon, the twittersphere broke into a brief flurry over the fate of Omar Hammami. The claim retweeted across Twitter was that Omar was killed.  Hhhhmmm, I had wondered about Omar’s fate this weekend but the reporting seemed a bit strange.  Here is where I’ve tracked the sourcing for this claim and if anyone knows other/better sources for this claim, please post them in the comments below.

Source - MyPetJawa first detected it from a tweet which said “Ommar Hamammi, aka al-Amriki — America’s Jihadist in Somalia is dead, said Foud Shangole, al-Shabaab’s chief operation”.  All of the other tweets I followed seemed to go back to this source. Today, I’ve heard from some others that Bar-Kulan broadcast this claim. (Update 1600 May 8)

The claim from Bar-Kulan (Updated 1600 May 8) didn’t  seem to make sense so I decided to fall back on my training to make my bet on Omar’s fate.  When evaluating information sources, I was taught to examine these factors to assess validity and reliability.

  • Motivation – Why is the source providing the information? What does the source of the information stand to gain by disclosing the event? If its a news outlet, then its readers and having a scoop which leads interested persons to advertisers.  If its a political group or a terrorist organization, a myriad of options could be multi-fold. 
  • Competency - Is the source of the information sufficiently capable of knowing and/or understanding the information they are provided?  The Internet is filled with both competent and incompetent sources.
  • Process - How was the information acquired?  Through what process did the information get from its beginnings to me? Can I follow the chain of information to see how the source knows the information? This is where primary and secondary sources come into play.  In general, the belief is that primary sources are better than secondary sources.  However, as anyone that has ever watched local TV news interviews can tell you, there are lots of incompetent or problematically motivated primary sources.  Likewise, there can be secondary sources that more accurately correlate multiple primary sources and combine it with analysis to provide a more accurate perspective on events – I have a group of these knowledge ninjas I rely on.
  • Product - What type of information product is it?  How does the type of information product influence its validity as a source? The information came in as text, video, audio…are there pictures?  Depending on the event and the context, the type of information product may matter significantly to its credibility.
  • Performance History – What is the reliability and validity of information from this source over time?  Does the information source provide good information on a routine basis?
  • General validity – In the context of the issue, does the information source provide information that makes sense in the context of the event?

Based on these factors, here is my quick assessment of this source.

Source – Bar-Kulan (Updated 1600 8 May) or any Somali news outlet for that matter -

  1. Motivation – I’m guessing by the tweets that these accounts are more of the journalist type and that the motivation is getting a scoop out in the public.  Media outlets and scoops from the Horn in general tend to be highly unreliable…here’s a similar claim about Hammami’s fate from last year.  Also, the other tweets in this feed seem to be very focused on general Somalia issues and sometimes critical of the U.S. from what I can tell.  The goal is to drive traffic, not get it right.
  2. Competency – Bar-Kulan (Updated 1600, 8 May) seems to follow Somalia issues in depth but I don’t have any real evidence to know why this source is particularly informed on Hammami’s fate other than its an interesting news item for the time.  (Updated 1600, 8 May)
  3. Process – This is completely unclear.  Did Bar-Kulan (Updated 1600, 8 May) interview Shangole? How did he know this information?  Or is it just rumor?    But why wouldn’t Shabaab just put this information out from its own sources? This is a distant secondary source at best.
  4. Product – The product is text – no pictures, video, etc.  This doesn’t match with other claims that come from Shabaab who tends to use pictures for big events like this.
  5. Performance History – For this source, I have none.  If anyone knows the track record of original sourcing of Bar-Kulan (Updated 1600, 8 May), I’d be interested.
  6. General Validity – The claim does make sense since Omar himself tweeted that he was on the run, surrounded and in trouble.  But, I’d need a lot more detail to feel comfortable with the claim.

Assessment – I have no reason to put much faith in this claim.

Here are some of my other thoughts on these claims.

  • So if the source is Shangole, let’s say, why would Shangole want the information out?  To show Shabaab’s competence in defeating one of their adversaries? Doubtful, they’ve bungled the Hammami thing for a year.   But I would guess that if Shabaab were subtly putting this information out, it’s because they want to draw Omar back out and gain further justification for killing him and maybe see if he’s still in the area.
  • I won’t believe anything till I see pictures – Omar has survived a great many close calls. I would expect this event to be accompanied with pictures.
  • Omar’s status could still change at any minute – Reports from both Omar and the media suggest Omar is surrounded and on the run.  Even with my assessment below, he could be killed at anytime.  And, I’ve not heard anyone talk about the possibility that Omar could die from wounds suffered during the assassination attempt.  Omar was shot in the throat in rural Somalia and may be on the run.  That wound could easily get infected and cause some problems over time.  He would not be the first person in Somalia to die from complications related to wounds.
  • Why hasn’t the Shabaab crowd been going crazy on Twitter if Omar was killed?  I would expect the Shabaab supporters to be chiming in and especially the MYC in Kenya.  They’ve long been Omar haters.
  • Why hasn’t Afghani, Robow or Aweys come to save Omar? Omar has boasted about these three being anti-Godane and Afghani appealed directly to Zawahiri for removal of Godane.  Yet, these guys, if they support Omar, do it only behind the scenes.  Ohhh, Omar, are you wondering where you are in this Game of Thrones? If Omar bashes Godane in public on Twitter, he’s a useful pawn for Afghani, Robow and Aweys.  But, if these guys publicly back Omar, they could be in poor standing with both Shabaab and al Qaeda.  Likewise, if Godane kills Omar, well, that would prove the allegations of Afghani about Godane’s corruption.  So for Afghani, Robow, Aweys, “Omar lives – they win, Omar dies – they win.”  Omar, there is another option, you could come home and turn yourself in before being betrayed on both sides.
  • The better sourcing on Omar’s fate is coming from those that cover the area where he is seeking refuge – the Rahanweyn clan.  Specifically, the Raxanreeb.com website which covers events surrounding Omar’s trials and tribulations.  While I don’t trust any Somali news sources outright,  this article says that Omar’s assassination attempt has stirred up a ruckus around the area of Raama Caday, Somalia, which makes sense.  Supposedly Shabaab has tried to cut communications to the area and that would explain why Omar has been quieter.  This location would make sense as well in the context of Omar’s tweeting of being in Bay region, previously being in and around Merca, and Shabaab not being able to get militias from Gedo and Juba engaged to go after Omar. See the map below for what I think is a VERY rough estimate of the situation.  Take a grain of salt (or a bag of it) with everything I write.  But, this source would suggest Omar would be in a valid location, but a precarious one dependent on Rahanweyn protection and with few options.

So what is my take?  Well, if I had to guess, and the situation could change at any minute, I’d make the following guess on Omar’s fate as of now. (Taking a lesson from Nate Silver, I’ll make my prediction based on probabilities.

  • 75% chance he’s still alive – unless I see more signals and verification, I’m not believing he’s been killed.  I think Shabaab will be quick to take credit if they get him.
  • 20% chance he’s dead – whether he died yesterday or not, he’s still in an incredibly vulnerable position.  They’ve already tried to kill him a few weeks back, they could get him at any minute.
  • 5% chance Omar is and always has been part of a Zombie vanguard operating in Somalia. This would explain why he continues to escape death – he was never alive in the first place.

Here’s my crazy map below. My recommendation –  look for competent sources with access to the area highlighted in yellow as they will probably have the best information on Omar’s fate.  However, don’t just listen to me, use lots of sources, and tell me where I’m wrong, I’ll listen.

Slide1 Screen Shot 2013-05-05 at 5.47.48 PM

by Clint

Did Shabaab get Omar Hammami in Somalia?

When I last posted about Omar Hammami in Somalia, he had just tweeted that he had been shot in the throat by a Shabaab assassin. As I had mentioned,

If there is going to be a war inside Shabaab, I’m guessing it will happen soon.

Well, Omar went quiet on Twitter for a little while and from what I gather (could be a bit off on this since I don’t speak Somali), a Shabaab contingent surrounded the Rahanweyn village Omar was hiding in and turned off the cell tower to cut off communications around the area.  A few days later, Omar popped back up with a few new tweets describing the stand off between he and Shabaab and his run into the forest to escape Shabaab’s manhunt.  Again, Omar went quiet for a while before firing off these two tweets on May 3 and April 30.

Screen Shot 2013-05-05 at 5.47.48 PM

Omar suggests that Shabaab has lost the initiative, that the people of Somalia are on his side and that the Shabaab militias of Gedo and Jubba aren’t really interested in going into Rahanweyn territory and stirring up a ruckus.

Since May 3, no word from Omar.  So…

  • What happened to Omar? Did he escape Shabaab’s grasp yet again or are Omar’s tweets really just his hopes for protection, redemption and survival?
  • Are Shabaab’s militias really disobeying Godane? Shabaab has launched a couple of suicide bombing attacks on Mogadishu over the past few weeks but these have mostly killed civilians from what I gathered.  Is Shabaab’s indiscriminate killing of civilians and their hunting of Omar finally eroding Godane’s power?  Omar claimed in another tweet that many key Shabaab leaders are against Godane. But how would we know if this is true?

Screen Shot 2013-05-05 at 5.58.42 PM

I guess only time will tell…or maybe it won’t.  The Twittersphere has been quiet.  Will we hear from Omar again?