al Qa'ida Central Archives - Selected Wisdom

April 6, 2013 by Clint

Shabaab in Somalia publicly fractures & pressures al Qaeda

Well, I’ve been waiting for a year to see the outcome of Shabaab’s “Game of Thrones” and today a surprising public fracture emerged on the aljihad.com website. Ibrahim al-Afghani, a once senior leader of al Shabaab, close associate of Ahmed Godane and fellow member of Godane’s Isaaq clan, posted a public and direct call to Ayman al-Zawahiri asking him to intervene in Somalia and remove Godane as leader of al Shabaab.

Ibrahim al-Afghani’s public posting finally discloses the fractures I’ve been discussing for the past year. Omar Hammami, the American public relations arm for Team Robow (maybe should be renamed Task Force Robow/Aweys/Afghani), has provided ten reasons for Afghani’s public denouncement of Godane – a major development in Somalia. These are quotes from Omar’s tweets so if you don’t like the language, complain to Omar on Twitter.

”Dr. Ayman has to act fast and decisively b4 the jihad is destroyed and enters a deep dark tunnel”
“2 scholars are being threatened.”
“Muhajirs are being expelled and misused/mistreated.”
“Secret jails are off limits to observers.”
“Scholars and leaders can’t check on claims of torture.”
“Opportunities to open new outside fronts are purposefully neglected.”
“The wealth of islam is squandered by the amir.”
“There is no real shura and all the real actors are kept from benifitting the jihad.”
“kids w/good intentions are put in charge of op.s that go wrong and have negative fall out, &they are in charge of policing elders”
“the leader is responsible for the recent defeats and the loss of the previously unprecedented public/tribal support”

Interesting that Omar wrote these tweets in English. Why not Arabic? I’m guessing its to get word out to the West, but the solution he is seeking is not likely to come from the West. I love it that he calls some of the Shabaab members “kids”. Oh wise twenty-something Omar who joined terrorist group that betrayed him. Omar continued immediately after the above posts to assert why everyone should listen to Ibrahim al-Afghani:

Essentially, Omar explains why it must be Afghani and potentially not Robow that engages Zawahiri and brings the injustices of Godane to Zawahiri’s attention. Afghani was a Godane ally at one time, fought in Afghanistan, and comes from the same clan as Godane. Also of note, there were rumors of Afghani once replacing Godane as Emir of Shabaab. See this Critical Threats article for a longer but still short description about Afghani.

When reviewing my scenarios from last year, Scenario #1 appears to have flushed out as most accurate:

“Scenario #1: Godane kills off old AQ members & Robow affiliated foreign fighters”

Also of note are the two forces over the past year that signaled which scenario would prove most accurate:

Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys who showed movement towards scenario #1 last summer , and
Ibrahim al-Afghani who showed his hand today.

Here is an update to my crazy Powerpoint chart from last year. I haven’t been tracking Raage so don’t know his status or position. I’ve put “X’s” over the scenarios that no longer make sense from last year and noted the migration of Afghani to the Aweys and Robow side. In yellow is what I anticipate as the coalition against Godane as of today.

Here are some thoughts for today and I’ll have another update in the next day or so:

What does Task Force Robow-Aweys-Godane want Zawahiri to do? - Usually these things occur behind the scenes but this is a public call to Zawahiri. Omar has suggested that communications with al Qaeda have been going through AQAP and that AQAP has gone cold on them in recent months or communicated intermittently with Godane. This puts Zawahiri in an awkward spot. Zawahiri went for a merger with Shabaab that Bin Laden would not pursue. The main hope for al Qaeda now is in Syria and Somalia is a distraction. If Zawahiri leaves Godane in, he confirms his negligence in not dealing with the Hammami situation the past year and demonstrates his naivety about formally merging with Shabaab in the first place. Dr. Z must be scratching his turbin.
A public plea at this time isn’t such a brave move - If this public call from Afghani had come last summer, it would have been a brave move. But the Afghani call coming now, after Shabaab has gotten their ass kicked incessantly since the merger, isn’t particularly brave. Shabaab lost its most important city of Kismayo, which Afghani once commanded, and I imagine he and many others have little to command under Godane at this point. Loss of turf has also likely brought folks like Afghani, Hammami, and Robow closer together as they get squeezed into Bay & Bakool. Bottom line: If Shabaab were winning, how Godane governs would not matter.
Source in Somalia again prove suspect – A year ago, several sources said that Ibrahim al-Afghani was chasing Omar around and trying to kill him in Somalia. This now seems unlikely. Again open sources from Somalia prove not credible. No surprise.
The revelations of Omar Hammami – A year ago, when Omar Hammami posted his plea video, many thought it was an anomaly amongst Shabaab’s alleged rise after aligning with al Qaeda. However, his persistent presence on Twitter has brought him supporters, probably kept him alive and turned him from goat to glamor jihadi again. However, over the long run, Omar’s postings are a double edged sword for the jihad in Somalia and foreign fighter recruitment globally. If a Westerner is considering joining Shabaab or any AQ affiliate and witnesses the absolute mess that is going on publicly, they must be crazy to join – and unfortunately jihadi foreign fighters usually are crazy.
Discussions of money - As I have mentioned in previous posts about jihad in Africa, resources and money play an important role and as Omar outlined on Twitter, how money is handed out matters a lot to these guys. While Omar and these Shabaab splinters blanket themselves in ideological cover, underneath they are really concerned about their personal power and control of resources. Jihad in Somalia – “Show me the money!”

March 5, 2013 by Clint

More details on old al Qaeda dudes leaving Iran

For those interested in last week’s post about the recent revelations of Suleiman Abu Ghaith allegedly being the last old al Qaeda guy to leave Iran, Mr. Flaneur (@flaneuresque) provided some perspective on what has been going on with Ghaith in Turkey. Here is an excerpt of his comment (at this link) and make sure to check it out if you want some different perspective on why Ghaith landed in Turkey.

Abu Ghaith was brought to Turkey with an Iranian national and resided in a hotel in turkish capital, Ankara. Then he was left at the hotel -as far as I remember it was Sheraton Hotel- by the iranian national at the hotel room. After a while, he went out to find a place to eat something. The hotel is in close proximity to the Ankara’s fancy, luxurious neighborhood Tunalı Hilmi Avenue and there he was arrested by Turkish Intelligence Agency after a long surveillance…

March 1, 2013 by Clint

What’s with the old al Qaeda guys leaving Iran?

Last summer when writing an assessment of the state of al Qaeda, I concluded with a few thoughts on things to look for in the future. One of the questions I’ve had for some time is what happened to the old al Qaeda guys that sought refuge in Iran – a wild card scenario I did not want to forget about in 2012:

“The Iran wild card: For many years, rumors of Iranian involvement and maybe conflict with al-Qaeda have persisted. Some senior al-Qaeda leaders, most notably Saif al-Adel, have allegedly been in a strange state of house arrest or operational support in Iran. Iran has always been a sly state sponsor of terrorist groups, both Sunni and Shia. If tensions were to arise between Iran and Israel or the U.S., would Iran seek to sustain al-Qaeda as a proxy? Analysts deliberating this issue may provide invaluable insights in the near future. “

Recently, some movement of al Qaeda folks out of Iran has surfaced in open source media. The most important figure to allegedly take refuge in Iran was Saif al-Adel – the interim head of al Qaeda after Bin Laden’s death and a highly capable, former Egyptian military officer who has been an instrumental military commander for al Qaeda over the years. Vahid Brown provided an amazing story at Jihadica detailing how Adel was possibly exchanged in a prisoner swap between Iran and al Qaeda in Pakistan in 2009. If true, the movement of Adel back into Pakistan would be extremely valuable to an al Qaeda in short supply of veteran leadership.

More recently, Asharq al-Awsat reported that Bin Laden’s son-in-law and one time al Qaeda spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, had arrived from Turkey after leaving Iran. The report notes:

“Sources close to the Bin Laden family informed Asharq Al-Awsat that Suleiman is a Kuwaiti national and the husband of Fatima Bin Laden, who is currently present in Saudi Arabia. The source added that Suleiman had intended to seek political asylum in Turkey…..The source confirmed that Suleiman is the “final remnant” of the branch of the Bin Laden family that was being held under house arrest by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).”

Suleiman was last seen at an al Qaeda camp in Pakistan before heading to Iran.

“In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Al-Qaeda spokesman Suleiman Abu Ghaith was quoted as saying, “The actions by these young men who destroyed the United States and launched the storm of planes against it have done a good deed. They transferred the battle into the US heartland. Let the United States know that with God’s permission, the battle will continue to be waged on its territory until it leaves our lands, stops its support for the Jews, and lifts the unjust embargo on the Iraqi people who have lost more than one million children.”

Just this past week, the always insightful @abususu tweeted that Suleiman had in fact arrived in Kuwait – according to jihadi forums.

So what does all this mean?

Well it seems my Iran wild card fears of summer 2012 may not be worthy of much attention. If Suleiman was in fact the last al Qaeda member held by the IRGC, then, atleast on the surface, it would appear that Iran is not intending to use al Qaeda, a Sunni extremist group, as a strategic proxy against the West and Israel in the way that it backs other Sunni groups like Hamas.
I wonder if the release of Suleiman and other al Qaeda members has some connection to the emerging proxy battle brewing between the IRGC and al Qaeda linked al Nusra Front in Syria? I’m guessing there is no way to know but the recent movement of Suleiman is quite curious. Stays in Iran for more than a decade and suddenly decides to leave? What’s up?

February 13, 2013 by Clint

Kidnapping: Why Al Qaeda Needs Donations More Than Ransoms

Yesterday, the Foreign Policy Research Institute provided me another opportunity to post on their blog Geopoliticus. For this post, I did an extended discussion and update to a series of posts I did with Alex Thurston several years back regarding AQIM’s use of kidnapping in the Sahel. For the old discussions of AQIM & others’ kidnapping operations see these posts and Alex’s excellent insights at these posts – #1, #2, #3, #4 and #5.

In this new post, entitled “Why al Qaeda Needs Donations More Than Ransoms,” I discuss the trade offs and disadvantages for al Qaeda affiliates such as AQIM that are dependent on illicit funding schemes, namely kidnapping, to sustain their operations. I conclude with the opinion that al Qaeda needs donations more than ransoms if they intend to orchestrate a comeback. Here’s an excerpt of the post below and for the entire post, visit this link at FPRI.

“On the surface, kidnapping and smuggling appears an ideal financial engine for terror groups like al Qaeda and its affiliates. This assertion, however, ignores the inherent challenges encountered when any organization, whether terrorist group to criminal enterprise, undertakes illicit funding schemes. Kidnapping and ransom operations introduce significant transaction costs which significantly devalue the gross sum of revenues. Kidnapping operations create a series of internal costs for terror groups:

Networks Of Intermediaries - Negotiations and payments for kidnapping operations require layers of middlemen with each network extracting a percentage of the overall take.
Transaction Time - The time between hostage taking and ransom payments can be significant requiring the terror group to maintain a solid reserve of capital to sustain its operations between transactions. Essentially, time is money, and in the case of kidnapping operations, a cost to the terror group.
Hostage Deaths - The trauma of kidnapping and the harsh environments in which terrorist groups operate often result in the death of hostages. The death of a hostage hurts the terror group directly in terms of loss revenues. But, even more damage occurs indirectly as the hostage death erodes trust for future ransom negotiations.
Infighting - In any business, transactions often lead to conflict. This is particularly true in illicit industries where trust is constantly being questioned. Kidnapping negotiations naturally generate friction between intermediaries and when negotiations become protracted parties may turn to open conflict.
Declines in Hostage Availability - As groups like AQIM continue to kidnap hostages, the availability of hostages naturally declines requiring the terror group to operate at longer distances to acquire captives. This distance imposes significant logistical costs.
Undermines Terror Group’s Ideology - Inevitably, in illicit schemes and even licit enterprises, business gets messy and the terror group must make choices with regards to sustaining its resource flow. Often times, these choices result in alienation of a terror group’s local base of popular support or hypocritical conflicts of interest between the terror group’s deeds and its words. The recent accusations of Omar Hammami, an American foreign fighter who has fallen out of favor with al Shabaab, demonstrate how al Shabaab’s turning a blind eye to Qat distribution in Somalia for the purpose of taxation has called into question the group’s committment to al Qaeda’s ideology and Sharia law.
Opportunity Costs - When al Qaeda is dedicating more time, manpower and resources to illicit fund generation, they are spending less time recruiting and training new operatives, planning operations and executing attacks.”

Also, @el_Grillo1 made a point which I overlooked in the FPRI post. Another detractor of illicit revenue generation for al Qaeda groups is the scrutiny brought on terrorists by law enforcement and the military when they conduct illegal activities like kidnapping and drug smuggling. An important point that I overlooked in the FPRI post. Here is a quick chart I put together showing the relative value of illicit funds to donor provided dollars.

January 31, 2013 by Clint

Are today’s al Qaeda affiliates following Bin Laden’s vision?

Yesterday, I was given the opportunity to provide a guest blog post at the Foreign Policy Research Institute where I am a Senior Fellow. I wrote the post based on a quick look back at the Abbottabad documents released by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point in May 2012. In a few quotes from al Qaeda’s senior leadership, I wanted to reflect on what Bin Laden hoped for al Qaeda prior to his death and then compare this strategic thinking with what is currently occurring around the Middle East and North Africa.

Here is the introduction to the post and see this link if interested in reading the entire discussion.

The May 2011 raid killing Osama Bin Laden in his Abbottabad compound not only eliminated the world’s most notorious terrorist but also provided a unique glimpse into the strategic musings of al Qaeda’s leadership. The Abbottabad documents released in May 2012 reveal Bin Laden’s strategic recalibration as he witnessed the demise of his organization in Afghanistan and Pakistan while missing out on an Arab Spring that toppled many of the so-called “apostate dictators” he despised. All of the documents disclosed to the public reveal different aspects of al Qaeda’s operations. However, two documents in particular shed light on Bin Laden’s last thoughts on the future direction.

January 14, 2013 by Clint

Hammami’s Twitter War with Shabaab & MYC in Somalia & Kenya

This weekend saw the full scale escalation of a Twitter war between Omar Hammami (or at least the Twitter account associated with him) and most of the Muslim world. Here’s a quick recap of events.

On Friday, I left off with this note reference Hammami’s claims that he had gained some defenders from the Raxanweyn clan.

This account may not be Hammami and is just a propaganda machine uploading old pictures of Hammami and bashing Shabaab. (I don’t think so, but maybe)

Well Saturday morning U.S. time, Hammami answered this question posting this photo on the @abumamerican Twitter account.

Well, I guess that clears it up a bit. Hammami’s tweet after this picture says he is with other foreign fighters who have been outcast from Shabaab. This makes sense and may also suggest his Twitter account has been operated by a team of people with whom he is detained or closely affiliated. This might potentially explain the tendency to speak in the third person, occasionally tweet in Somali and Swahili languages, etc. What’s also interesting is the pattern of Hammami tweets. They come in bursts and endure only for a few hours before dropping off. This could mean several things such as only having limited power for communication before having to recharge, only being able to communicate before or after a guard shift, operating the tweets on a delay through a relay point, or only having cell coverage for certain periods of the day. Overall, I think Omar’s speaking in third person stuff is a bit ridiculous at this point. Lastly, who let Ali G join Hammami? He’s got some nice gear and a tough look. Nice!

Hammami suggests in his Twitter feed that he recently received some visitors and now may have some more folks to protect him. It also seems he may have been visited by a ‘Sheikh’, potentially form Kenya, who was trying to negotiate some sort of settlement or something. I may be confused on this. (I’m not sure why I would be confused since understanding terrorist infighting in 140 characters or less is so easy.)

Here’s a quick O.T.R. (Omar Tweet Rundown), noting where there is something interesting, significant or just generally funny.

Omar doesn’t like Godane - What’s glaringly obvious is that he does not like Ahmed Godane (Abu Zubayr) the head of al Shabaab. Omar claims on many occasions that Godane’s takfiri ways led to him excommunicating Omar & friends. In addition, Omar believes Godane is a sissy who never fights in battles and thus is not a true jihadi. (Tell me this is not typical Game of Thrones stuff!)

Screen Shot 2013-01-13 at 10.09.51 PM

Omar says that Fazul and old al Qaeda dudes never liked Shabaab – I’ve contended for a while that it was old al Qaeda guys aligned with Bin Laden, namely Fazul, that prevented the merger of al Qaeda and al Shabaab. Omar seems to suggest the same. I’m not sure how he would know this, but it’s interesting nonetheless.

Omar doesn’t like e-jihadi’s who talk the talk but don’t walk the walk – Omar displayed his frustration in the past about not getting much attention from al Qaeda’s online community. Omar amplified his view of al Qaeda’s online-only supporters this weekend and I imagine he will continue bashing e-jihadi’s until he gets their attention.

Omar thinks Omar is a big deal – Shabaab contended in December that Omar was a narcissist. Well, some of these tweets seem to suggest he is quite a diva. It also appears that he might have liked the show In Living Color as a kid, homie!

Screen Shot 2013-01-13 at 10.11.04 PM Omar says he escaped to Bay and Bakool region – As I assumed from his previous tweets about the Rahanweyn clan, Omar is in Sheikh Robow’s territory in Bay and Bakool.

Omar isn’t getting along with the MYC in Kenya – The Muslim Youth Center, a younger Kenyan extremist group aligned with al Shabaab, have really been sticking it to Omar on Twitter. Despite sticking up for Kenyans a good bit and warning Kenyans not to join Shabaab, Omar has been getting a lashing from those guys. (BTW, the MYC Twitter feed is way better than the Shabaab feed. Whomever mans the MYC Twitter account is using it way more effectively than @HSMPress – Shabaab account)

Screen Shot 2013-01-13 at 10.07.59 PM

Screen Shot 2013-01-13 at 10.10.22 PM

Lastly, Omar seems to be re-directing any of his supporters away from Shabaab and to other jihadi conflicts – namely Syria. One of the questions posed is here below. It seems Omar mistakenly believes that the infighting and conflict he’s found in Shabaab would be absent from the front in Syria. I think he needs to do some research.

My last point is for those analysts that maintain that al Qaeda Central or al Qaeda as a collective organization is ‘stronger‘. In light of the Hammami diatribes, how can this be? Do you believe a Bin Laden led al Qaeda would allow such a damaging, public dispute occur within its ranks? I know there have been rifts in al Qaeda before, but they were private and settled without tainting the organization’s foreign fighter pipelines. While I understand the perspective that certain al Qaeda affiliates may be getting relatively stronger, I do not understand, in light of the recent musings of Omar Hammami on social media, how one can believe that al Qaeda as a whole is stronger. As Omar suggested in previous tweets, al Qaeda may be having a schism of its own at the highest levels. At the lower ranks, where foreign fighters reside, Hammami’s enduring public bashing shows a loss of centralized control and awareness on the part of al Qaeda globally.

January 8, 2013 by Clint

Hammami’s Latest Call Reveals Deceit, Dissension and Death in Shabaab & al Qaeda

Yesterday, I posted about a Twitter account I believed to be that of Omar Hammami or his close associate (here and here). Well, Hammami didn’t disappoint and returned this morning with some tweets and this afternoon with all the real dirt about the al Shabaab fractures and al Qaeda merger/fiasco. Omar, thanks for sending all the details on al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s infighting and how you got pushed out by Godane (Abu Zubayr). You confirmed many of my suspicions from last winter. @Aynte was also thinking along the same lines as well. And for those that were claiming there was no evidence of splits in al-Shabaab, stop being foolish.
Here’s where the morning started off.

First, a tweet from Omar. I’m not sure how Omar’s mission in Somalia relates to Martin Luther King. Last time I checked, Martin Luther King was about non-violence and Omar and the Somalia jihad is very much about violence. I believe MLK had a dream and Omar is having a nightmare.

But, then came this tweet.

Now we are talking. Omar seems to think the splits and fractures he is experiencing with al Shabaab are occurring with al Qaeda as well. Omar, we’d all love to know more so please expand. I realize you don’t want to put yourself in jeopardy, but I think you’ve already shot one of your feet, so no need to hold back.

Things were quiet for most of the day and then @azelin sent out the links to a new Hammami video showing a tired and gaunt Hammami (See below). This video link at his YouTube channel was accompanied with two documents in Arabic (Here’s #1 and #2). Previously, Omar had posted his biography, in english, which was ignored by the e-jihadi crowd. This time he wrote two Arabic documents, which detail his trials and tribulations in Somalia. I’m assuming he chose Arabic to make sure word got out in the jihadi crowd. While I don’t read Arabic, I’ve gone through the Google translate and talked to a knowledgeable scholar, Dr. Will McCants, about what I think are key passages.

Omar names “names” and illustrates in great detail conflict between different factions in al Shabaab, conflict between al Qaeda and al Shabaab, and even disagreements between different al Qaeda elements in Somalia. Great stuff all around and for those that believe al Qaeda is unified and operates in lock step based on the rules of an all powerful ideology – you need to stop what you are doing and read Omar’s notes.

Again, I’m not an Arabic speaker, but I’ll do some quick paraphrasing here of what I interpreted (could be some mistakes) and the implications. For Arabic speakers out there, if you do an english translation of these documents, please post and send me the link and I’ll do a post on them here.

Connections between al Shabaab and al Qaeda in Yemen – In one section, Omar describes how members of al Qaeda in Yemen (AQAP) showed up in Somalia and were the communication conduit with al Qaeda Central in Afghanistan/Pakistan. The AQAP members were trying to coordinate the official merger of al Shabaab with al Qaeda. At the time, Ahmed Godane (Abu Zubayr) was against the merger as he thought the conditions in Somalia were not right yet. It seems at the point of the AQAP visit, Shabaab thought local public support for an Islamic state was sufficient but that the local populace would reject an alliance with al Qaeda. However, the foreign fighters present, in principle, did agree to be affiliated with al Qaeda. (My question: Did Godane balk at unity with al Qaeda at this point because he did not have firm control of al Shabaab and wanted to shore up loose ends before a formal merger?)
Desire to conduct external operations in Kenya – Throughout the second document, Hammami consistently discusses the desire by many within al Shabaab and particularly al Qaeda elements to begin conducting foreign operations and a deliberate campaign in Kenya. However, it appears certain leaders within Shabaab, particularly Godane I think, wanted to keep a lid on the foreign fighters and keep them focused on internal fighting in Somalia. (My question: Does the recent uptick in al Shabaab activity in Kenya represent a loss of control by Godane over Shabaab? I would assume with Shabaab’s losses and Godane likely fleeing north to Galgala, his control on those wanting to operate in Kenya is limited.)
Fazul’s return to Somalia, his conflict with Godane and resulting death – Omar describes in one section that legendary al Qaeda operative Harun Fazul returned with trainers to Somalia with the intent of establishing an external operations capability to project al Qaeda attacks from Somalia. Fazul told one of the commanders of foreign fighters, going by the name of A’sar Yusr, that he wanted to establish a training camp in the mountains of Puntland (probably Galgala). From what I understand, A’sar Yusr let Fazul’s plans slip to Godane (Abu Zubayr). Godane apparently didn’t like Fazul’s plan because 1) Godane, being from Hargeisa, didn’t want Fazul playing on his turf in Puntland (probably Galgala) and 2) Godane believed Fazul to be aligned with Mukhtar Robow (Abu Mansur) – Godane’s Southern Somalia rival for control of al Shabaab. As I understand it, this led Godane to plot Fazul’s demise setting Fazul up to approach a checkpoint in Mogadishu that was awaiting his arrival and prepared to kill him. (My note: This passage confirms Nelly Lahoud’s theory that Fazul was betrayed. This section also describes al Qaeda’s intent to conduct external operations from Somalia and matches the reporting of Michelle Shepard where she details how Fazul had plans for attacking London when he was killed.)
Conflicts between local Somali clan fighters (Ansar) and foreign fighters (Muhajir)- Hammami describes how many of the trainers that came with Fazul left Somalia. When they departed, many foreign fighters to Somalia left the country with the trainers to join al Qaeda’s ranks outside of Somalia. Hammami says the foreign fighters were frustrated because the fighting in Somalia was not a real jihad. Omar suggests foreign fighters were treated poorly in a variety of ways. As mentioned in his biography, he notes that there were constant tensions about how foreign fighters desired to be separated into their own cadres similar to how its done with Taliban/al Qaeda in Pakistan. There are also some comparisons to how foreign fighters are used in Iraq but I didn’t understand all of this. (My note: Omar, this is an exact replay of al Qaeda’s experience in Somalia from 1992-1994. The clans didn’t like being bossed around by outsiders and they always wanted to focus on local battles over global issues.)
Hammami overstepped with Godane and got punished – In one passage, Hammami describes his rift with Godane and how this has likely put him in his current predicament. Hammami had pledged at some point to stay out of Shabaab politics. Godane, at some point, wants to know why the foreign fighters are leaving Somalia. Hammami volunteers to explain the circumstances under which foreign fighters are frustrated over the local focus of clan fighters. Hammami suggests that a way to alleviate this frustration is for Godane to step aside and let Mukhtar Robow (Abu Mansur) take a bigger leadership role in Shabaab as he is well respected by the local Shabaab fighters and also has good rapport with the foreign fighters. Godane sees this as a challenge to his leadership and believes Hammami is partaking in politics again (breaking his promise to abstain) and joining the side of his rival Robow. This overstep later leads to Godane having angst with Hammami. (My notes: Omar needs a class in how to win friends and influence people. Sounds like he directly questioned Godane’s leadership and it wasn’t received well.)
Disastrous merger between al Shabaab and al Qaeda – My interpretation is that Godane calls a meeting for all of al Shabaab’s shura. Once everyone arrives, Godane announces that al Shabaab is going to officially join al Qaeda. Those in attendance, I believe, were caught a little off guard but were amenable. Then, Godane’s deputy (Guessing this might be Ibrahim al-Afghani) compels everyone to swear bayat (oath of allegiance) to al Qaeda and Godane. Those at the meeting think they have been fooled because there is no immediate formal recognition of this merger by al Qaeda Central and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Those that swore allegiance have a bad taste in their mouth about how this meeting went down as they have been told before they were going to be officially part of al Qaeda only to find out later that this was not true. Instead they would usually find out that a Somali leader had used the claim only as a political ploy to consolidate power. Also, Robow (Abu Mansur) is not at the meeting, which makes people nervous, and it is weeks (if I remember correctly) before Zawahiri formally and publicly recognizes the merger. (My note: It appears that Godane is a total Machiavelli in Somalia. Over many months, he systematically kills or pushes out those al Qaeda operatives in the country with connection to al Qaeda global, particularly after Bin Laden’s death. Once all connections to al Qaeda Central are removed, he uses his remaining connection to al Qaeda to push the merger forward and secure loyalty of other Shabaab leaders and establish sole communication and control with al Qaeda, which I imagine included resources. Total Game of Thrones going on with Godane, he sounds like a real dick! An additional note for all those that believe an oath to al Qaeda’s is a rigid everlasting and binding agreement that cements loyalty of al Qaeda members forever, please read this section. This totally undermines such a notion.)
Omar asserts that Godane killed off al Qaeda members and foreign fighters such as abu Talha, Fazul, Sudani and detained other foreign fighters – After the al Qaeda merger, Godane gave Hammami a figurehead position on a Shura but ultimately Hammami pushed back on the strategic direction of Shabaab landing him in his current predicament. Essentially, Godane used his linkage with al Qaeda to take firm control over foreign fighters in Somalia, focus all efforts on local power plays and suppress dissent. (My note: Bin Laden would not go with a Shabaab merger because he knew better and he had his aides in Somalia – Fazul. Zawahiri fell for the alliance with Godane, and in doing so is now aligned with a leader, Godane, and an affiliate, Shabaab, that killed off core members of al Qaeda. While I don’t think Zawahiri called for the killing of old al Qaeda vets like Fazul, he is negligent for not doing better intel in preparation for the merger.)

There are many other things in these documents and I just haven’t had time to go through it.

Other small things I picked up on:

Omar used his own money at some point to hire his own security and car to protect himself against Godane- Shabaab. (My note: this is when I would have broken with the group probably, like when they are trying to kill me.)
Omar explains how Shabaab deliberately discussed shifting back to Phase 1 guerilla warfare once Ethiopia and Kenya had fully invaded.

I’ll stop for now. And Omar, thanks for the information and feel free to send more. It appears you have resigned yourself to Shabaab and what appears to be a confrontation that will likely lead to your death. You don’t have to go that way. You’ve been betrayed by the group you joined. You could always turn yourself in and encourage those that might be considering a similar path to rethink their choice to join a terrorist group.

January 4, 2013 by Clint

Is al Qaeda ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’ after Bin Laden? Poll Results #11

The relative strength of al Qaeda remains a point of constant debate – a debate that grows more complicated each year as the definition of al Qaeda becomes ever more amorphous. Earlier this week, I kicked off 2013 with a quick survey question asking readers whether they believe al Qaeda is ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’ as compared to the time of Bin Laden’s death. I’ll post the results of the 24 hours of responses here below. But first, I wanted to show the results of this same question when asked on the first anniversary of Bin Laden’s death.

Starting on May 2, 2012 through July 2012, 197 people answered the following question.

One year after the death of Bin Laden, do you believe al Qaeda as a terrorist organization is ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’? (Use an definition of ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’ that you prefer)

Of the 197 votes cast, just over 75% of respondents thought al Qaeda was ‘weaker’ a year after the death of its founder. Interesting! The first chart here shows the percentage of each professional group choosing ‘stronger’ (blue) or ‘weaker’ (red). Here are some results that I found interesting.

Government Contractors were most likely to select al Qaeda is ‘stronger’. Why? I’m not sure.
‘Academia’, ‘Private Sector’ and ‘Students’ were all solidly of the belief that al Qaeda is ‘weaker’. What are they teaching in academia and how much are students influenced by their professors? May be just a coincidence, but I do wonder.

The following table has the results broken out by different demographic attributes. There were two results that were curious.

Those living in the DC-Baltimore corridor were more likely to say al Qaeda is ‘weaker’.
Those that have lived outside the U.S. and E.U. for two years or more were slightly more likely to select al Qaeda as being ‘stronger’. While the difference isn’t large, I do find it curious that those most traveled were more alarmed about a ‘stronger’ al Qaeda. I expected those with more travel under their belt to be less likely to believe al Qaeda is ‘stronger’.

Just this week, I reissued the same question that was asked on May 2, 2012. As of January 1, 2013, is al Qaeda ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’? Here are the results of the respondents that voted to date (and feel free to cast your vote now if interested, I’ll post an updated set of results in the coming days.)

While not a large sample, in the seven months since the first anniversary of Bin Laden’s death, there have been some significant changes in opinion with more believing that al Qaeda is ‘stronger’ than only a few months before.

Some were kind of enough to elaborate on their assessment during this week’s al Qaeda ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’. Here are some of the open responses.

– As the question notes, this answer depends somewhat on one’s definition of “stronger.” While I’m not sure that al-Qaeda is (necessarily) in a particularly strong position in terms of attacking the United States, that doesn’t really seem to be what most of AQ’s branches are focusing on right now. I’d say that the domestic strength and influence of the loose affiliation of regional AQ branches throughout MENA (AQIM, AQAP, Jabhat al-Nusra, ISI/AQI, etc.) is sufficient evidence that al-Qaeda is “stronger” in the sense that they are playing a larger role within MENA itself than they were at the time of bin Laden’s death.

– I think it is getting weaker, as an organisation in Af Pak region and stronger in the mid east, like Syria, Yemen, Libya and Egypt.. But these may be temporary fluctuations unless its ideology is defeated.

– I find this black and white question bullshit and not nuanced. There is no such thing as ‘al-Qaeda’. It depends, which branch or region you are talking about.

– Franchises are stronger or at least holding; AQC weaker but holding

– AQAP is still viable but I think AQ core is a thing of the past. Ideological figureheads maybe, but that’s it. That may be what some AQ core envisioned all along though, to be the vanguard of a movement – not the movement itself. E. g. Abu musab al Suri’s ideas.

January 3, 2013 by Clint

At the start of 2013, is al Qaeda ‘Stronger’ or ‘Weaker’?

Over the last several years, I’ve posted many survey questions at this blog. Most of these questions have focused on terrorism and specifically al Qaeda. In recent weeks, I’ve posted the results to several questions (here, here, here) from the “1 Year Post Bin Laden” survey which in many cases suggest that some still believe al Qaeda to be a threat and a growing one at that.

The next round of results from the “1 Year Post Bin Laden” survey will focus on voter perceptions of al Qaeda’s strength on the first anniversary of Bin Laden’s death. Before I posted these results, I thought I’d ask readers’ opinions on al Qaeda’s strength at the start of 2013, more than a year and half after Bin Laden’s death. So what do you think of al Qaeda in 2013? Cast your vote here, and in the next post, we’ll compare the results of the vote here with the results from last May (2012).

Create your free online surveys with SurveyMonkey, the world’s leading questionnaire tool.

December 26, 2012 by Clint

What is the primary affiliate of al Qaeda a year after Bin Laden’s death? Poll Results #10

From May 2, 2012 through July 2012, I asked a related question with respect to the relative strength of al Qaeda (AQ) affiliates. After asking each respondent whether al Qaeda affiliates were ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’ (see the results here), I asked respondents:

Which affiliate is the primary node of al Qaeda globally?

In total, 165 respondents selected a primary node of al Qaeda. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was the clear favorite on the anniversary of Bin Laden’s death. This seems unsurprising as AQAP was discussed profusely in the U.S. media during the May/June 2012 timeframe.

Here’s a chart showing the selections of voters this past summer.

Again, consistent with my break down of previous questions, I have shown the votes based on different demographic categories. Here are some that caught my eye.

’Government Non-Military’ voters were less likely to select AQAP and appear to believe AQ Central in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains the central node of al Qaeda.
Those selecting ‘Television’ as their primary source (note – a small group of voters), were more likely than any other demographic to select an ‘Emerging AQ in North Africa’ as the primary node.
Travel played an interesting dynamic in this vote. Those who have traveled outside the U.S./EU more than 2 years were evenly split between AQAP and AQ Central being the primary node of AQ. However, those that have traveled less than 2 years outside the U.S./EU selected AQAP at the same rate as the majority but were more diffuse in their selections beyond AQAP including the selection of al Shabaab at a rate of almost 10%.

Here are the results of all voters broken down by demographic group.

Selected Wisdom

Smarter Than The Crowd, Stronger Than The Individual

Category Archives: al Qa’ida Central