ISIS Rise After al Qaeda’s House of Cards – Part 4 at FPRI

My latest installment of the “Smarter Counterterrorism” series at FPRI was just released – “ISIS Rise After al Qaeda’s House of Cards“.  It took me a little while longer than I anticipated to get this post together as things have been changing quickly the past month.  Those breaking for ISIS and leaving al Qaeda’s network of affiliates have been significant.  Here is an excerpt of this latest installment where I propose three future scenarios of how jihadi groups might go in the future.

“The outcome from Zawahiri’s retribution has been surprisingly to ISIS advantage.  Rather than punishing ISIS and regaining authority over the global jihad, Zawahiri and al Qaeda may soon become the second largest jihadist organization in the world.  Angered by Zawahiri’s betrayal and admiring of ISIS commitment to pursue an Islamic state, what were once thought to be al Qaeda Central affiliates are openly declaring allegiance to ISIS emir Baghdadi.  As seen in Figure 4, jihadist groups across North Africa and the Middle East have switched allegiances largely along the lines of the Iraq 2003-2009 foreign fighter distribution from Figure 3 in Part 3.  While al Shabaab in Somalia has reaffirmed its support for Zawahiri and ‘Old Guard’ al Qaeda, the majority of contested affiliates have swung to ISIS’s favor. Ansar al Shariah in both Tunisia and Libya appear to be far more in ISIS camp. The younger generation of jihadis in AQAP/Ansar al Sharia in Yemen have sided up with ISIS (See Figure 6) even pushing at times in social media for AQAP’s emir al-Wuhayshi to shift his support from Zawahiri to Baghdadi –  I expected a transition, but this is occurring at a pace far quicker than I anticipated.  Zawahiri’s plan has backfired and his status has never been so diminished. “

An important note with this Part 4 on future jihad scenarios.  I do not believe that the al Qaeda affiliates and upstart jihadi groups are as structured in reality in the way the media and the West might have one believe.  These groups are morphing weekly and are populated with young twenty somethings who are also confused by Syria infighting.  Ultimately, these dopey young men may not always know or agree about what group they are in.  Omar Hammami had similar challenges after breaking with Shabaab.  I don’t think these groups are particularly well defined, are certain about their own membership and at the same time, many of these groups may not even exist in a year.  Old AQ affiliates and new upstarts are very malleable, so we shouldn’t get to hung up on exact organizational structure. Its more a swarm of like-minded subsets right now than well defined jihadi organizations.

Also, if interested in the graphics that were used in the FPRI post, I’ll post the scenarios from Part 4 here with a quick excerpt. Note, this is only part of the article from FPRI and only charts from Part 4.  If you would like to download a copy of these charts, just right click on the chart and it will open in this window or in a separate window so you can download them.

  • Updated Fractures Map – March 2014

First, I updated my fractures map from February and here is my new estimate of the situation amongst global jihad.  The big changes come from allegiances emerging within AQIM and I believe more allegiances between younger jihadis in Yemen.

Figure 4 alternate

  • Scenario #1: ISIS Replaces al Qaeda as the Global Leader of Jihad

The first scenario I offered in the article is ISIS running the table on al Qaeda and securing loyalty from the second generation of jihadis that fought in Iraq (See Part 3 here).  Here is a chart for what that future scenario might look like.

Figure 5 scenario 1

  • Scenario #3: Dissolving Into Regional Nodes

Another possibility is that all jihadi groups slowly move away from notions of global al Qaeda resulting in regional nodes which are still connected but with only light connections between all groups.  See Part 4 of the series for a full explanation.

Figure 7 scenario 3

 

Ansar Dine: When jihad goes local for reasons other than ideology

The New York Times released another article this weekend again questioning the ideological commitment of so called “al Qaeda linked” groups in Mali.  The post “Algeria Sowed Seeds Of Hostage Crisis as it Nurtured Warlord” describes how Ansar Dine leader, Iyad Ag Ghali, used religion as a means to reassert himself amongst his secular Tuareg rivals.

In late 2011, scholars say, he made a bid to become head of his Tuareg tribe — a position that would have put him at the forefront of northern Mali’s struggle for autonomy. When he was rebuffed, Mr. Ag Ghali struck out on his own and formed Ansar Dine, branding it as a religiously inspired alternative to the more secular Tuaregs.

A common mantra of Western CT pundits remains the argument that the U.S. will never be safe unless the evil ideology of Bin Laden has been removed from the planet forever.  This briefs well in DC as it makes Americans believe that terrorism can be eliminated if we simply solve one problem – that of bad ideology. However, this article rightly points out how this “hedgehog – one big thing” type thinking quickly falls apart when placed in local contexts.

Chasing a few hundred foreign fighters inspired by religious zeal from the vast, trackless area would be challenge enough. But the forces shaping the conflict are far more complicated than that, driven by personal ambitions, old rivalries, tribal politics, the relationship between militants and states, and even the fight for control of the lucrative drug trade.

Some gather from my blog posts and Twitter sarcasm that I believe ideology has no importance with regards to terrorism.  This is not the case.  I believe al Qaeda’s ideology is important at different levels for each group and individual based on their own context.  The combination of incentives groups and individuals receive from pursuing al Qaeda’s ideology varies considerably based on physical, economic and social contexts.  (See here and here.) I use a labor economics approach when I analyze terrorism because it allows for factors other than ideology to contribute to a recruit’s decision to work as a terrorist.  For Westerners, like Omar, joining al Qaeda groups rests largely on their belief in al Qaeda’s ideology and probably a host of psychological factors.  However, for African groups and individuals (much of what I blog about here), there are many factors contributing to a wavering allegiance to al Qaeda’s ideology (See Chapter 2).  In Africa, survival often trumps ideology resulting in malleable interpretations of al Qaeda’s ideology and Sharia. A recent example is Omar Hammami’s complaints over Shabaab’s passive allowance of Qat under Sharia – largely for the purpose of taxing the drug trade for revenue.

Screen Shot 2013-02-04 at 9.54.21 AM

Oh Omar, calling me a “kuffar”.  Thank you, you are too kind.

In conclusion, I do believe ideology matters but I don’t believe it should be overstated.  The importance of al Qaeda’s ideology in Africa, at least for the West, remains the targets it designates.  If AQIM/Ansar Dine/MUJWA, etc. didn’t support an ideology where the West was the primary target, I doubt the West would care much about African conflict in the Sahel.  Genocide has occurred in Darfur for years, yet the West never seriously mobilized to intervene.  However, nine months of perceived “al Qaeda linked” strength in the Sahel brought on a French intervention and Western support.  If militant groups like Ansar Dine didn’t support an ideology directly targeting the West, the West would probably ignore them and their issues – such is one of the motivations for pursuing terrorism according to Dr. Bruce Hoffman.

Last point of interest from this latest article on Algeria and Ansar Dine.  GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS everywhere please listen: 1) when you adversary’s ideology believes that your government should not exist (i.e. al Qaeda, its affiliates) and 2) they offer to negotiate for peace (i.e. Ansar Dine with Algeria, Pakistani Taliban with Pakistan), what the militant group is really saying is, “We want to negotiate with you, government, so that you will not interfere with us while we consolidate our resources and develop a plan to attack you!”

his men were in Algiers negotiating with the government, promising peace and signing agreements. This continued despite ample evidence that Mr. Ag Ghali had become a committed ally of Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb — Algeria’s sworn enemy — receiving arms, weapons, men and other material from the group.

Not-so-Ideological, al Qaeda-linked, Islamist Narco-terrorists on the run in Mali

The French intervention into Mali has forced the media to try and dissect the numerous militant groups operating in the Sahel.  Newscasters have no idea what to call the groups controlling parts of Mali.  Pundits and many news readers prefer to just call them “al Qaeda” as that’s a known brand quickly associated with the 9/11 attacks.

The straight labeling of all violence in the Sahel as al Qaeda gets really tricky, really quickly.  Some northern Mali militant groups don’t necessarily believe themselves to be al Qaeda.  However, this hasn’t stopped many an ‘expert’ from using Mali as another reason to call for once again “defeating the virulent, ideology of al Qaeda that continues to spread around the world, only then can we stop terrorism.” However, many of the so-called al Qaeda linked groups pontificated on by pundits appear less committed ideologically than one might expect. This past weekend’s New York Times article “French Capture Strategic Airport To Retake North Mali” describes how local Malians were none to impressed by the religious commitment of their visiting jihadis.

Boubacar Diallo, a local political leader, said that only a few rebel fighters came at first. Later, hundreds more joined them, overwhelming the Malian soldiers based here. He said he never saw them pray and scoffed at their assertion that they would teach the Muslim population a purer form of Islam.

“They say they are Muslims, but I don’t know any Muslim who does not pray,” Mr. Diallo said.

The article noted earlier that the backgrounds of the foreign fighters varied considerably amongst the AQIM splinter group – Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA).  (By the way, Andrew Lebovich has done an excellent breakdown of the groups in Mali at Jihadica see: AQIM, old GIA/GSPC, Blood Signers, MUJWA, Ansar al-Din.)

The rebels spoke many languages, the residents said. Some were light-skinned Arabs and Tuaregs, a nomadic people, while others were dark-skinned people who spoke the local languages of Niger, Nigeria and Mali.

Some analysts have been parsing the statements of these AQIM splinter groups in the Sahel looking for the smoking gun and direct ideological links that clearly reveal each of the militants in Mali as part of a global al Qaeda nexus. However, the labels placed on the fighters/militants rampaging through the Sahel change from daily. One man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist, one man’s terrorist is another man’s mercenary, another man’s mercenary is another man’s patriot, another man’s patriot is ……..I think you get the picture.

In my opinion, when it comes to the Sahel, focus on resources rather than ideology if one wants to know the direction of militant groups. As I discussed a year ago, the play for al Qaeda to conduct long-run recruitment in sub-Saharan Africa has come from buying local support through resource distribution in the near-term as a pathway to cementing ideological commitment to al Qaeda over the long-term.  Here’s a hypothetical diagram I posted last year of what I estimate the initial recruitment cost might be to gain an adherent in Africa; represented as a combination of tangible and intangible benefits.

recruitment

Here are some additional reasons why I believe AQIM and its splinter groups will have trouble sustaining their momentum over the long run.

  • RacismWhen I was doing research of al Qaeda’s initial forays into Somalia in the early 1990′s, it was interesting to see how condescending and elitist the Arab members of al Qaeda were to their African members.  In the Sahel, my impression is that the African clan/tribal groups, at least to this point, seem content to let Arab foreign fighters and folks from Algeria direct their operations.  However, in Somalia, as Omar Hammami can attest, the local clans have persistently been less than receptive to being bossed around by foreign al Qaeda leaders. In Sudan, Bin Laden paid Arab volunteers at a higher rate than he did African members and this wage discrepancy later led to Jamal al-Fadl embezzling from al Qaeda and betraying them as a witness for the Embassy Bombings trial.  It’s also important to note that when Zawahiri called in 2007 for international volunteers to support the jihad in Somalia, only a few answered the call and most were ethnic Somalis or Kenyans accompanied by only a trickle of Westerners and Arabs.  As Omar Hammami can tell you, answering that call turned out to be a bad decision as he has been expelled mostly for being a foreigner challenging local leaders. (Right Omar?) Today, I’m guessing most jihadi recruits are still more excited to join an Arab dominated jihad in Syria over a campaign in West Africa. So in the long-run, how long will local African tribes adhere to the guidance of their foreign masters while under pressure from the French?  I’m guessing not very long.  
  • Excessive violence alienates local populations – As of my writing this post, I’ve started to see reports of retaliatory violence by Malians against those who stayed in Timbuktu and became subservient to AQIM. I’m guessing this aggressive behavior likely comes in part as a reaction to the severe form of Sharia instituted by AQIM in North Mali. As noted above, the ideological commitment of these al Qaeda linked splinters (MUJWA, Ansar al Dine) appears low so the violence dished out on locals equivocates “Sharia” to “lopping off the hands of anyone that challenges the group or does something the group doesn’t like.”  Essentially, Sharia for locals in Mali feels a lot like the extortion of organized criminals, not enlightened ideologues.
  • Reliance on illicit revenues – While Belmohktar’s bold attack in Algeria likely generated needed attention and maybe appealed to a couple fanatical donors, AQIM and its splinters still really heavy on illicit financing to sustain their operations.  The Sahel is a difficult place to attract Gulf donor support and an even more difficult place to transfer donor funds.  Lacking a strong donor base and more restricted in their ability to conduct illicit financing after the French intervention, I suspect AQIM’s influence and ability to project will contract in the coming months.  This does not mean they won’t be able to conduct an operation, but I believe the pace of their efforts will have to scale down.

The Sahel Heats Up: AQIM, Algeria, Mali & France

The past few weeks I’ve been focused on the Horn of Africa, but the real story in terrorism has been occurring in the Sahel.  There is way too much to talk about in one blog post. However, I’ll make a few notes here about the current situation in West Africa.

  • Sahel Experts I Listen To – As I noted in a previous post about AQIM and the Sahel, these are the folks I would recommend listening to on this topic. Also, I’ve embedded a clip from @tweetsintheME with Wolf Blitzer on CNN down below.

In general, I turn to @tweetsintheME@themoornextdoorDr. Geoff Porter@tommymiles and @Hannahaniya to keep me informed on the daily fluctuations and insecurity of the Sahel and recommend their blogs and Twitter feeds to all those wanting to stay up to speed.

  •  Most Frustrating Media Analysis Thus Far – A consistent theme in the media thus far has been that the intervention to oust Qaddafi in Libya is the reason why there’s more terrorism coming from the Sahel.  Analysts taking this line imply that the West should not intervene to oust authoritarian dictators because unforeseen events might occur in the future that are bad.  I’m also guessing these same ‘experts’ next week will be bashing administrations for not yet intervening in Syria to help topple a dictator and end a humanitarian crisis.  These flip-flopping analysts love events like this where they can trace backward to past events as causes for current conflict.  However, I don’t remember many analysts saying that the Libya intervention would lead to instability and the rise of terrorism in Mali. Most were focused on the obvious instability that would come amongst Libyan factions after the fall of Qaddafi. In general, I can’t stand analysts that take this course as they can always find a reason not to do something and their ‘Loss Aversion’ leads policymakers to pursue inaction, which also has its second and third order effects as well. Let me think real quick, has there ever been a case where a policy of inaction went awry? Oh yeah, there were those attacks on September 11, 2001.  I could go on about this forever, but I won’t.  Bottom line: Extremist growth in Mali and the Sahel has been going on steadily back to at least 2008 and results from the confluence of many factors rather than just one factor.
  • How about France! – One of the things I’ve been most impressed with is France jumping into the fight executing an intervention in Mali on the same day they attempted a hostage rescue in Somalia.  The French took casualties in both operations, but they have stopped the march of militants southwest into interior Mali. Nice to see other countries taking action against terrorists to protect their own interests.  I’ll be interested to see how long they can hold out.
  • AQIM is the new epicenter of al Qaeda! (Or is it Yemen, Somalia, Syria?) – Media analysis of the situation and Mali and Algeria is absolutely hilarious.  I’ve seen several stories discussing how the Sahara is the new top Al Qaeda threat and shows the resilience of the network and the strength of the terror group.  Amazingly the same media outlets don’t appear to research any of their own reporting.  As has been discussed here, the story of Al Qaeda growth and strength repeats every few months.  Four months ago Libya was the center of attention. Six months before that it was Yemen. And three months before that it was Somalia.  Today, one hardly hears a peep about Somalia where Shabaab’s alliance with Al Qaeda has crumbled under the pressures of clan disputes.  And in Yemen, reporting has died down to merely a trickle.  So I am curious to see how long discussion will stay focused on the Sahara.

Today, the center of attention has moved away from France’s Mali intervention, though, and rests specifically on the hostage crisis at the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria.  This is a fascinating turn of events and leads me to several things to explore in the coming days.

  • The attack was prepared before the French intervention – I have to believe that Belmokhtar’s attack on the gas facility was prepared a significant amount of time before the French intervention. The interesting fact is that he likely prepared the attack and waited for the appropriate time to launch such that he could gain international attention and use it for his own purposes.  While this attack is significant, the timing of his next attack will be more important.  As noted in some excellent research back in 2011, its the pace of attacks, not the size of any single attack, that are indicative of a terror affiliate’s strength.
  • Mokhtar

  • Is the In Amenas attack as much about internal AQIM power plays than strategically attacking the West? – The focus for the most part has been on how the attack was spectacular and hit Westerners.  However, as was discussed here a few weeks back, maybe this attack by Belhmoktar represents his efforts to reclaim the throne as leader of AQIM.  See this post from a few weeks back.  Did Belhmoktar launch this attack in coordination with AQIM? I don’t know, but if he didn’t coordinate, this attack could be a power play for him to shore up support locally and fighters and resources globally.
  • Could Belhmoktar be the inspiring leader for al Qaeda’s next generation? – Last summer, I noted the following in a report “What if there is no al Qaeda?” -

Where are the most talented al-Qaeda veterans going? Today, analysts should seek to identify what path al-Qaeda’s most talented veterans are choosing to pursue. Al-Qaeda’s limited centralized control has likely encouraged some talented terrorists to move on to new groups. Knowing where these veterans go will be essential for anticipating future threats.

In the winter of 2011, I was deliberating as to the effect of al Qaeda losing its key international recruiters inspiring young people.

Who will lead al Qaeda’s next wave of radicalization? Al Qaeda needs a new inspirational messenger to ramp up its global radicalization and recruitment. Only a select few al Qaeda leaders have actually generated significant audience to radicalize many recruits. Three of al Qaeda’s most effective messengers, Bin Laden, Zarqawi and Awlaki, all blended a unique combination of competence and charisma to radicalize and inspire recruits.

So, is Belhmoktar, AKA Mr. Marlboro, the first new inspiring leader of a new generation of Salafi-Jihadi extremism?  He’s a bit weak on the ideological aspects, but he’s a veteran fighter with charisma and attacks under his belt.  I guess only time will tell.

Here’s the clip of @TweetsintheME on CNN.

 

 

 

Counterterrorism Across North Africa: Complicated, Messy but Moving Forward

This week, while everyone in the U.S. has been bickering about what happened in Benghazi more than 3 ½ months ago, counterterrorism operations have occurred across North Africa with the apprehension/battling of militants in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.  I’m not even going to get into whether these individuals are in al Qaeda or not, since the definition of “al Qaeda” is completely unclear at this point.  But, what is clear is that North African countries have seemingly made some counterterrorism gains against militants of one type or another.

(Note: Appears for the media and select Congressmen the current definition of al Qaeda is “all angry, armed men in Africa, the Middle East or South Asia that are not already a part of Hezballah or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.”)

Here’s a quick rundown on the latest developments.

Tunisia:

Brandon Darby reports that:

“Tunisian security forces arrested seven men for actively playing a role in the recruitment of Al Qaeda terrorists. The North African government claims to have completely dismantled the cell.”

While Tunisia led the way in the Arab Spring, they’ve always had an al Qaeda recruitment problem.  While most discussion of Iraq foreign fighters has focused on the boys of Darnah, Libya, I’ve always thought the Tunisian foreign fighter supply line to be more interesting. The rate of Tunisian foreign fighters revealed in the Sinjar records was quite high and a main facilitator to Iraq was a Tunisian – “Abu Omar”.  See here for a breakdown of the 2007 records by a) country and b) city.   According to Darby, the arrests in Tunisia were close in proximity to Algeria and related to Benghazi – whether its Ansar al-Sharia, al Qaeda or both is unclear.

Algeria:

According to AllAfrica.com, the Algerian government arrested Salah Gasmi, AKA Salah Abou Mohamed near Bouira, Algeria.  Gasmi is allegedly:gasmi

“responsible for the terrorist group’s propaganda and the co-ordination of the various small groups operating in Kabylie. A computer and communications specialist by profession, he is the suspected mastermind of the 2007 suicide bombings in Algiers.”

This arrest follows a string of other alleged interdictions in Algeria in recent months:

“This security operation follows another carried out November 18th on the border between the provinces of Tizi-Ouzou and Bejaia (east of Algiers) in which three terrorists were killed. They included the head of AQIM’s military committee, who was also a member of its committee of dignitaries.

This dangerous terrorist, Makhfi Rabah (aka Cheikh Abdenacer), a former member of the Armed Islamist Group (GIA) had been actively sought since 1992.”

So why is Algeria, now, suddenly so mobilized to interdict AQIM?

Libya:

Lastly, Juan Cole describes an interesting scene in Benghazi – one that resembles the “Old West” cowboy days of the U.S.

Last Saturday, Benghazi security forces loyal to the elected government in Tripoli, captured a man they suspected of being involved with the groups behind the violence. (in Benghazi) And, he appears to have been willing to spill the beans. So let’s call him the Libyan Deep Throat.”

Wow, this would be a major development for the U.S., and yet I haven’t heard a peep about it in the U.S. media.  Cole continues:

“Deep Throat is so knowledgeable about the conspiracies facing the city and so dangerous to those hatching them that the latter immediately attempted to spring him from jail.”

Cole describes a fascinating series of jailbreaks and shootouts in Benghazi and I encourage all those truly interested in Libya to take a read.  While the veracity of the news report Cole cites is unknown, which he points out in his post, the alleged detainee may have spilled some interesting beans on Benghazi’s militant landscape.

“So what is Deep Throat saying? According to local journalist Mohamed Bujenah of the Libyan Herald, a senior figure in the Benghazi police told him that the informant had fingered as many as 7 prominent Muslim fundamentalist leaders in connection with these attacks, of whom the police named 6 explicitly:

1 Sufyan Ben Qumu, from the notoriously radical town of Derna, and a former prisoner at Guantanamo

2. Ahmad Bukatela, leader of the Ubaida Militia

3. Muhammad al-Zahawi, head of the Ansar al-Sharia militia

4. Muhammad al-Gharabi, a leader of the Rafallah al-Sahati Militia

5. Ismail Sallabi, another leader of Rafallah al-Sahati

6. Salim Nabous, head of the Zawiya Martyrs’ Brigade

It is just a newspaper article. We don’t know if the informant actually named these individuals or if he did so to escape torture, in which case we can’t trust what he said. But if the allegations are true, there is collusion among several hardline militias in the city to create instability in hopes of taking it over”

Only time will tell if these claims are true, but what is certain from this past week, counterterrorism actions across North Africa are in high gear.  So why all the counterterrorism energy and coordination now?  Terrorists have been operating in these countries for years, and this week each of these countries has undertaken significant actions.

AQIM Fractures: New Leaders & New Money in the Sahel

For several weeks there has been rumbling of  al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) fragmenting in the Sahel.  This morning, All Africa reports:

Former Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir Mokhtar Belmokhtar (aka “Laaouar”) quit the group to assemble his own band of suicide bombers in northern Mali. …The Algerian terrorist (real name Khaled Abou El Abass) reportedly left AQIM after his demotion as head of the El Moulethemine katibat (“Brigade of the Veiled Ones”)

It appears Belmokhtar wants to create his own terrorist group, which I imagine will compete with AQIM for recruits, turf, weapons and money.

The new terrorist group “is headquartered in the Malian city of Gao, which is under the control of Islamists from the Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), an offshoot of AQIM”….Through the creation of the new group, Belmokhtar wants “to help to consolidate Sharia rule in northern Mali, where armed Islamists are enforcing Islamic law very strictly after having driven the Malian army out in the spring,” the French daily added… Belmokhtar will finance his activities “including the purchase of weapons” by “specialising in the kidnapping of Westerners, whom he usually frees in return for large ransoms”.

So why would Mokhtar, a long-time leader of AQIM, break from the group that according to ‘Western analysts’ is becoming so strong?  Much of the recent counterterrorism analysis I have read suggests that ransoms from kidnappings, foreign fighters moving to the Sahel, weapons from Libya’s collapse has all led to unity and strength in AQIM.  But is that the case, the All Africa article suggests something different.

“One of the reasons for this dissent is the disagreement between these leaders over how to share the ransoms paid for the release of Western hostages,” said Abdalahi Ould Ahmed, editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper Chouhoud….”As the organisation has grown and incorporated fighters of different origins, conflicts of interests have become increasingly frequent,” he added….Journalist Hamid Fekhart argued that “Droukdel’s decision was motivated by the unruliness of his junior, who is thought to have been gunning for him over the past few months. Security sources say that the supreme leader, who tried in vain to bring Mokhtar Belmokhtar to heel, simply decided to relieve him of his duties as part of a bid to reorganise AQIM.”…Fekhart noted that his successor, thirty-six year old Abou El Hammam, was reportedly “behind the kidnapping of an Italian-Burkina Faso couple in the Sahel in December 2010″.

Well, it looks like more money and fighters has led to more conflict than unity in AQIM.  Analysis suggesting more of any one terror group input (Weapons, money, fighters, etc) will lead directly to a stronger collective whole (AQIM) naively ignores the one thing that is most difficult to quantify and analyze: Human nature.

Concurrent to recent discussions of the rise of Shabaab (February-ish 2012), AQAP in Yemen (May-ish 2012) and then AQIM (Summer-ish 2012) has been the notion that al Qaeda’s ideology continues unabated, stronger than ever, and remains a binding tie that overides petty disputes within the terror group over leadership and resources.  GARBAGE! Ideology and money go hand-in-hand for al Qaeda.  Money without ideology turns AQ affiliates into little more than organized criminal groups.  Ideology without money, over time, renders al Qaeda nothing more than a poorly resourced cult drowned out by better financed Muslim Brotherhood affiliated organizations.  As Gregory Johnsen noted in his book on AQAP, what separated Bin Laden and al Qaeda from other militant groups was that:

“Bin Laden talked less than others, but he planned more.  And he had something no one else had: money.”

In June, I argued that the al Qaeda of 9/11/2001 really does not exist today.  One of the reasons I pushed this theory arises from the new state of acquisition and allocation of resources amongst al Qaeda affiliates.  Across al Qaeda’s global footprint, decentralization has led to there being more incentive for affiliates to compete than cooperate.  With Bin Laden’s death, donors spread their funds more diffusely and local affiliate illicit revenue schemes must increase. Ultimately, this change leads to al Qaeda affiliates with waning allegiance to al Qaeda Central.  As I noted in July,

As money transfers shift, influence, authority and strategic direction will drift.

For counterterrorists, Belmokhtar’s defection will hopefully prove to be instructive.  How do we replicate the conditions that led to Belmokhtar’s creation of a competing terror group?  In some cases, infrequent but well calculated drone strikes on key AQ leaders, I believe, can be very effective.  However, I think in the end it might be subtle, indirect actions that help exploit these factors.  What if the French or Germans were to only pay kidnapping ransoms to one leader of AQIM as opposed to another?  Could we use the unfortunate action of having to pay ransoms as a method/opportunity for creating dissension in the ranks of a loosely formed al Qaeda coalition?  Maybe.

Chaos in the Sahel: AQIM, Ansar al Dine & Others

I’ve been slow to discuss the fascinating turn of events in the Sahel in recent months.  Mali, considered by some a great hope for democracy in West Africa, has fallen to pieces in a combined resistance effort from the Tuareg rebellion and AQIM affiliated groups heavily-armed by weapons proliferating from the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in Libya.

In general, I turn to @tweetsintheME, @themoornextdoor, Dr. Geoff Porter, @tommymiles and @Hannahaniya to keep me informed on the daily fluctuations and insecurity of the Sahel and recommend their blogs and Twitter feeds to all those wanting to stay up to speed.  However, I’m reading a group of interesting articles and analysis to get a better handle on the situation.  Here are some of my general thoughts and recommended readings linked in each section.

  • Thankfully young AQ upstart/affiliated groups haven’t read How to Win Friends and Influence People. Much like the Taliban in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Ansar al Sharia in Yemen and al Shabaab in Somalia, Ansar al Dine has decided to make a harsh environment, Northern Mali, even harsher by instituting a tyrannical form of Sharia governance.  A refugee quoted in The Washington Post notes:
    “First they ordered women to cover up. Then they ordered us not to enter the market,” said Yatara, a food seller, her voice rising. “ I could not make money to feed my child. This is against our traditions. This is against the Islam we know.” So what’s Ansar al Dine’s endgame, if it is not to win popular support?  Here’s another quote: “There’s no work, no food. And they are restricting our freedoms,” Maiga said. “Why should we stay?”  Strategically, for Ansar al Dine, I can’t understand what is to be gained by seizing and holding Timbuktu only to destroy some Islamic shrines, displace all the residents and stunt the economy – which was likely a source for Ansar al Dine to generate operational funds.  I would hope residents of Northern Mali and competing groups will soon stand up to this group.  We’ll see as the land holds little value for refugees to return to.
  • Geography matters: Ansar al Dine is “out in Timbuktu” after all.  Some have begun speculating about whether Ansar al Dine is building a terrorist safe haven comparable to what is occurring in Yemen.  At this point, I’m skeptical as the center of the Sahara is a harsh geography from which to operate.  Westerners often speak unflatteringly about places difficult to reach as “being way out in Timbuktu”.  This isn’t just a joke!  Timbuktu is a harsh geography; a difficult place to project terrorism, generate revenue, resource operations, and attract recruits.  Sure, terrorist attacks can be generated from here, but it’s not the easiest nor best safe haven for executing global terrorism.
  • Impacts of no detention policy – Two weeks back I discussed the progressive limitations placed on U.S. counterterrorism policy and the implications of these decisions.  Well, again the lack of a detention and extradition policy/program has come to haunt the U.S.  This past weekend, Mauritania, for reasons I can’t grasp, reportedly released Mahfouz Ould al-Walid (alias Abu Hafs al-Mauritani) al Qaeda’s Grand Mufti and one of the remaining AQ senior leaders with some connection back to Zawahiri and AQ Central in Pakistan.  Again, a U.S. counterterrorism “Partner” has released a key prisoner.  Much like we’ve seen in Yemen with prison escapes and AQAP strengthening, I expect al-Mauritani has or soon will join AQIM in the Sahel and strengthen the groups connections with other AQ affiliates, provide some leadership and potentially inspire some recruitment.  Bad news all around, begging the question about how the U.S. works with CT partners moving forward.  If the U.S. can’t detain AQ operatives, U.S. partners can’t detain operatives, and drones are bad, what should the U.S. do?  Train and equip partner armies and militias?  Oh yeah, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative?  Right.
  • Great Info Map of Current Sahel: Lastly, I saw this post at the Arabist, which shows an excellent map from Monde Diplo diagramming current Sahel related activity.  I’ll repost it here.

 

Protests & Foreign Fighter Records

I’ve written in the past about foreign fighters and their choice to be either a ‘Martyr’ or ‘Fighter’ upon arrival in Iraq.  I’ve argued that ‘Fighter’ recruits have a higher tendency to return to their source country while ‘Martyr’ (suicide bombers) recruits do not intend to return home for obvious reasons. My theory is that ‘Fighter’ recruits come from cities and neighborhoods with a history of local rebellion and a culture of resistance.  I glanced at Figure 4 (below) and noticed that the largely ‘Fighter’ countries were Algeria, Yemen, and Tunisia.  Interesting that these three countries have had significant protests recently.  Meanwhile, the largely ‘Martyr’ countries (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Morocco, Syria) have seen little to no protests.

I don’t think the protests have anything to do with foreign fighters.  Instead, I think the protests once again illustrate those countries with an internal propensity for rebellion (‘Fighter’ countries) and those countries with particularly oppressive security environments (‘Martyr’ countries).

The good news-protests have begun to change the political landscape in North Africa. The bad news- countries experiencing protests likely have experienced foreign fighters from Iraq poised to derail democratic efforts.

More AQIM Kidnapping in the Sahel

A 56-year old Italian woman was kidnapped in Southern Algeria.  Andrew Lebovich provides a good overview of this most recent Sahel kidnapping.  Andrew notes that the initial kidnappers may have been cigarette or drug smugglers that then turned the hostage over to AQIM.  I noted in an earlier post that the kidnapping supply chain is one of opportunity more than strategy.  If you are European and float into the Sahel, then someone will likely try to kidnap you.  After that, the kidnap victim floats to the highest bidder, which appears to be the most capitalized organization; AQIM.  Whether the kidnappers are initially AQIM or smugglers, I don’t know and am not sure that it matters.

Alex Thurston posted a really excellent analysis on the options for dealing with kidnapping. He describes the pros and cons of five different options and ultimately settles on a hybrid of all of them.  Alex’s discussion is really good and I encourage all interested in the kidnapping debate to check it out.  Ultimately, I am still of the opinion that Westerners should be advised not to travel to the region under any circumstances and that no ransom should ever be paid.

I respect Alex’s points on development and extending military capacity in Mali, Niger, and Mauritania.  However, the West has tried economic development and government capacity improvement in the Sahel for fifty years without success.  Military capacity strengthening can also turn into militia arming or warlord development.  With the U.S. engaged and trying to solve problems in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now North Africa, I don’t see how the U.S. could execute a large-scale coordinated effort in the Sahel.  If there is any progress to be made, I think the Europeans must lead as they know the terrain and its their people that are being kidnapped.

Foreign Fighter Terrorism: Worry about ‘Fighters’ more than ‘Martyrs’

The Sinjar records served as human resources files for al Qaeda in Iraq.  Much like any job, al Qaeda recruits provided all sorts of biographical information and answered recruitment questions upon arrival in Sinjar. One data entry from the Sinjar records that I initially overlooked was the question: “Work”.  Over time, I realized this response may be the most significant data point in the Sinjar records.

In this question, incoming recruits were asked what role they wanted to play in al Qaeda in Iraq.  The responses mostly consisted of two distinct answers: ‘Fighter’ or ‘Martyr’.  Occasionally, an oddball (less than 1%), would respond with “media specialist” or some other random task.  An important note about this data point, the “Work” selection is quite likely influenced by group think and recording error.  For example, recruits that arrive together likely respond in a similar fashion to this question or are lumped together by the data recorder.  However, deviation in foreign fighter recruit responses remains quite significant despite this potential error.

Differences between the two main responses forecast strategic terrorism implications for the West.  For those that chose ‘Martyr’, the connotation is simple: “I want to be a suicide bomber.”  For those that choose ‘Fighter’, the message morphs to something more complicated: “I’ll fight the infidel, but if I survive, I’ll probably head home or to another safe haven and ultimately fight again somewhere else.” While ‘Martyr’ recruits are tactically devastating, ‘Fighter’ recruits have far greater strategic impact.  Only poor performing ‘Martyr’ recruits survive the battlefield but high performing ‘Fighter’ recruits are more likely to head back home (equipped with skills and combat experience) and become the thread for future jihadi campaigns at home or in the West.  See the below table.  Moroccan, Libyan and Saudi foreign fighter recruits were far more likely to choose ‘Martyr’.  Meanwhile, Algerian, Yemeni and Tunisian foreign fighter recruits were more likely to choose ‘Fighter’.

Recently, we have seen significant growth in two affiliated al Qaeda groups:  Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  The 2007 Sinjar recruits told us what was to come.  In 2008, Algeria and Yemen were the top two locations for terrorist attacks outside of Iraq and Afghanistan (See Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut).  These same two countries had the largest percentage of ‘Fighter’ recruits to Sinjar in 2007.  It’s quite likely the return of ‘Fighter’ recruits to their hometowns in source countries that helped spearhead the expansion of these two al Qaeda affiliates.

Analysis of the “Work” responses by country suggests al Qaeda recruits likely come from two different recruiting environments and radicalization processes. ‘Fighter’ recruits, from towns in Algeria and Yemen, likely arise from neighborhoods with a long history of rebellion. Young men tend to follow in the footsteps of their fathers, brothers, uncles, and friends; continuing long histories of fighting colonial and internal government repression.  The attraction is tradition, social acceptance, and honor.  Meanwhile, the ‘Martyr’ recruits, from towns in Morocco and Saudi Arabia, may be more influenced by messages of religious fulfillment or fame.  These recruits might be more repressed socially and seek their own purpose in the world.  Ironically, Moroccans and Saudis also showed greater propensity to access terrorist websites than other countries (See Foreign Fighters: How are they being recruited?) suggesting that attractive martyrdom messages distributed via the web might be more influential  in these locations. Ultimately, I haven’t done enough research into this Internet hypothesis to test its validity but I’d be interested to see what Internet Haganah thinks about this based on his cross-country data.

I believe there is a different recruitment process between these two groups: ‘Fighter’ and ‘Martyr’.  The implications of this difference suggest 1) future terrorism is likely to arise from ‘Fighter’ recruits and 2) countering recruitment in the Middle East and North Africa probably requires two different messaging strategies depending on the flashpoint city and its propensity to produce either ‘Fighters’ or ‘Martyrs’.

Countering terrorism from foreign fighters- Key Finding #2 from the Sinjar Records- Focus on ‘Fighter’ recruits more than ‘Martyr’ recruits.  Recognize different recruitment messaging for these recruits depending on their source country.

If I were an analyst in Afghanistan today, I would be examining all recent foreign fighters trying to identify the ‘Fighter’ recruits and where they came from.  They are likely to be the strategic vein of al Qaeda inspired terrorism for the next five years.  The Turkish and German recruits may be the most scary of this lot.  More to follow on this.