Category Archives: AQ Strategy

by Clint

Looking Back At Perceptions Of Terrorism and Bin Laden

Two weeks ago, I launched the two year follow up to the Post Bin Laden survey to capture the collective assessment of al Qaeda and terrorism two years after the death of al Qaeda’s founder.  Thanks to all that have already voted and the polls are still open for anyone that would like to cast their vote. The more votes the better and your contributions will strengthen the analysis of they survey.  If interested, visit this link to vote and please forward to anyone that you think might be interested in voting.

Meanwhile, those new to the “Post Bin  Laden” surveys were curious what the results of past iterations looks like.  So, I decided to post a compilation of links to the results from the 1st Post-Bin Laden poll, the AQ Strategy 2011-2012 survey, the 2nd Post-Bin Laden poll, and the One Year After Bin Laden survey.

Here are the links to each of the results of these four surveys and I’ll be comparing the results of these previous iterations with the upcoming results of the “2 Years After Bin Laden” survey going on now.  Thanks for voting and here are the results from 2011-2012.

Results from the Bin Laden survey initiated on January 2, 2011:

Does Bin Laden Matter? (Jan. 2011)

Does Bin Laden Matter? Poll Results Part #1

Bin Laden Poll Analysis, Part 1b

Does Bin Laden Matter? Poll Results Part #2

Future AQ Attacks? More or Less

Results from two years ago, surveys launched immediately prior (al Qaeda Strategy 2011-2012 –  April 2011) and immediately after UBL’s death (May 2, 2011):

▪   AQ Strategy & Post UBL Poll Overview (Background Summary on Voters)

▪   Voters say Zawahiri 1 to 2 years from capture

▪   Chief Consequence of UBL’s Death

▪   AQ Leadership After Bin Laden

▪   Financial Impact on AQ Post Bin Laden

▪   AQ Donor Support Before & After UBL

▪   UBL’s Death & The Afghanistan Mission

▪   AQ Affiliates After Bin Laden

▪   AQ Affiliate Targeting Focus

▪   Crowd Considered AQ Central Top Affiliate After UBL’s Death

▪   Will AQ foreign fighters return home to fight?

▪   What will al Qaeda do?

▪   Keys to AQ’s Survival & Resurgence

▪   Western CT Main Efforts Against AQ

▪   Academics are confident – before & after Bin Laden’s death

▪   International Perspectives Increase Confidence

▪   Listen To Your Friends, Read Academic Publications, Build Your Confidence

▪  The Strength of al Qaeda’s Name: Stronger or Weaker?

Results from the “1 Year After Bin Laden” Poll initiated on May 2, 2012:

 

by Clint

What is the state of al Qaeda & terrorism two years after Bin Laden? Vote Now!

Two years ago, Osama Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan marking one of the most significant milestones in the history of terrorism and counterterrorism. Two and a half years ago, I began conducting surveys to assess what the impact might be if Osama Bin Laden ever met his demise.  These surveys have since become an annual assessment I generate to gauge public perceptions of the threat of al Qaeda and terrorism in general.  While Bin Laden may be gone, terrorism continues and the past year has demonstrated how terrorist attacks might manifest themselves in a variety of ways from Benghazi to the Boston Marathon bombing.

Today, I’m launching the fifth iteration of the al Qaeda Strategy/Post Bin Laden Survey.  Thanks to those that have participated in versions #1 – Does Bin Laden Matter - Jan.2, 2011, #2 – AQ Strategy 2011-2012 - April 27. 2011, #3 – Terrorism Post-Bin Laden – May 2, 2011, #4 One Year After Bin Laden- May 2, 2012. You can find the results at this link which hosts the results of past surveys.

This poll is shorter and a bit different than past surveys.  Realizing there have been changes in terrorism, I opened the questions up a bit to include new emerging trends.  However, I did repeat some questions verbatim so we can see how our collective thinking has changed over time.

Thanks in advance for contributing to the survey. And anyone is welcome to participate – the more votes the better the results. I’ll begin posting the results and comparisons with past data sets in a few weeks.  Here is the link to the survey if you would like to open it in a separate window: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/2yearsafterBinLaden

And if you would like to just take the survey here, I’ve embedded it in this post.  Thanks for taking the survey!

Create your free online surveys with SurveyMonkey , the world’s leading questionnaire tool.

 

 

by Clint

Strange “al Qaeda in Iran” supported plot disrupted in Canada

Yesterday, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) arrested two men for plotting to attack the VIA rail line between Canada and the U.S. That two men would be plotting an al Qaeda type attack isn’t surprising. Nor is it surprising that the RCMP would arrest them only a week after the Boston Marathon bombing.  I imagine any agency investigating terrorism right now that has any credible threat does not want to be sitting on their hands waiting to see if their subjects will speed up their terrorist planning in copycat style.  No one wants to be part of the counterterrorism investigative element that has an attack occur immediately following the Boston Bombing.  I’d guess we’ll see lots of rapid disruptions after Boston.  To the public, don’t freak out. When you see these arrests and disruptions, its more CYA (Cover Your Ass) than increased threat – the threat is relatively constant over time.

The curious part of the Canadian arrests was the al Qaeda connections were not with any familiar al Qaeda affiliate.

Assistant RCMP Commissioner James Malizia, the officer in charge of federal policing operations, said the plot was supported by “Al Qaeda elements in Iran.”  He also said that Al Qaeda provided “direction and guidance” to the alleged plot….”Current and former US officials said that the group, known to US investigators as the Al Qaeda “Management Council,” was kept more or less under control by the Iranian government, which viewed it with suspicion.”

Iran? Yes! Occasionally, I’ve discussed here at this blog the uncertain nature of al Qaeda’s position and role in Iran. Last summer, I wondered about an al Qaeda wild card in Iran.

“The Iran wild card: For many years, rumors of Iranian involvement and maybe conflict with al-Qaeda have persisted. Some senior al-Qaeda leaders, most notably Saif al-Adel, have allegedly been in a strange state of house arrest or operational support in Iran. Iran has always been a sly state sponsor of terrorist groups, both Sunni and Shia. If tensions were to arise between Iran and Israel or the U.S., would Iran seek to sustain al-Qaeda as a proxy? Analysts deliberating this issue may provide invaluable insights in the near future. “

But then just last month I had posted about the apprehension of Suleiman abu Ghaith, an old al Qaeda member seemingly expelled from Iran this year.  After this apprehension, I was thinking:

Well it seems my Iran wild card fears of summer 2012 may not be worthy of much attention.  If Suleiman was in fact the last al Qaeda member held by the IRGC, then, atleast on the surface, it would appear that Iran is not intending to use al Qaeda, a Sunni extremist group, as a strategic proxy against the West and Israel in the way that it backs other Sunni groups like Hamas.

Today, I’m not sure what to think.  But I do have lots of questions:

  • What was the Iranian State’s involvement in the AQ direction from Iran?  - Iran denies any involvement and I kind of think they probably had no involvement. But, maybe this is an underhanded proxy that Iran has decided to start leveraging.  I have no idea but will be interested to hear what surfaces.
  • What al Qaeda members are still in Iran? – The open source belief has generally been that Ghaith was one of the last al Qaeda guys hiding out in Iran. There are rumors of Saif al-Adel but as I referenced before, Vahid Brown had noted there may have been a prisoner swap some years back.
  • Why did al Qaeda choose to go through Iran to coordinate the attack planning? - My guess is that al Qaeda’s senior leaders in other locations may be too bogged down and monitored to effectively reach out to potential operatives in the West. So, maybe Iran is one of those places where al Qaeda thought they could slip by Western CT and coordinate a plot?  If that was their thinking, I guess they are wrong.
  • What’s with Canada? - In recent months, Canadians have been popping up all over in terrorism related issues.  Two Canadian attackers at the In Amenas attack in Algeria, recruits to al Shabaab in Somalia, now this.  What is the deal Canada? We here in the U.S. enjoy taking your best performing actors and singers, but not your terrorists.

 

by Clint

Shabaab’s betrayal of Omar Hammami – In English this time!

After being frustrated by the Arab world ignoring his revelations about the bad behavior of Shabaab in Somalia, Omar Hammami posted an English version of his demise via a Twitter link today.  In January, I suffered through some miserable Arabic translation nightmares to write the post “Hammami Reveals Deceit, Dissension and Death in Shabaab and al Qaeda!“, but now all can read of his demise and betrayal by al Shabaab in the English version at this link.

Back in January, Omar hoped to reach the Muslim world and maybe al Qaeda by publishing his latest troubles in Arabic hoping to appeal to that audience – since his previous YouTube calls for help broadcast in a mix of English and Arabic fell on deaf ears in the Arab World.  Again, it appears Omar’s Arabic revelations from January didn’t find much audience amongst al Qaeda’s mainstream.  However, Omar’s American audience, despite this being Omar’s home country which he despises, has read and paid attention to Omar’s plight.  In January, Omar didn’t seem thrilled about myself and others in the West reading his Arabic pronouncements.

Screen Shot 2013-01-11 at 9.08.40 AM

But today, it appears Omar has changed his tune, reaching out in English this time.  Omar so desperately wants an Arab audience, but maybe he’s realized his biggest audience is in his native country.  Here’s some clips from Omar’s English version of the document.

On Godane (Abu Zubayr):

As for Abu Zubayr’s entrance into the whole affair, well, his background is a bit unclear because he was in Pakistan during the days of the Russian occupation and no one knows with certainty if he really participated in the Jihaad or if he just sat in Peshawar.

On Somalis and their distrust of al Qaeda:

history has proven that the Somalis generally do not want any influence from al-Qaa’idah or foreigners in their internal affairs.

On al Qaeda fomenting fractures with Shabaab as much as Shabaab creating fractures between local Somali (Ansar) vs. Foreign Fighters (Muhajirs)

It is here that I blame the brother s from al-Qaa’idah to some degree (and I mean Abu Talhah as-Sudaani, Abu ‘Abdallaah, Fazul, and an-Nabhaan) because, despite have pure intentions (as we see it, but Allaah is their Reckoner), there developed a sense of competition between them and the brothers of the Salaah ad-Diin camp.

Al Qaeda’s shift to focus on Kenya as anticipated in this document here in 2007:

Eventually, and probably because of such divisiveness, the brothers from al-Qaa’idah went to Ras Chiamboni to focus on training Kenyan Somalis to do outside operations.

On al Qaeda’s lack of strategy in Somalia:

Here I don’t know what to say about the actions of the brothers from al-Qaa’idah. They split up amongst themselves without executing any real strategy.

and on this one, I have nothing to add.  See the closing of the document….

And it seems I was duped by the slogans and the pretty words, and I hadn’t yet learned the realities,

by Clint

Shabaab in Somalia publicly fractures & pressures al Qaeda

Well, I’ve been waiting for a year to see the outcome of Shabaab’s “Game of Thrones” and today a surprising public fracture emerged on the aljihad.com website.  Ibrahim al-Afghani, a once senior leader of al Shabaab, close associate of Ahmed Godane and fellow member of Godane’s Isaaq clan, posted a public and direct call to Ayman al-Zawahiri asking him to intervene in Somalia and remove Godane as leader of al Shabaab.

Ibrahim al-Afghani’s public posting finally discloses the fractures I’ve been discussing for the past year.  Omar Hammami, the American public relations arm for Team Robow (maybe should be renamed Task Force Robow/Aweys/Afghani), has provided ten reasons for Afghani’s public denouncement of Godane – a major development in Somalia.  These are quotes from Omar’s tweets so if you don’t like the language, complain to Omar on Twitter.

  1.  ”Dr. Ayman has to act fast and decisively b4 the jihad is destroyed and enters a deep dark tunnel”
  2. “2 scholars are being threatened.”
  3. “Muhajirs are being expelled and misused/mistreated.”
  4. “Secret jails are off limits to observers.”
  5. “Scholars and leaders can’t check on claims of torture.”
  6. “Opportunities to open new outside fronts are purposefully neglected.”
  7. “The wealth of islam is squandered by the amir.”
  8. “There is no real shura and all the real actors are kept from benifitting the jihad.”
  9. “kids w/good intentions are put in charge of op.s that go wrong and have negative fall out, &they are in charge of policing elders”
  10. “the leader is responsible for the recent defeats and the loss of the previously unprecedented public/tribal support”

Interesting that Omar wrote these tweets in English.  Why not Arabic?  I’m guessing its to get word out to the West, but the solution he is seeking is not likely to come from the West.   I love it that he calls some of the Shabaab members “kids”. Oh wise twenty-something Omar who joined terrorist group that betrayed him. Omar continued immediately after the above posts to assert why everyone should listen to Ibrahim al-Afghani:

Screen Shot 2013-04-06 at 5.20.17 PMScreen Shot 2013-04-06 at 5.20.06 PM

 

Essentially, Omar explains why it must be Afghani and potentially not Robow that engages Zawahiri and brings the injustices of Godane to Zawahiri’s attention. Afghani was a Godane ally at one time, fought in Afghanistan, and comes from the same clan as Godane.  Also of note, there were rumors of Afghani once replacing Godane as Emir of Shabaab.  See this Critical Threats article for a longer but still short description about Afghani.

When reviewing my scenarios from last year, Scenario #1 appears to have flushed out as most accurate:

“Scenario #1: Godane kills off old AQ members & Robow affiliated foreign fighters”

Also of note are the two forces over the past year that signaled which scenario would prove most accurate:

  1. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys who showed movement towards scenario #1 last summer , and
  2. Ibrahim al-Afghani who showed his hand today.

Here is an update to my crazy Powerpoint chart from last year. I haven’t been tracking Raage so don’t know his status or position.  I’ve put “X’s” over the scenarios that no longer make sense from last year and noted the migration of Afghani to the Aweys and Robow side.  In yellow is what I anticipate as the coalition against Godane as of today.

Slide1

Here are some thoughts for today and I’ll have another update in the next day or so:

  • What does Task Force Robow-Aweys-Godane want Zawahiri to do?  - Usually these things occur behind the scenes but this is a public call to Zawahiri.  Omar has suggested that communications with al Qaeda have been going through AQAP and that AQAP has gone cold on them in recent months or communicated intermittently with Godane.  This puts Zawahiri in an awkward spot.  Zawahiri went for a merger with Shabaab that Bin Laden would not pursue.  The main hope for al Qaeda now is in Syria and Somalia is a distraction.  If Zawahiri leaves Godane in, he confirms his negligence in not dealing with the Hammami situation the past year and demonstrates his naivety about formally merging with Shabaab in the first place. Dr. Z must be scratching his turbin.  
  • A public plea at this time isn’t such a brave move -  If this public call from Afghani had come last summer, it would have been a brave move.  But the Afghani call coming now, after Shabaab has gotten their ass kicked incessantly since the merger, isn’t particularly brave.  Shabaab lost its most important city of Kismayo, which Afghani once commanded, and I imagine he and many others have little to command under Godane at this point.  Loss of turf has also likely brought folks like Afghani, Hammami, and Robow closer together as they get squeezed into Bay & Bakool.  Bottom line: If Shabaab were winning, how Godane governs would not matter.
  • Source in Somalia again prove suspect – A year ago, several sources said that Ibrahim al-Afghani was chasing Omar around and trying to kill him in Somalia.  This now seems unlikely.  Again open sources from Somalia prove not credible.  No surprise.
  • The revelations of Omar Hammami – A year ago, when Omar Hammami posted his plea video, many thought it was an anomaly amongst Shabaab’s alleged rise after aligning with al Qaeda.  However, his persistent presence on Twitter has brought him supporters, probably kept him alive and turned him from goat to glamor jihadi again.  However, over the long run, Omar’s postings are a double edged sword for the jihad in Somalia and foreign fighter recruitment globally.  If a Westerner is considering joining Shabaab or any AQ affiliate and witnesses the absolute mess that is going on publicly, they must be crazy to join – and unfortunately jihadi foreign fighters usually are crazy.
  • Discussions of money - As I have mentioned in previous posts about jihad in Africa, resources and money play an important role and as Omar outlined on Twitter, how money is handed out matters a lot to these guys.  While Omar and these Shabaab splinters blanket themselves in ideological cover, underneath they are really concerned about their personal power and control of resources.  Jihad in Somalia – “Show me the money!”
by Clint

Foreign Fighters: How are they being recruited?

Tonight I was invited to participate in 16 x 9′s live blog for their upcoming news program “Why North Americans Are Joining Terrorist Organizations?”  I believe the documentary will be online Sunday night.  While the live blog was fun, it was difficult to summarize my thoughts on al Qaeda recruitment processes, which I believe vary considerably between Western countries and the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia.  So for those interested in some discussion on foreign fighter recruitment processes, here’s some analysis I did in 2008 entitled “Foreign Fighters: How are they being recruited?”  You can get the entire pdf at this link and here’s a brief summary from the conclusion:

Certainly, official AQ members at times directly initiate recruitment in North African and Middle Eastern countries. Occasionally, individuals self-radicalize and independently seek out the greater jihad, possibly using the Internet for ideological indoctrination and communication with facilitators. However, both of these scenarios represent only a portion of foreign fighter recruitment. Most North African and Middle Eastern foreign fighters are instead recruited through social, family and religious networks empowered by former foreign fighters who catalyze the radicalization process. These local networks are efficient, built for the community and adaptable to local conditions. Such networks are difficult to create in either a hierarchical AQ Central (top-down) or a self-selecting (bottom-up) system.

An alternative foreign fighter recruitment model might reflect all three patterns described above. My hypothesis for future research estimates that global foreign fighter flow consists of roughly the following:

–Self-selecting (bottom-up) recruitment accounts for 10 -15 percent of global foreign fighter recruitment. These self-recruits consist largely of second and third generation Muslims and converts to Jihadi doctrine based in Western countries, the majority of which reside in the EU. Their increased Internet access and propensity for militancy help radicalize them locally before moving through select intermediaries to more formal networks. These individuals are inexperienced, untrained and often a liability to the larger AQ movement as their conduct may stray from AQ’s global message, and their operational and security mishaps endanger the group. However, their access to Western targets and their propaganda value remain a coveted prize for AQ and a worthwhile risk.

–AQ hierarchical (top-down) recruitment accounts for an additional 10 – 15 percent of global foreign fighter recruitment. AQ, under intense pressure from Western military and intelligence, expends effort to specifically recruit individuals that maintain valuable skills in weaponry, media, operational planning, finance and logistics. These recruits pose the greatest threat globally as their knowledge, skills, and experience create hallmark AQ attacks and maintain organizational coherence. While self-recruits are dangerous due to their access, these direct recruits are dangerous due to their ability.

–Former foreign fighters embedded in family, religious and social networks in flashpoint North African and Middle Eastern cities produce between 60 and 80 percent of global foreign fighter recruitment. Jihadi veterans and their networks are the center of gravity not only for al-Qa’ida but also for decades of Jihadi militancy. These communities are motivated not only by militant ideology but by their perceived oppression from the West economically and politically, frustration over Palestinean-Israeli conflict, and the influence of Western values on their culture. High foreign fighter producing communities sustained the Afghan jihad during the 1980’s, provide for current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will be the thread for future militant efforts at the close of current conflicts.

 

by Clint

New Season of Shabaab’s Game of Thrones in Somalia: Hammami’s re-ascension?

A little over a year ago, Andrew Lebovich and I published a short article detailing the plight of Omar Hammami amongst al Shabaab’s Game of Thrones in Somalia.  In this March 2012 piece Lebovich and I made several hypotheses:

  1. Hammami’s plea reflected serious divisions inside Shabaab with Ahmed Godane (Abu Zubeyr) on one side and Mukhtar Robow on the other, likely supported by Sheikh Hassan Aweys.
  2. AQAP was an important conduit to Shabaab.
  3. Shabaab’s leader Godane killed off old Al Qaeda members, namely Fazul, in his attempts to consolidate power in Somalia and become the single conduit with al Qaeda.
  4. Zawahiri overreached officially aligning with Shabaab and entangled al Qaeda with an ally plagued with internal dissension.

Thanks to the revelations published by Omar Hammami, these hypotheses all seem to have some merit, although some evidence is suspect or unconfirmed.

Beginning last May, Omar Hammami began a public campaign to keep himself alive in Somalia.  Unable to leave Somalia and suppressed by Godane, Omar’s long-winded initial English biography revealed his belief that Godane’s Shabaab leaders were killing off dissenters in the ranks and in particular foreign fighters supporting Shabaab.

However, Omar’s initial biography left out some key details and only when he resurfaced via his Twitter account (@abumamerican) did we learn from his Arabic biography how Godane adeptly played the game of Somalia’s “Game of Thrones” securing his leadership position by killing off foreign fighters and excluding Robow from key meetings such as the oath of allegiance to al Qaeda.  In January’s Arabic supplement, Omar dropped all the dirty details of the rift between local fighters and foreign fighters and the pseudo-imprisonment of he and his band of banished foreign fighters.  Omar hit the Twittersphere again in January to both bash Godane’s Shabaab and sustain his public presence making it more difficult for Godane to rub out Hammami – a messy situation for a Shabaab in decline and an al Qaeda that has overreached.

Shabaab initially tried to ignore Hammami’s chatter.  When Omar continued the public bashing, Shabaab took to discrediting him via a glossy product. This only emboldened Omar and finally opened the flood gates for Shabaab haters and Shabaab supporters to go full force into battle on Twitter ending and subverting the censorship imposed on al Qaeda forums when Omar defected a year ago.  Two months ago, Omar appeared alone and isolated in his fight against Shabaab’s stalwart supporters.  However, Shabaab dissenters have grown publicly in recent weeks and Omar appears to be fully engaged in a four-language Twitter battle against Shabaab (English, Swahili, Arabic, Somali).

Here’s my quick recap of recent proceedings.  This is a quick and dirty breakdown, not all encompassing.

Team Omar’s Position:

  • Omar claims to be living with the Rahanweyn clan and living somewhere in Bay & Bakool provinces.
  • Omar and his allies on Twitter chief complaints with Godane and Shabaab are:
    • Godane has taken Shabaab off the path of true jihad and created divisions between the local Shabaab (Ansar) and the foreign fighters (mujahidin).
    • Permitting of qat usage and sale are against the tenets of Sharia; Shabaab apparently does this for the purpose of taxation and revenue generation.
    • Godane forces taxation on people that should be exempt.
    • Godane mismanages Shabaab politically, militarily and economically and is responsible for the group’s retreat.
    • Godane doesn’t take the input of other key Somali jihadi leaders like Robow and Aweys into account when he governs.
    • Godane imprisons those that challenge his decisions (often times foreign fighters) and those with money that potentially could challenge Godane’s authority.
    • Godane has a henchmen, maybe named Dahir, who does Godane’s dirty work acting as the internal policeman snuffing Screen Shot 2013-04-03 at 11.22.04 AMout dissent.
    • Omar uses the reasons cited on Twitter to justify pausing his violent jihad. Omar cites Koranic and historical justifications for quitting jihad when its not pursued justly.  Team Omar claims that Robow and Aweys would share this view – although this may not be evident publicly.
    • Omar has gained support from others on Twitter, enough that he is taking questions for debate on a second tier jihadi forum aljihad.com.  Two months ago this would seem inconceivable, but in some weird way, Omar’s banter has rallied some that share his feelings.
    • In conclusion, Omar insists that there will soon be a revolution underway internally and that the right leadership will come back to take control of the situation in Somalia and return Shabaab to prominence – or something like this.  This seems to be more bravado and wishful thinking than concrete plan but we’ll see.

On the Team Godane/al Shabaab side, they continue to attack Omar and his disciples.  Their chief lines of attack and allies are:

  • Omar is a narcissist that cannot stay in line because of his own glory seeking.
  • Omar exaggerates his battle prowess, importance in Shabaab, skills as a military tactician and took credit for a rap he did not write (the last one Omar admits to) – see this post here for summary.
  • Omar and anyone that uses Twitter is a CIA or MI-6 spy and should be imprisoned or killed.
  • Shabaab’s key allies on Twitter seem to be fellow members of Godane’s Isaaq clan, the Muslim Youth Center (MYC) in Kenya and a handful of ethnic Somali foreign fighters from abroad.
  • When Shabaab can’t get traction attacking Omar on his points about jihad, they go after his Americanism and family – yeah that’s right, they go with “Yo Mama” jokes, a key tactic of hardcore terrorists – I guess.

Omar has been boasting about an impending revolution in Somalia where the Mujahidin take back control of jihad from Godane’s influence.  And today, Omar posted this:

Screen Shot 2013-04-03 at 11.19.22 AM

Does this tweet represent more bolstering and bragging or an actual coup in Shabaab’s ranks?  One of the reasons Omar’s support as grown is that Shabaab under Godane has been in retreat.  If Shabaab were ascending rather than descending, Omar would likely be alone in his complaints.

I’ve also wondered some other things:

  • Did al Qaeda, either Central or in Yemen, intervene to quell this divide?  After a year of disaster in their relationship with Shabaab, maybe some key AQ folks stepped in to mend this public dispute.
  • Has Robow re-established his own communications channel back into al Qaeda?  A communication sufficient to gain their support for overtaking Godane?
  • Is Hammami really just the public spokesman for a Robow coup in Shabaab?   This is a “Game of Thrones” after all.  Maybe Hammami is just the public mouthpiece eroding Godane’s credibility in return for protection provided by the Rahanweyn clan?

Stay tuned for the next season in Shabaab’s “Game of Thrones”.

by Clint

Insightful new al Qaeda document (Talked about) in Germany

I meant to post on this last week, but for those that might have missed it @abususu has some details on a new al Qaeda document that has been declassified talked about in Germany (Sorry, a modification as of 1200 EST. @abususu says its not publicly available but people have seen it).  The U.S. provided the document to the Germans in support of their prosecution of Abdeladim el-K. Yassin Musharbash always provides excellent analysis of al Qaeda and his post here is one of the most informative things I’ve read in a while.  Great reporting by Yassin – he has been out in front on the story of German prosecutions for several months.

Here are some of the pertinent details Yassin describes (but please check out the original post as it is worth the read):

-The document is a letter by Junis al-Mauretani to Osama Bin Laden, dated March 2010. It is 17 pages in the original Arabic.

-The reason the US shared this particular document with the Germans is that in it, al-Mauretani refers to a Moroccan recruit whose date of birth he gives – and which is the same as the date of birth of one of the defendants in said trial.

-In essence, the letter is a sketch or rather a vision of a comprehensive plot against the West, including maritime, economical and other sensitive targets. There is a certain emphasis on critical infrastructure, as al-Mauretani singles out water dams, underwater gaspipelines, bridges between cities and tunnels connecting countries, as well as internet cables as potential targets.

- He also claims that there is a process in place by which followers would be asked to enter into sensitive jobs, e.g. in the transport business for oil and gas. By this, he suggests, it could become easier to attack targets like airports, love parades (sic!) and highly frequented tunnels.

This document sheds light on the cause for concern in 2010 when there were numerous news reports about a potential attack.  From Yassin’s notes, it would seem that al Qaeda was also a bit afraid to create many civilian casualties.

Here are some of the more fascinating bits Yassin mentions in his analysis:

-There is also an interesting passage in which he claims that AQIM has enough funds to help finance his ideas and that the cadres there trust him personally.

So in 2010, the word on the street was that AQIM, of all affiliates, had the money to finance operations.  Sure, the kidnapping ransoms were significant, but maybe we should be asking where else they were getting their money from in 2010? and now?

 2.- AQ during that time actively recruited Westerners - even from among other Jihadist groups like the IMU. I think this means that they wanted this to be large and comprehensive effort – probably sending all of them back around the same time but not striking immediately but rather asking them to recruit even more people and then lie down until told to act. Al-Mauretani in several cases made sure there would be secure means of communications.

One of the notions I’ve heard repeated in analysis on al Qaeda is the group’s supposed conduct of wide-scale direct recruitment.  I disagree with this notion (as I discussed in 2007).  While al Qaeda does direct recruit specific individuals at times, more routinely they use feeder affiliates and other terror groups to parse out many of their most promising recruits.  This system of minor league terrorist farm teams allows mauretanial Qaeda to keep their distance from new recruits that appear too eager or potentially risky and provides a method for assessing the recruit’s abilities before assigning them a role.  Likewise, it provides al Qaeda a larger set of recruitment options from which to choose better talent. This system flourishes when the group situates securely behind an insurgent safe haven allowing them to pluck key people ideally suited for certain roles from pseudo-terror/definite-insurgent groups like IMU, Shabaaab, Ansar al-Sharia, etc.

Essentially, insurgencies allow for the development of terrorist farm teams where recruits then arrive in al Qaeda’s camp with some training, experience and vetting minimizing al Qaeda’s costs and exposure while maximizing their options.  Two things sustain al Qaeda’s position in this hierarchy as the major league team: ideology & money.  While the West is ill-equipped to erode the ideology of zealots, in the future, the West could work to stifle AQ’s resource allocation - something that proved decisive (but lightly discussed) during al Qaeda’s more recent setbacks in Waziristan.

Lastly, this document points to why the U.S. will always need to maintain an aggressive CT posture despite the recent successes against al Qaeda.  Either al Qaeda, or some group like them, will continue to plot terrorist attacks against the U.S.  The U.S. will be attacked, and we will be attacked less if we maintain a persistent eye on the plethora of threats that might emerge from more than a dozen recruitment portals around the world.

Overall, a great post from Yassin and I hope everyone takes a read.

by Clint

Al Qaeda (AQIM) Doesn’t Follow Its Own Lessons Learned

The Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) published a short blog post I wrote on revelations from internal al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) documents showing how they integrated into the Tuareg insurgency in Mali.  Here’s the introduction to the post and I’ll link to the full discussion here at this link.

At FPRI’s Geopoliticus:

“Don’t feel bad U.S. military, you are not the only force struggling to make better decisions from your lessons learned.  Al Qaeda and particularly their Sahel affiliate, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), struggle to improve their operations based on analyses of past failures as evidence in the Associated Press’s (AP) recent publication of AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel’s confidential letter to his fighters in Mali.  While an incomplete manuscript, three chapters of AQIM guidance discovered in Timbuktu provide some clarity to al Qaeda’s strategic thinking in a post-Bin Laden era.

Overall, the document echoes many of the recommendations discussed by Bin Laden in the Abbottabad documents and outlined in a previous post “Are today’s al Qaeda offshoots following Bin Laden’s vision?”.  Droukdel, like Bin Laden, stresses several important principles to his followers at some point after the June 2012.

  • Patience – Droukdel realizes that AQIM’s gains in Northern Mali were fragile and that pushing the implementation of Sharia aggressively amongst a resistant population could short circuit their future Islamic state.
  • Integrate with local movements – Droukdel encourages his followers to, “extend bridges to the various sectors and part of Azawad society – Arab, Tuareg, and Zingiya – to end the situation of political, social, and intellectual separation.” Droukdel’s narrative is strikingly similar to that of Bin Laden’s “winning hearts and minds” guidance.
  • Learn from mistakes – In Chapter 1 page 3, Droukdel discusses mistakes made by their proxies in implementing Sharia requesting that they avoid the “destruction of shrines” and harsh application of religious punishments.  Droukdel, like Bin Laden, does not want to see his troops continuing to make the same mistakes.

In addition to the points of similarity with Bin Laden’s vision, Droukdel provides some rather interesting analysis of AQIM’s situation and future. ….

See the rest of the discussion at FPRI at this link: http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2013/03/al-qaeda-doesnt-follow-its-own-lessons-learned

by Clint

More details on old al Qaeda dudes leaving Iran

For those interested in last week’s post about the recent revelations of Suleiman Abu Ghaith allegedly being the last old al Qaeda guy to leave Iran, Mr. Flaneur (@flaneuresque) provided some perspective on what has been going on with Ghaith in Turkey.  Here is an excerpt of his comment (at this link) and make sure to check it out if you want some different perspective on why Ghaith landed in Turkey.

Abu Ghaith was brought to Turkey with an Iranian national and resided in a hotel in turkish capital, Ankara. Then he was left at the hotel -as far as I remember it was Sheraton Hotel- by the iranian national at the hotel room. After a while, he went out to find a place to eat something. The hotel is in close proximity to the Ankara’s fancy, luxurious neighborhood Tunalı Hilmi Avenue and there he was arrested by Turkish Intelligence Agency after a long surveillance…