Well, it’s May, and it seems like every year about this time (2011, 2012, 2013) I end up writing more about drones.  I didn’t see this being a heavy week on the discussion of drones, but what else should I do but continue to drone on…..

First, the International Crisis Group (ICG) released one of the more extensive research efforts into the use of armed drones in counterterrorism.  The report ”Drones: Myths and Realities in Pakistan” provides a comprehensive analysis and lots of references.  I’m still reading it now, but I’ve already found many interesting points in “Section IV:  Drones and Counterterrorism” starting on page 22.  I’ll note some interesting quotes here in this post which mirror discussions I’ve had in previous posts on drones here at this blog.

On page 24, the section entitled “Winning Hearts and Minds or Losing Allies?” starts off with hosts this paragraph.

In debates on the drone issue, the argument is commonly put forward that drones produce more terrorists than they kill: militant groups exploit real and fabricated accounts of civilian deaths to enlist fresh recruits, including the relatives of drone strike victims, for jihad against the U.S. and its allies.133  The actual benefit to extremist groups, including in terms of recruitment, appears, however, minimal. A local analyst who has extensively researched security and governance in FATA notes that while anti-drone rhetoric does draw some converts, “the loss of a Baitullah Mehsud or a Qari Hussain is much more damaging than the recruitment of a few dozen foot soldiers”.134

As I noted in my previous post, the reasons for joining an extremist group vary significantly from place to place and person to person.  In all cases, I believe the local socioeconomic dynamics surrounding the recruit play the greatest role.  In this report, ICG notes:

Moreover, militant recruitment is a complex process, achieved more often on economic than ideological grounds. The main causes for the spread of militancy in FATA are not drone strikes but domestic factors. These include the absence of the state and insecurity due to the resulting political, legal and economic vacuum; and the military’s support of, provision of sanctuaries to, and peace deals with militant groups.

As noted earlier this week, Christine Fair described the same root causes in 2010. The ICG report goes on to explain why public opinion polling reference drone use in FATA is essentially worthless.  In my opinion, the closer one polls to where the drone strike occurs, the less people will like drone strikes.  This isn’t rocket science (well, maybe it is a little bit, drones fire rockets).  One final quote from the paper comes from a researcher who compares drone strikes to other options:

 said a researcher. “You had military operations and militancy on one side, which destroyed towns and villages, and you had drones on the other, which were more precise.”

The article concludes that drones are not the solution or a long-run solution. I think almost everyone agrees on this.  The article says the solution is for Pakistan and the West to establish “Rule of Law”.  OK, well, Pakistan and other nations have only tried to govern this area for a few centuries, right, so maybe we can tackle this challenge ……uhhh, next fiscal year?  Not likely.

Second, Attorney General Eric Holder revealed one of the biggest non-secrets in American history: the U.S. uses drones and these drones have killed Americans.

Holder’s letter offered a detailed justification for the CIA’S killing of Awlaki, who Holder said had “repeatedly made clear his intent to attack U.S. persons and his hope that these attacks would take American lives.”

Transparency, I like it.  I wish they did this after every drone strike.  But then again, would we expect this sort of transparency after every infantry squad engagement?  Probably not! And are Americans sufficiently informed to understand what they would even be reading?  Would they care?  I don’t know, but I guess Holder’s prelude is set up for…..wait for it…..

Third, President Obama will provide an address on his counterterrorism policy on Thursday. Supposedly this address will go over everything: GITMO, drones, disposition matrix kind of stuff maybe.  It sounds like the President will be addressing all the CT stuff I was complaining about last year in the post “Counterterrorism 2012: No Drones, No Detention, No Intervention“. The NY Times article “Debate Aside, Number of Drone Strikes Drops Sharply”  shows how drone use has decreased ( I posted their table from Long War Journal below).  The article notes:

Mr. Obama, who insisted early in his presidency on a personal role in many strike decisions, may also shed light on the declining use of drone strikes. Current and former officials say the reasons include a shrinking list of important Qaeda targets, a result of the success of past strikes, and transient factors ranging from bad weather to diplomatic strains. But more broadly, the decline may reflect a changing calculation of the long-term costs and benefits of targeted killings.

So, after all the complaints the past year about transparency and CT strategy, all the bashing on both political sides about the threat of terrorism and how counterterrorism should be conducted, the President seems to be giving everyone what they want right; information and a strategy.  And what will likely happen? Both sides will probably crucify him for it. The President will attempt to do exactly what some of the American public has asked for, and Friday morning on Twitter, there will be nothing but bitching, moaning and sharpshooting.  Well, I think we should close GITMO, I think we should keep using drones, and I have a feeling, for the most part, I’ll be happy with most of what the President outlines that the USG is doing in counterterrorism.  If anything, I think we could maybe do less in some areas.   In retrospect, for me, U.S. counterterrorism makes a lot more sense in 2013 than it did in 2003.   In conclusion, for my take on what modifications could be made to the drone program, see this post (Americans: If you don’t want to get killed by a drone avoid these four things!) and this post (After Brennan, Implementing Curbs on Drone Targeting).

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Today, I had the opportunity to do an interview on extremist radicalization and recruitment with @cldaymon at the Loopcast.  The interview was fun and I talked way too long.  I also discussed a mix of different things I’ve researched with regards to radicalization and recruitment as well as social media.  So in follow up, if anyone is interested in where my mumblings come from, here are links to the different publications.

• The discussion of different al Qaeda recruitment models comes from 2008, “Foreign Fighters: How are they being recruited?”.
• Heffelfinger’s stages of radicalization comes from his book Radical Islam in America. 
• I used Heffelfinger’s model originally in a piece examining indicators of radicalization as it related to MAJ Nidal Hasan.  This is at FPRI and entitled “Major Nidal Hasan and the Fort Hood Tragedy: Implications for the U.S. Armed Forces.“
• More broadly, the perspective I voiced in the interview comes from a paper I authored in 2011 ”Radicalization in the U.S. Beyond al Qaeda“
• And my concluding complaints about the lack of effectiveness for the domestic CVE program is best captured from earlier this year in an article I wrote with @will_mccants entitled ”U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment,”

Lastly, I discussed the differences in incentives for recruits to join al Qaeda based on their role in the organization or based on their geographical location. I noted that I thought Westerners tended to join for more ideological reasons than recruits from Africa for example.  Here are two posts I wrote here at this blog related to that theoretical framework and below each post link I’ll paste the two graphs of how I thought the incentives might vary (theoretically) depending on the individual recruit.

Countering Violent Extremism of Terror Cell Recruits (And graph below)

Countering Violent Extremism Around The Globe (And Graph Below)

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After a few weeks of quiet, the drone debate has surfaced again in the U.S.

The past week has seen at least two drone strikes in Yemen.  One reportedly killed the Ansar al-Sharia leader of Abyan province and the Long War Journal claims the latest attack , launched missiles at,

“two fighters “as they left a farm on a motorbike” in the Khobza area of Baydah province”

A year ago, all the talk of terrorism, counterterrorism and drones centered on Yemen.  The media has lost interest in Yemen over the past year and while the pace of drone strikes appears to have decreased; their use has not gone away.

More interesting, an article from the Huffington Post I read yesterday that was published in 2010 entitled “Drones over Pakistan: Menace or Best Viable Option?”. This article is a must read.  Dr. C. Christine Fair had spent months in Pakistan researching the drone issue and, similar to Christopher Swift’s take on Yemen last year, found a very different perspective on the drone debate inside Pakistan.  She spoke with a senior Pakistani officer and:

This senior officer himself attested to Pakistan’s own inability to eliminate key threats and the necessity of the drones to eliminate terrorists in a way that most effectively minimizes the loss of innocent lives.

As for those stories that recount the psychological damage placed on populations by the buzz of drones, Fair contrasts with this anecdote:

“Another interlocutor explained that when children hear the buzz of the drones, they go their roofs to watch the spectacle of precision rather than cowering in fear of random “death from above.”

While I’m sure there have been mistakes in the use of drones in Pakistan, Fair says in Pakistan,

This antipathy towards the program is due in large measure to the collaboration of Pakistan’s media to sustain tenacious criticism of the program by spreading suspect civilian casualty reports planted by the militants themselves or various “agencies.”

Well, what should we think? As readers of this blog, you likely know my stance, “Go Drone With Some Modifications” (See here and here). However, the debate often centers around one’s perception of innocence and a which is more noble: means or ends. This is where it all gets really tricky.

COIN proponents like the notion of winning “hearts and minds” and this sells well to the public as the means ‘feel’ just. But in actuality, COIN in Pakistan means Pakistani army and militia invasion, which creates immeasurable casualties over time.  Drones, on the other hand, ‘feel’ evil, but I believe kill more precisely than any other tool and if I had to choose between a drone strike or sending in a tribal militia – I’ll go drone every time. (Did you see above, we just hit two dudes on a motorbike! it doesn’t get much more precise than that.) Again, both parties, drone critics and drone advocates, will swing the number of civilian casualties in their favor because there is no clear definition of the enemy and the U.S. isn’t overly clear about its use of the tool.  Would Osama Bin Laden’s wife be considered a militant or a civilian? Were the people in an AQAP member’s house hit by a drone strike militants or civilians? What about the house across the street from where the missile strikes, militants or civilians?

Drone critics have made some progress, I believe, in curbing the use of drones.  The pace of attacks has decreased overall it seems.  I assume this is either due to public pressure or that the U.S. may be running out of targets.  However, critics of drones are unlikely to make much more progress in reducing drone use unless they can provide a viable counterterrorism alternative to drones – America’s most effective and efficient counterterrorism tool.  While critics protested publicly during the hearings, I’ve heard little from them since Brennan’s confirmation. If drone critics remain concerned about their use, they must sustain a real campaign against their use and provide plausible alternatives.  The truth is: both political parties and most Americans are big fans of drones as long as they aren’t aimed at them.

The mantra I’ve seen repeated amongst drone critics has been that the U.S. use of drones will result in “blowback” against the U.S. While I agree this is conceivable, this repeated “you just wait, this is going to come back to haunt you” argument needs to come with some specific predictions if it is to be treated seriously.  I’ve listened to this argument against drone use for more than two years now.  (See here and here) If there is going to be “blowback” for the U.S. use of drones, when will there be “blowback” and where will there be “blowback”?  Be specific. To say there will be a terrorist attack from Yemen again, or from Pakistan again, will surely be correct, but these attacks may have only some or no relation to U.S. drone use.

Conversely, the option “to not use drones” over the past several years must be discussed by those that criticize drone use.  For example, I believe if the U.S. had not developed and implemented the use of drones in Pakistan, al Qaeda would be stronger today than it currently is, the U.S. would be further engaged in Afghanistan providing more troops for a longer period, and the TTP and al Qaeda would maintain a strong foothold in Pakistan’s frontier that would further destabilize Pakistan and yield more terrorist attacks against the West. Likewise, I also believe the success of drones in Pakistan has sent al Qaeda to seek alternative safe havens – one of which is Yemen.  In Yemen, without the use of drones, I believe the U.S. would be committed to a larger ground presence and further entanglement with dubious allies in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.  Additionally, I believe the U.S. would have suffered more attacks from an AQAP whose external operations, led by Awlaki, would have continued, increased and improved with time.  While my assessment, due to the course of history, cannot be proven right or wrong, I can see the logic for why the U.S. chose to pursue drone strikes and I believe it outweighs the arguments for not using drones.  For drone critics, they must qualify their prophecy about the long-run effects of drone use.  I’ve heard the drone “blowback” argument for at least three consecutive years now and, while I respect it, I’m not convinced.

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This past week, I finished Lawrence Wright’s latest book Going Clear: Scientology, Hollywood and the Prison of Belief.  It is one of the most fascinating books I’ve read in a long time; a truly amazing story of modern America that is exceptionally researched.  The book provides a contemporary accounting of how a religion is formed and in these descriptions I found many parallels to what is described in the recruitment processes of other ideological groups like al Qaeda and how they recruit new members.  (Note: I do not think Scientology is a terror group nor do I have anything against Scientologists with the exception of those described in the book that senselessly beat subordinate members and imprison them in dark basements. (Read the book, you’ll be amazed!) I don’t care what anyone believes as long as you don’t use it to justify killing other people or restricting others’ freedoms.)

In the book, Wright describes how writer/director Paul Haggis was recruited into Scientology.  On page 4, of Going Clear, I’ve done a short paraphrasing of Wright’s description of the Scientology playbook:

“Although he didn’t realize it, Haggis was being drawn into the church through a classic four-step “dissemination drill” that recruiters are carefully trained to follow.  The first step is to make contact…The second step is to disarm any antagonism the individual may have toward Scientology. Once that’s done, the task it to “find the ruin” — that is, the problem most on the mind of the potential recruit…The fourth step is to convince the Subject that Scientology has the answer.”

This description sounded so familiar to what I’ve seen and studied with regards to groups like al Qaeda.  But in reality, this approach can be seen in most all religions.  Wright does a great comparison of Scientology with other religions in the final chapter of the book, one that is both fair and instructive of Scientology’s parallels with more ancient religious traditions.

As I discussed in a recent post on Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s recruitment to extremism, the ability for one to be susceptible to a recruitment strategy is an emotional trigger; or as described in Going Clear as “finding the ruin”. If one is primed by one or more emotional triggers, for example, the loss of a family member (family), a struggle for employment (financial), a mental condition (psychological) or the failure to achieve a goal (professional), the “ruin” can send one seeking an answer and an ideology can easily be a solution to solve all problems.  It’s not a coincidence that those sentenced to prisons (a “ruin”) often quickly find either God, a gang or both.

While Scientology is thankfully not a violent organization, at least not externally anyways, the process by which they “find the ruin” mirrors many extreme groups.  Wright’s description reminds me of on of my favorite articles on radicalization and recruitment – an article by TJ Leydon, a former white supremacist, who wrote a response to the Wade Michael Page massacre last year entitled ”What I Might Have Told Wade Michael Page“. Leydon explains how he targeted people for recruitment.

“Treat someone normal like a winner and he’ll fight for you, but treat a loser like a winner and he’ll kill for you” became a phrase that I took to heart in recruiting others. As the years passed, I started to care more about the power of being high in the hierarchy of the white supremacy movement, so I started to go along with the ideology, even ideals I didn’t believe in or care about, such as Holocaust denial.”

Leydon’s conclusion also provides another contrasting perspective as to why people join different ideologies; extreme or otherwise.  The ideology provides the answer to all problems and a way to pursue both group and individual goals whether they be enlightenment, enrichment or power.  It’s striking how this thinking (the ideology is the solution to everything if its applied in such a way that it suits my needs) still provides comfort to those like Omar Hammami who routinely speak in the same narratives of  ideological panacea as the solution to solve their ruin and all problems.

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Two weeks ago, I launched the two year follow up to the Post Bin Laden survey to capture the collective assessment of al Qaeda and terrorism two years after the death of al Qaeda’s founder.  Thanks to all that have already voted and the polls are still open for anyone that would like to cast their vote. The more votes the better and your contributions will strengthen the analysis of they survey.  If interested, visit this link to vote and please forward to anyone that you think might be interested in voting.

Meanwhile, those new to the “Post Bin  Laden” surveys were curious what the results of past iterations looks like.  So, I decided to post a compilation of links to the results from the 1^st Post-Bin Laden poll, the AQ Strategy 2011-2012 survey, the 2^nd Post-Bin Laden poll, and the One Year After Bin Laden survey.

Here are the links to each of the results of these four surveys and I’ll be comparing the results of these previous iterations with the upcoming results of the “2 Years After Bin Laden” survey going on now.  Thanks for voting and here are the results from 2011-2012.

Results from the Bin Laden survey initiated on January 2, 2011:

Does Bin Laden Matter? (Jan. 2011)

Does Bin Laden Matter? Poll Results Part #1

Bin Laden Poll Analysis, Part 1b

Does Bin Laden Matter? Poll Results Part #2

Future AQ Attacks? More or Less

Results from two years ago, surveys launched immediately prior (al Qaeda Strategy 2011-2012 –  April 2011) and immediately after UBL’s death (May 2, 2011):

▪   AQ Strategy & Post UBL Poll Overview (Background Summary on Voters)

▪   Voters say Zawahiri 1 to 2 years from capture

▪   Chief Consequence of UBL’s Death

▪   AQ Leadership After Bin Laden

▪   Financial Impact on AQ Post Bin Laden

▪   AQ Donor Support Before & After UBL

▪   UBL’s Death & The Afghanistan Mission

▪   AQ Affiliates After Bin Laden

▪   AQ Affiliate Targeting Focus

▪   Crowd Considered AQ Central Top Affiliate After UBL’s Death

▪   Will AQ foreign fighters return home to fight?

▪   What will al Qaeda do?

▪   Keys to AQ’s Survival & Resurgence

▪   Western CT Main Efforts Against AQ

▪   Academics are confident – before & after Bin Laden’s death

▪   International Perspectives Increase Confidence

▪   Listen To Your Friends, Read Academic Publications, Build Your Confidence

▪  The Strength of al Qaeda’s Name: Stronger or Weaker?

Results from the “1 Year After Bin Laden” Poll initiated on May 2, 2012:

• 1 Year After Bin Laden Poll – Respondent Overview – Results #1
• 1 Year After Bin Laden Poll – AQ Plots Decreased – Results #2
• AQ Fundraising Decreased – 1 Year After Bin Laden Poll – Results #3
• AQAP in Yemen Getting the Money After UBL – 1 Year After Bin Laden – Poll Results #4
• Syria Support and ‘Loss Aversion’ – How do we think about foreign intervention? – 1 Year Post UBL – Results #5
• Is al Qaeda recruitment increasing or decreasing? – Poll Results #6
• Is Zawahiri still in control of al Qaeda? – 1 Year Post UBL Poll – Results #7
• For al Qaeda: More ‘Unity’ or ‘Conflict’ One Year After Bin Laden? – Results #8
• Is al Qaeda ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’ after Bin Laden? Poll Results #9

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Yesterday afternoon, the twittersphere broke into a brief flurry over the fate of Omar Hammami. The claim retweeted across Twitter was that Omar was killed.  Hhhhmmm, I had wondered about Omar’s fate this weekend but the reporting seemed a bit strange.  Here is where I’ve tracked the sourcing for this claim and if anyone knows other/better sources for this claim, please post them in the comments below.

Source - MyPetJawa first detected it from a tweet which said “Ommar Hamammi, aka al-Amriki — America’s Jihadist in Somalia is dead, said Foud Shangole, al-Shabaab’s chief operation”.  All of the other tweets I followed seemed to go back to this source. Today, I’ve heard from some others that Bar-Kulan broadcast this claim. (Update 1600 May 8)

The claim from Bar-Kulan (Updated 1600 May 8) didn’t  seem to make sense so I decided to fall back on my training to make my bet on Omar’s fate.  When evaluating information sources, I was taught to examine these factors to assess validity and reliability.

• Motivation – Why is the source providing the information? What does the source of the information stand to gain by disclosing the event? If its a news outlet, then its readers and having a scoop which leads interested persons to advertisers.  If its a political group or a terrorist organization, a myriad of options could be multi-fold. 
• Competency - Is the source of the information sufficiently capable of knowing and/or understanding the information they are provided?  The Internet is filled with both competent and incompetent sources.
• Process - How was the information acquired?  Through what process did the information get from its beginnings to me? Can I follow the chain of information to see how the source knows the information? This is where primary and secondary sources come into play.  In general, the belief is that primary sources are better than secondary sources.  However, as anyone that has ever watched local TV news interviews can tell you, there are lots of incompetent or problematically motivated primary sources.  Likewise, there can be secondary sources that more accurately correlate multiple primary sources and combine it with analysis to provide a more accurate perspective on events – I have a group of these knowledge ninjas I rely on.
• Product - What type of information product is it?  How does the type of information product influence its validity as a source? The information came in as text, video, audio…are there pictures?  Depending on the event and the context, the type of information product may matter significantly to its credibility.
• Performance History – What is the reliability and validity of information from this source over time?  Does the information source provide good information on a routine basis?
• General validity – In the context of the issue, does the information source provide information that makes sense in the context of the event?

Based on these factors, here is my quick assessment of this source.

Source – Bar-Kulan (Updated 1600 8 May) or any Somali news outlet for that matter -

1. Motivation – I’m guessing by the tweets that these accounts are more of the journalist type and that the motivation is getting a scoop out in the public.  Media outlets and scoops from the Horn in general tend to be highly unreliable…here’s a similar claim about Hammami’s fate from last year.  Also, the other tweets in this feed seem to be very focused on general Somalia issues and sometimes critical of the U.S. from what I can tell.  The goal is to drive traffic, not get it right.
2. Competency – Bar-Kulan (Updated 1600, 8 May) seems to follow Somalia issues in depth but I don’t have any real evidence to know why this source is particularly informed on Hammami’s fate other than its an interesting news item for the time.  (Updated 1600, 8 May)
3. Process – This is completely unclear.  Did Bar-Kulan (Updated 1600, 8 May) interview Shangole? How did he know this information?  Or is it just rumor?    But why wouldn’t Shabaab just put this information out from its own sources? This is a distant secondary source at best.
4. Product – The product is text – no pictures, video, etc.  This doesn’t match with other claims that come from Shabaab who tends to use pictures for big events like this.
5. Performance History – For this source, I have none.  If anyone knows the track record of original sourcing of Bar-Kulan (Updated 1600, 8 May), I’d be interested.
6. General Validity – The claim does make sense since Omar himself tweeted that he was on the run, surrounded and in trouble.  But, I’d need a lot more detail to feel comfortable with the claim.

Assessment – I have no reason to put much faith in this claim.

Here are some of my other thoughts on these claims.

• So if the source is Shangole, let’s say, why would Shangole want the information out?  To show Shabaab’s competence in defeating one of their adversaries? Doubtful, they’ve bungled the Hammami thing for a year.   But I would guess that if Shabaab were subtly putting this information out, it’s because they want to draw Omar back out and gain further justification for killing him and maybe see if he’s still in the area.
• I won’t believe anything till I see pictures – Omar has survived a great many close calls. I would expect this event to be accompanied with pictures.
• Omar’s status could still change at any minute – Reports from both Omar and the media suggest Omar is surrounded and on the run.  Even with my assessment below, he could be killed at anytime.  And, I’ve not heard anyone talk about the possibility that Omar could die from wounds suffered during the assassination attempt.  Omar was shot in the throat in rural Somalia and may be on the run.  That wound could easily get infected and cause some problems over time.  He would not be the first person in Somalia to die from complications related to wounds.
• Why hasn’t the Shabaab crowd been going crazy on Twitter if Omar was killed?  I would expect the Shabaab supporters to be chiming in and especially the MYC in Kenya.  They’ve long been Omar haters.
• Why hasn’t Afghani, Robow or Aweys come to save Omar? Omar has boasted about these three being anti-Godane and Afghani appealed directly to Zawahiri for removal of Godane.  Yet, these guys, if they support Omar, do it only behind the scenes.  Ohhh, Omar, are you wondering where you are in this Game of Thrones? If Omar bashes Godane in public on Twitter, he’s a useful pawn for Afghani, Robow and Aweys.  But, if these guys publicly back Omar, they could be in poor standing with both Shabaab and al Qaeda.  Likewise, if Godane kills Omar, well, that would prove the allegations of Afghani about Godane’s corruption.  So for Afghani, Robow, Aweys, “Omar lives – they win, Omar dies – they win.”  Omar, there is another option, you could come home and turn yourself in before being betrayed on both sides.
• The better sourcing on Omar’s fate is coming from those that cover the area where he is seeking refuge – the Rahanweyn clan.  Specifically, the Raxanreeb.com website which covers events surrounding Omar’s trials and tribulations.  While I don’t trust any Somali news sources outright,  this article says that Omar’s assassination attempt has stirred up a ruckus around the area of Raama Caday, Somalia, which makes sense.  Supposedly Shabaab has tried to cut communications to the area and that would explain why Omar has been quieter.  This location would make sense as well in the context of Omar’s tweeting of being in Bay region, previously being in and around Merca, and Shabaab not being able to get militias from Gedo and Juba engaged to go after Omar. See the map below for what I think is a VERY rough estimate of the situation.  Take a grain of salt (or a bag of it) with everything I write.  But, this source would suggest Omar would be in a valid location, but a precarious one dependent on Rahanweyn protection and with few options.

So what is my take?  Well, if I had to guess, and the situation could change at any minute, I’d make the following guess on Omar’s fate as of now. (Taking a lesson from Nate Silver, I’ll make my prediction based on probabilities.

• 75% chance he’s still alive – unless I see more signals and verification, I’m not believing he’s been killed.  I think Shabaab will be quick to take credit if they get him.
• 20% chance he’s dead – whether he died yesterday or not, he’s still in an incredibly vulnerable position.  They’ve already tried to kill him a few weeks back, they could get him at any minute.
• 5% chance Omar is and always has been part of a Zombie vanguard operating in Somalia. This would explain why he continues to escape death – he was never alive in the first place.

Here’s my crazy map below. My recommendation –  look for competent sources with access to the area highlighted in yellow as they will probably have the best information on Omar’s fate.  However, don’t just listen to me, use lots of sources, and tell me where I’m wrong, I’ll listen.

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When I last posted about Omar Hammami in Somalia, he had just tweeted that he had been shot in the throat by a Shabaab assassin. As I had mentioned,

If there is going to be a war inside Shabaab, I’m guessing it will happen soon.

Well, Omar went quiet on Twitter for a little while and from what I gather (could be a bit off on this since I don’t speak Somali), a Shabaab contingent surrounded the Rahanweyn village Omar was hiding in and turned off the cell tower to cut off communications around the area.  A few days later, Omar popped back up with a few new tweets describing the stand off between he and Shabaab and his run into the forest to escape Shabaab’s manhunt.  Again, Omar went quiet for a while before firing off these two tweets on May 3 and April 30.

Omar suggests that Shabaab has lost the initiative, that the people of Somalia are on his side and that the Shabaab militias of Gedo and Jubba aren’t really interested in going into Rahanweyn territory and stirring up a ruckus.

Since May 3, no word from Omar.  So…

• What happened to Omar? Did he escape Shabaab’s grasp yet again or are Omar’s tweets really just his hopes for protection, redemption and survival?
• Are Shabaab’s militias really disobeying Godane? Shabaab has launched a couple of suicide bombing attacks on Mogadishu over the past few weeks but these have mostly killed civilians from what I gathered.  Is Shabaab’s indiscriminate killing of civilians and their hunting of Omar finally eroding Godane’s power?  Omar claimed in another tweet that many key Shabaab leaders are against Godane. But how would we know if this is true?

I guess only time will tell…or maybe it won’t.  The Twittersphere has been quiet.  Will we hear from Omar again?

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Two years ago, Osama Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan marking one of the most significant milestones in the history of terrorism and counterterrorism. Two and a half years ago, I began conducting surveys to assess what the impact might be if Osama Bin Laden ever met his demise.  These surveys have since become an annual assessment I generate to gauge public perceptions of the threat of al Qaeda and terrorism in general.  While Bin Laden may be gone, terrorism continues and the past year has demonstrated how terrorist attacks might manifest themselves in a variety of ways from Benghazi to the Boston Marathon bombing.

Today, I’m launching the fifth iteration of the al Qaeda Strategy/Post Bin Laden Survey.  Thanks to those that have participated in versions #1 – Does Bin Laden Matter - Jan.2, 2011, #2 – AQ Strategy 2011-2012 - April 27. 2011, #3 – Terrorism Post-Bin Laden – May 2, 2011, #4 One Year After Bin Laden- May 2, 2012. You can find the results at this link which hosts the results of past surveys.

This poll is shorter and a bit different than past surveys.  Realizing there have been changes in terrorism, I opened the questions up a bit to include new emerging trends.  However, I did repeat some questions verbatim so we can see how our collective thinking has changed over time.

Thanks in advance for contributing to the survey. And anyone is welcome to participate – the more votes the better the results. I’ll begin posting the results and comparisons with past data sets in a few weeks.  Here is the link to the survey if you would like to open it in a separate window: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/2yearsafterBinLaden

And if you would like to just take the survey here, I’ve embedded it in this post.  Thanks for taking the survey!

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Today, FPRI in Philadelphia provided me the opportunity to do a guest blog post on the radicalization of the Tsarnaev brothers of Cambridge, MA.  I’ll post the introduction here below and the post summarizes some of my previous articles on radicalization I’ve done with FPRI and how they relate to the recent bombings.  These three articles are:

“Major Nidal Hasan and the Fort Hood Tragedy: Implications for the U.S. Armed Forces“, 2011

“Radicalization in the U.S. Beyond al Qaeda: Treating the Disease of the Disconnection“, 2011

“U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment” with Will McCants, 2012

Here’s the introduction to the post and you can read the entire thing on FPRI at this link (Update 0800: Sorry, post at FPRI won’t be live until later this morning):

“The investigation into the radicalization of the Boston Marathon bombing’s Tsarnaev brothers has only just begun. While the picture of the radicalization of the Tsarnaev brothers remains incomplete, many have already pointed to what appear to be obvious warning signs of violence.  Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the younger of the two brothers, seemingly became a recruit of his older sibling Tamerlan.  However, the older brother Tamerlan showed many classic signs of radicalization and a turn to violence.  When placed in context, the question shifts from “How was Tamerlan radicalized?” to “Why was Tamerlan’s radicalization not detected?”

Two years ago in the summer of 2011, I used a radicalization model designed by Chris Heffelfinger, author of Radical Islam in America, to outline a potential framework for researching and eventually creating indicators and warnings for law enforcement and the military trying to assess the move of vulnerable individuals down the pathway of violent extremism.  In the article, “Major Nidal Hasan and the Fort Hood Tragedy: Implications for the U.S. Armed Forces,” I tried to use Heffelfinger’s framework to note what indicators might emerge as individuals move through the process of radicalization and recruitment to violence.  The four stages of Heffelfinger’s construct are:

1. Introduction – Initial contact with the extremist ideology
2. Immersion – Immersion in the thinking and mindset of the extremist ideology
3. Frustration – Frustration over inaction of other members of the ideology
4. Resolve – Resolve to commit violence on behalf of the extremist ideology

Movement along the four phases of this framework varies for every extremist.  Some take years to move through the entire process, others only weeks or months.  And yet others travel through some of the initial phases and never commit to violent action.  The pace and intensity through which those being radicalized move through the process often hinges on one or more emotional triggers – significant life events accelerating the individual’s dive into extremism and increasing the susceptibility of an extremist ideology’s resonance.  Four broad categories of emotional triggers are:

• Family- Death of a family member or divorce may leave the service member searching for a coping ideology.
• Professional- Failure to achieve professional goals or adapt to military lifestyle may result in the individual being particularly vulnerable to extremist recruitment.
• Financial- Extremist ideologies often provide comfort to those suffering financial struggles.
• Psychological- Witnessing or participating in a traumatic event may trigger distress leading to the pursuit of extremist ideologies.

Not discussed in the paper but of equal importance to the framework and emotional triggers is the presence of catalysts – people and places that help vulnerable individuals move along the phases of radicalization.  Today, these catalysts guiding radicalization are often extremist Internet content, key influencers (often times former foreign fighters, ideologues or family members) and social circles. ”

See the rest of the post here.

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Many have wondered how long Omar Hammami could freely bash al Shabaab in Somalia without suffering repercussions. Well, today was the day that Shabaab tried to end Omar’s public bashing on Twitter.  Omar just posted an update early this afternoon claiming Shabaab just attempted to kill him.

Later, he followed up with some pictures to prove the assassination attempt.  Check out his Twitter feed if you want to see the pics.  Again, Omar used one of his 9 lives to survive the incident and apparently Omar thinks this might be the straw that opens up full warfare between Hammami, Hammami’s protectors and al Shabaab as he told @intelwire here in this tweet.

While most are not likely surprised that Shabaab would try to kill Hammami, this assassination attempt by Shabaab does suggest a few things.

1. Hammami should fear for his life – Despite Shabaab’s claims in a previous propaganda piece that Omar’s life was never threatened , today confirms that Omar’s fears were justified.
2. Shabaab will kill foreign fighters to Somalia - There has always been some doubts about Hammami’s claims that Godane’s Shabaab would kill off foreign fighters to Somalia.  Well, today  confirms that Shabaab has no restraint in going after those that challenge the group’s leadership.
3. Omar’s social media rants were getting to Shabaab – While Shabaab has tried to play it cool for more than a year, today proved that Omar’s public criticisms of Shabaab really do bother the group.
4. Open conflict between different Shabaab factions in Somalia – Omar has been talking of a war within Shabaab for some time.  Ibrahim al-Afghani’s public letter to Zawahiri a couple weeks back strongly signaled fractures in Shabaab’s ranks.  Now a public assassination attempt against a well known American foreign fighter.  If there is going to be a war inside Shabaab, I’m guessing it will happen soon.  I’m not sure what more posturing can occur without the schism escalating to full blown conflict.

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