The NY Times published an important article this morning entitled “Signs that Bin Laden Weighed Seeking Pakistani Protection”. Here are some of the articles insights I keyed on:
Documents seized at the compound where Osama bin Laden was killed show that he and his aides discussed making a deal with Pakistan in which Al Qaeda would refrain from attacking the country in exchange for protection inside Pakistan
Thoughts: The Pakistani government (as a whole) maybe didn’t know that UBL was in their midst; officially. However, I imagine if AQ considered negotiating with the Pakistani government, then some AQ operatives, maybe Atiyah in fact, maintained contact with elements inside the Pakistani Army and ISI that he considered amenable to AQ’s protection.
Speaking of Atiyah:
the documents highlight the central role played by Atiya Abdul Rahman, the operations chief with whom American officials said Bin Laden discussed a possible truce with Pakistan.
Thoughts: Last week’s poll results discussed who would lead AQ after UBL’s death. AQ TV leaders were largely credited with leading AQ in the future. However, discussions of Sayf al- Adel illustrate his key role and suggest (correctly I think) that it’s those that do operations more than those that talk about operations who will lead AQ in the future. I believe Adel and Atiyah are key to AQ Central’s future operations and essential glue to AQ’s global affiliates.
Mr. Rahman notified Bin Laden of a request by the leader of Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen to install Anwar al-Awlaki, the radical American-born cleric, as the leader of the group in Yemen. That group, known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, apparently thought Mr. Awlaki’s knowledge of the United States and his status as an Internet celebrity might help the group’s operations and fund-raising efforts.
Thoughts: Two issues emanate from this key quote:
- American media pundits and terrorism analysts (the tail) helped promote Awlaki in the minds of Americans and AQ (the dog). Endless punditry on Awlaki’s Internet statements increased Awlaki’s profile communicating to AQ, “the Americans are really freaking out about Awlaki so maybe we should promote him.” I still think Awlaki’s role in planning operations justifies his removal. However, ePundits promoted iJihad through their media race to anoint AQ’s next Bin Laden.
- UBL didn’t approve of Awlaki’s ascension. This revelation may be one of the most important strategic communication messages for counterterrorism efforts. Did UBL think Awlaki lacked experience? Maybe Awlaki needed to increase his ideological credibility? Or was Awlaki outshining AQ’s top dog? Hopefully, UBL’s disapproval of Awlaki will curb his recruitment value for AQ wannabes.