In a post this past February, I compiled the results of 268 respondents who answered this question in April/May 2011:
In two years, will regional insurgent groups and local, upstart terror groups continue to brand themselves as AQ affiliates? (See this link for the full results.)
Respondents overwhelming believed, “Yes, groups will re-brand as al Qaeda, but will have no direct connection with AQ”. In the West, we grow concerned if this prophecy proves true as it points to the unstoppable growth of al Qaeda’s social movement and an enduring terrorist threat after more than a decade of war.
The expansive description of al Qaeda and the amorphous process for joining the organization was seen by many CT pundits as the terror group’s greatest strength – the construction of a social movement where extremists from all walks of life could join al Qaeda’s call and pursue global jihad under core ideological principles outlined by al Qaeda’s central leadership. Some professors and pundits flocked to social movement theory promoting every AQ wannabe executing a bungled, ill-conceived plot as a symbol of al Qaeda’s strength. These same theorists would note how al Qaeda’s flat structure makes the terror group resilient and difficult to counter.
Ironically, while social movement professors rustled through their closets searching for their wrinkled Che Guevara t-shirt from graduate school, al Qaeda became increasingly worried about their social movement – specifically their loss of operational control and dilution of their brand. Lacking a formal process for integrating all new members and affiliates joining al Qaeda, the terror group’s senior leaders could not vet the quality of new joiners. The amateurish failed plots of AQ wannabes and the expansive, reckless violence of AQ affiliates slowly began to erode popular support for AQ globally calling AQ leaders to ask, “Who are these guys in our organization?”.
The Abbottabad documents released last weak reveal that Bin Laden and his top leadership struggled with the issue of membership and control. In document SOCOM-2012-0000006-HT, a document potentially written by Zawahiri (although unconfirmed) to Bin Laden in December 2010, Zawahiri (or some high level AQ leader) notes:
“concerning controlling the affairs in general, membership and the affiliation in particular. There is no secret to you that, in the past, there were a lot of advantages and faults. However, what I would like to emphasize in this letter is the issue of individuals, those who pledge allegiance, and the affiliates. Therefore, from the last experience it showed great figures with high quality have emerged, and also some figures have emerged did not benefit any groups by their affiliation, yet some kind of bragging and boasting appeared by joining Al-Qa’ida. And, the formulation of specific titles have been published by their owners in the network of information.”
So it appears by 2010, AQ Central was becoming increasingly concerned about its unknown “volunteers” as a liability tarnishing its brand name. Likewise, local start-ups with little or no connection to AQ were creating their own groups and appointing themselves titles previously hard won on jihadi battlefields – annoying veteran AQ members with more experience. I can hear it now, “Hey, How did Habis get to be an Emir? He just joined 6 months ago and all he did was start his own group… he’s never done anything!” So much for a flat, horizontal “let’s all get along” AQ. Zawahiri (or some high AQ leader) continues on:
“Anyways, the important thing, honorable sir, is that the issue needs to be controlled, to know who is member of Al-Qa’ida, what his function is, what side he follows, what is the way to impeach him, so as not to increase the friends of desire and greed and seclude those friends of religion and morals.”
Contextual translation: Some of these recruits don’t deserve to be al Qaeda. We need to determine who is in and who is out. Zawahiri (or some senior AQ leader), concludes by recommending three standards, all quite subjective, by which membership in al Qaeda might be evaluated.
“Therefore, starting from now please think about controlling the matter with a system that deals with people, each according to his religion, piety and contribution.”
By Zawahiri’s standard, one must be subservient, prove their religious credentials, and contribute – either on the battlefield or for a certain “nominal fee” one might be able to buy their way into al Qaeda.
It appears Zawahiri (or some senior AQ leader) wanted to know who was in al Qaeda, and even within al Qaeda, who was in charge of who. Very interesting, I wonder how Zawahiri’s desires have played out in the past year as he has assumed command – assuming he can actually communicate and command anything from his current location. I also wonder, how Zawahiri’s desires for control and structure are being received by affiliates who appear to have had a relatively free reign to pursue objectives as they wished during Bin Laden’s rule.
Two closing notes:
Last summer, I helped J.M. Berger launch a survey asking CT enthusiasts “What is al Qaeda?”. The results (Part #1 & Part #2) were quite interesting and the conclusion was that we in the West don’t really know what organizations or individuals really constitute al Qaeda. I wonder how al Qaeda members would answer the same survey? I bet the results would be quite similar.
Lastly, if you haven’t voted already, please take three minutes and cast your opinions here on the fate of al Qaeda one year after the death of Bin Laden. The questions follow up on posts from last year’s survey I linked to above and will hopefully open up some good discussion in the coming weeks about the current state of al Qaeda.
Clint, I worry you are mischaracterizing what social movement theory tries to illuminate. Most people in that field, including me, will tell you organizations still matter (Social Movement Organizations or SMOs) as they are sources of leadership, well-springs of messaging, and often best positioned to mobilize resources and develop strategies. The problem that SMOs face in dealing with competing SMOs and unincorporated activists is an old one in social movement studies that has produced some excellent scholarship. And in fact, the luminaries in the field of social movement studies (McAdam, Klandermans, etc…the people who may very well own Che t-shirts) have almost entirely remained aloof from studying jihadism. When they have, most say it isn’t a big deal. Quintan Wiktorowicz, who now works in USG as I am sure you know, is a movement theorist who has studied Islamist groups. He definitely emphasizes the role of organizations in all of his work. So I am not sure who you are attacking here. The scholars and bloggers who have picked up bits and bobs of movement theory and employed it very selectively? Sure I can get on board with you there, but go easy on my field of study. It has a lot to offer. I’d be happy to recommend a few books and articles.
Let me be more precise in terms of the perpetrators of “The al Qaeda Movement” argument and what the implications were from their peddling of this discussion.
-The worst offenders, which I’m referring to above, came from the political science community and pulled from social movement theory to support their fascination with al Qaeda’s terrorist propaganda on the Internet and their lack of field research, foreign travel and language speaking ability. The formula used by these political scientists was a slide with an al-Suri quote discussing social movements with a picture Suri pointing to a map followed by a picture of Che in the background. I’ve seen a half dozen different presenters in USG buildings use some combination to brief these social movement theory as it relates to al Qaeda.
-The second category were those in government that sought out the social movement theory approach because it supported a political or bureaucratic agenda they could advance. SMT talk was essential in many briefings justifying “Winning Hearts and Minds” campaigns both domestically and internationally. The SMT argument of al Qaeda expanded the scope of the CT fight to fit any problem one wanted to tackle. BLUF – “We have to win over the entire Muslim world to defeat al Qaeda.”
-You are correct, the sociologists of mainstream were not the ones predominately pushing the jihadi social movement theory. However, being a luminary and a leading scholar in one’s field requires protecting one’s discipline. SMT luminaries could have done much more to protect their field if they had appropriately countered the “bloggers, pundits and political scientists” that selectively grabbed onto SMT to advance their agenda in the absence of empirical research.
-Lastly, you cite Quintan Wiktorowicz above as an SMT luminary in government. While he has written a great book of case studies on SMT related to Islamic Activism in Muslim countries, I also believe he is further degrading the credibility of SMT by inappropriately applying his case studies and experiences from Muslim majority countries on the U.S. (a non-Muslim majority country). The result I believe is the worst White House policy related to CT in recent years – “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the U.S.” This will ultimately prove to be another set back for the SMT community.
I mention the SMT luminaries staying away from jihadism as a topic of study, in reaction to your t-shirt comment – not because I think it is a good thing or I agree that AQ isn’t worthy of study. My own career speaks for itself on that front