So the information keeps coming in. Foreign Policy just released an update on their Failed States research identifying new revelations on Somalia. Foreign Policy concurs that the existence and influence of foreign fighters in Somalia is overstated. Here’s a key quote:
Perhaps even more interesting for Somalia watchers is a June 9, 2009, cable that describes the country’s conflict as a largely clan-against-clan turf war rather than a political or ideological struggle. This explanation conflicts with other popular accounts of the crisis, which tend to focus on religious extremism combined with the potent quest for wealth and security.
As I mentioned in Part 1 of this post, Somalia is about clan before jihad. Only in certain locations and at certain times, which I’ll discuss in Part 2, does ideology drive action. Survival-security trumps ideology for the most part. Unless ideology can provide security…..more to follow.
You´ve done a great job, Misadventures are really a great analysis of the Harmony documents. I do not agree with one of your conclusions however.
“1- Weak states support terrorism better than failed states- As Dr. Ken Menkhaus has noted many times, failed states like Somalia are hard for everyone. It doesn’t matter if your AQ or Western peacekeepers. The cost of operating in chaos makes terrorism tough.”
You are basing this statement on more or less intuitive logic and two case studies (Somalia 92-94, Kenya 92-98). But if you see the broader picture (i.e. more case studies) it gets more complicated.
- it is problematic, even though not unsolvable to treat those countries as one entity and then classify the strength of the statehood.
- in my research it came out that not the strength of a given state but presence of a strategic ally (or radical islamist subculture) is the key variable when it comes to success of al-Qa´ida. I do not want to bother you with details, but simply to say al-Ittihaad could not provide AQ with the safe haven, unlike ash-Shabaab, which in my understanding is a good case of al-Qa´ida success.
Petr,
Thanks for chiming in on this issue. This is one of my favorite debates so I’ll just write up my response in a new post and let’s see if we can get some additional readers/researchers involved. I do understand what you are saying above, but I have a few reasons why I believe that weak states are still better for terrorists than failed states. I do believe failed states can assist terrorists groups in some functions, but sustaining a terrorist operation in ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states is not ideal for AQ.
looking forward to that.