Shabaab’s betrayal of Omar Hammami – In English this time!

After being frustrated by the Arab world ignoring his revelations about the bad behavior of Shabaab in Somalia, Omar Hammami posted an English version of his demise via a Twitter link today.  In January, I suffered through some miserable Arabic translation nightmares to write the post “Hammami Reveals Deceit, Dissension and Death in Shabaab and al Qaeda!“, but now all can read of his demise and betrayal by al Shabaab in the English version at this link.

Back in January, Omar hoped to reach the Muslim world and maybe al Qaeda by publishing his latest troubles in Arabic hoping to appeal to that audience – since his previous YouTube calls for help broadcast in a mix of English and Arabic fell on deaf ears in the Arab World.  Again, it appears Omar’s Arabic revelations from January didn’t find much audience amongst al Qaeda’s mainstream.  However, Omar’s American audience, despite this being Omar’s home country which he despises, has read and paid attention to Omar’s plight.  In January, Omar didn’t seem thrilled about myself and others in the West reading his Arabic pronouncements.

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But today, it appears Omar has changed his tune, reaching out in English this time.  Omar so desperately wants an Arab audience, but maybe he’s realized his biggest audience is in his native country.  Here’s some clips from Omar’s English version of the document.

On Godane (Abu Zubayr):

As for Abu Zubayr’s entrance into the whole affair, well, his background is a bit unclear because he was in Pakistan during the days of the Russian occupation and no one knows with certainty if he really participated in the Jihaad or if he just sat in Peshawar.

On Somalis and their distrust of al Qaeda:

history has proven that the Somalis generally do not want any influence from al-Qaa’idah or foreigners in their internal affairs.

On al Qaeda fomenting fractures with Shabaab as much as Shabaab creating fractures between local Somali (Ansar) vs. Foreign Fighters (Muhajirs)

It is here that I blame the brother s from al-Qaa’idah to some degree (and I mean Abu Talhah as-Sudaani, Abu ‘Abdallaah, Fazul, and an-Nabhaan) because, despite have pure intentions (as we see it, but Allaah is their Reckoner), there developed a sense of competition between them and the brothers of the Salaah ad-Diin camp.

Al Qaeda’s shift to focus on Kenya as anticipated in this document here in 2007:

Eventually, and probably because of such divisiveness, the brothers from al-Qaa’idah went to Ras Chiamboni to focus on training Kenyan Somalis to do outside operations.

On al Qaeda’s lack of strategy in Somalia:

Here I don’t know what to say about the actions of the brothers from al-Qaa’idah. They split up amongst themselves without executing any real strategy.

and on this one, I have nothing to add.  See the closing of the document….

And it seems I was duped by the slogans and the pretty words, and I hadn’t yet learned the realities,

Get To Know Boko Haram

This past week, HSPI at George Washington University released the first issue brief of its Africa series (initiated last month) entitled “Boko Haram in Nigeria: No Easy Fix“.  The first installment covers a topic I don’t know much about – Boko Haram in Nigeria.  Omar Mahmood does an excellent job of concisely putting some needed details and perspective on Boko Haram, its origins, the underlying causes for its ascension and identifies some questions we might examine in the coming months.  Additionally, Omar addresses some of the questions surrounding the group’s links to al Qaeda and its newest manifestation Ansaru.  Here is the link to the full article and I’ve pasted the introduction here below.

In July 2009, Muhammad Yusuf, the founder of Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad, or “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad,” was killed while in police custody.1 Yusuf’s movement, known in local parlance as Boko Haram, or Hausa for “Western education is forbidden,” had been part of a five-.‐day uprising across four Nigerian states, resulting in over 700 deaths. The army was called in to quell the violence, and with Yusuf’s suspicious death, many assumed the movement was broken.

However, a prison break in September 2010 heralded Boko Haram’s return, and the movement has morphed into a significantly more lethal enGty than under Yusuf’s leadership, increasing its violence,expanding its geographic scope, and broadening its external connecGons. Efforts to combat Boko Haram have been compounded by a lack of knowledge, and the movement’s continued evoluton poses a threat to the stability of the Lake Chad Basin region, if not beyond. Nonetheless, a number of underlying factors make northern Nigeria susceptible to extremist influence, and the recent emergence of a splinter group called Ansaru signals that extremist ideology in the region extends beyond Boko Haram itself.

Shabaab in Somalia publicly fractures & pressures al Qaeda

Well, I’ve been waiting for a year to see the outcome of Shabaab’s “Game of Thrones” and today a surprising public fracture emerged on the aljihad.com website.  Ibrahim al-Afghani, a once senior leader of al Shabaab, close associate of Ahmed Godane and fellow member of Godane’s Isaaq clan, posted a public and direct call to Ayman al-Zawahiri asking him to intervene in Somalia and remove Godane as leader of al Shabaab.

Ibrahim al-Afghani’s public posting finally discloses the fractures I’ve been discussing for the past year.  Omar Hammami, the American public relations arm for Team Robow (maybe should be renamed Task Force Robow/Aweys/Afghani), has provided ten reasons for Afghani’s public denouncement of Godane – a major development in Somalia.  These are quotes from Omar’s tweets so if you don’t like the language, complain to Omar on Twitter.

  1.  ”Dr. Ayman has to act fast and decisively b4 the jihad is destroyed and enters a deep dark tunnel”
  2. “2 scholars are being threatened.”
  3. “Muhajirs are being expelled and misused/mistreated.”
  4. “Secret jails are off limits to observers.”
  5. “Scholars and leaders can’t check on claims of torture.”
  6. “Opportunities to open new outside fronts are purposefully neglected.”
  7. “The wealth of islam is squandered by the amir.”
  8. “There is no real shura and all the real actors are kept from benifitting the jihad.”
  9. “kids w/good intentions are put in charge of op.s that go wrong and have negative fall out, &they are in charge of policing elders”
  10. “the leader is responsible for the recent defeats and the loss of the previously unprecedented public/tribal support”

Interesting that Omar wrote these tweets in English.  Why not Arabic?  I’m guessing its to get word out to the West, but the solution he is seeking is not likely to come from the West.   I love it that he calls some of the Shabaab members “kids”. Oh wise twenty-something Omar who joined terrorist group that betrayed him. Omar continued immediately after the above posts to assert why everyone should listen to Ibrahim al-Afghani:

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Essentially, Omar explains why it must be Afghani and potentially not Robow that engages Zawahiri and brings the injustices of Godane to Zawahiri’s attention. Afghani was a Godane ally at one time, fought in Afghanistan, and comes from the same clan as Godane.  Also of note, there were rumors of Afghani once replacing Godane as Emir of Shabaab.  See this Critical Threats article for a longer but still short description about Afghani.

When reviewing my scenarios from last year, Scenario #1 appears to have flushed out as most accurate:

Scenario #1: Godane kills off old AQ members & Robow affiliated foreign fighters”

Also of note are the two forces over the past year that signaled which scenario would prove most accurate:

  1. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys who showed movement towards scenario #1 last summer , and
  2. Ibrahim al-Afghani who showed his hand today.

Here is an update to my crazy Powerpoint chart from last year. I haven’t been tracking Raage so don’t know his status or position.  I’ve put “X’s” over the scenarios that no longer make sense from last year and noted the migration of Afghani to the Aweys and Robow side.  In yellow is what I anticipate as the coalition against Godane as of today.

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Here are some thoughts for today and I’ll have another update in the next day or so:

  • What does Task Force Robow-Aweys-Godane want Zawahiri to do?  - Usually these things occur behind the scenes but this is a public call to Zawahiri.  Omar has suggested that communications with al Qaeda have been going through AQAP and that AQAP has gone cold on them in recent months or communicated intermittently with Godane.  This puts Zawahiri in an awkward spot.  Zawahiri went for a merger with Shabaab that Bin Laden would not pursue.  The main hope for al Qaeda now is in Syria and Somalia is a distraction.  If Zawahiri leaves Godane in, he confirms his negligence in not dealing with the Hammami situation the past year and demonstrates his naivety about formally merging with Shabaab in the first place. Dr. Z must be scratching his turbin.  
  • A public plea at this time isn’t such a brave move -  If this public call from Afghani had come last summer, it would have been a brave move.  But the Afghani call coming now, after Shabaab has gotten their ass kicked incessantly since the merger, isn’t particularly brave.  Shabaab lost its most important city of Kismayo, which Afghani once commanded, and I imagine he and many others have little to command under Godane at this point.  Loss of turf has also likely brought folks like Afghani, Hammami, and Robow closer together as they get squeezed into Bay & Bakool.  Bottom line: If Shabaab were winning, how Godane governs would not matter.
  • Source in Somalia again prove suspect – A year ago, several sources said that Ibrahim al-Afghani was chasing Omar around and trying to kill him in Somalia.  This now seems unlikely.  Again open sources from Somalia prove not credible.  No surprise.
  • The revelations of Omar Hammami – A year ago, when Omar Hammami posted his plea video, many thought it was an anomaly amongst Shabaab’s alleged rise after aligning with al Qaeda.  However, his persistent presence on Twitter has brought him supporters, probably kept him alive and turned him from goat to glamor jihadi again.  However, over the long run, Omar’s postings are a double edged sword for the jihad in Somalia and foreign fighter recruitment globally.  If a Westerner is considering joining Shabaab or any AQ affiliate and witnesses the absolute mess that is going on publicly, they must be crazy to join – and unfortunately jihadi foreign fighters usually are crazy.
  • Discussions of money - As I have mentioned in previous posts about jihad in Africa, resources and money play an important role and as Omar outlined on Twitter, how money is handed out matters a lot to these guys.  While Omar and these Shabaab splinters blanket themselves in ideological cover, underneath they are really concerned about their personal power and control of resources.  Jihad in Somalia – “Show me the money!”

Foreign Fighters: How are they being recruited?

Tonight I was invited to participate in 16 x 9′s live blog for their upcoming news program “Why North Americans Are Joining Terrorist Organizations?”  I believe the documentary will be online Sunday night.  While the live blog was fun, it was difficult to summarize my thoughts on al Qaeda recruitment processes, which I believe vary considerably between Western countries and the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia.  So for those interested in some discussion on foreign fighter recruitment processes, here’s some analysis I did in 2008 entitled “Foreign Fighters: How are they being recruited?”  You can get the entire pdf at this link and here’s a brief summary from the conclusion:

Certainly, official AQ members at times directly initiate recruitment in North African and Middle Eastern countries. Occasionally, individuals self-radicalize and independently seek out the greater jihad, possibly using the Internet for ideological indoctrination and communication with facilitators. However, both of these scenarios represent only a portion of foreign fighter recruitment. Most North African and Middle Eastern foreign fighters are instead recruited through social, family and religious networks empowered by former foreign fighters who catalyze the radicalization process. These local networks are efficient, built for the community and adaptable to local conditions. Such networks are difficult to create in either a hierarchical AQ Central (top-down) or a self-selecting (bottom-up) system.

An alternative foreign fighter recruitment model might reflect all three patterns described above. My hypothesis for future research estimates that global foreign fighter flow consists of roughly the following:

–Self-selecting (bottom-up) recruitment accounts for 10 -15 percent of global foreign fighter recruitment. These self-recruits consist largely of second and third generation Muslims and converts to Jihadi doctrine based in Western countries, the majority of which reside in the EU. Their increased Internet access and propensity for militancy help radicalize them locally before moving through select intermediaries to more formal networks. These individuals are inexperienced, untrained and often a liability to the larger AQ movement as their conduct may stray from AQ’s global message, and their operational and security mishaps endanger the group. However, their access to Western targets and their propaganda value remain a coveted prize for AQ and a worthwhile risk.

–AQ hierarchical (top-down) recruitment accounts for an additional 10 – 15 percent of global foreign fighter recruitment. AQ, under intense pressure from Western military and intelligence, expends effort to specifically recruit individuals that maintain valuable skills in weaponry, media, operational planning, finance and logistics. These recruits pose the greatest threat globally as their knowledge, skills, and experience create hallmark AQ attacks and maintain organizational coherence. While self-recruits are dangerous due to their access, these direct recruits are dangerous due to their ability.

–Former foreign fighters embedded in family, religious and social networks in flashpoint North African and Middle Eastern cities produce between 60 and 80 percent of global foreign fighter recruitment. Jihadi veterans and their networks are the center of gravity not only for al-Qa’ida but also for decades of Jihadi militancy. These communities are motivated not only by militant ideology but by their perceived oppression from the West economically and politically, frustration over Palestinean-Israeli conflict, and the influence of Western values on their culture. High foreign fighter producing communities sustained the Afghan jihad during the 1980’s, provide for current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will be the thread for future militant efforts at the close of current conflicts.

 

New Season of Shabaab’s Game of Thrones in Somalia: Hammami’s re-ascension?

A little over a year ago, Andrew Lebovich and I published a short article detailing the plight of Omar Hammami amongst al Shabaab’s Game of Thrones in Somalia.  In this March 2012 piece Lebovich and I made several hypotheses:

  1. Hammami’s plea reflected serious divisions inside Shabaab with Ahmed Godane (Abu Zubeyr) on one side and Mukhtar Robow on the other, likely supported by Sheikh Hassan Aweys.
  2. AQAP was an important conduit to Shabaab.
  3. Shabaab’s leader Godane killed off old Al Qaeda members, namely Fazul, in his attempts to consolidate power in Somalia and become the single conduit with al Qaeda.
  4. Zawahiri overreached officially aligning with Shabaab and entangled al Qaeda with an ally plagued with internal dissension.

Thanks to the revelations published by Omar Hammami, these hypotheses all seem to have some merit, although some evidence is suspect or unconfirmed.

Beginning last May, Omar Hammami began a public campaign to keep himself alive in Somalia.  Unable to leave Somalia and suppressed by Godane, Omar’s long-winded initial English biography revealed his belief that Godane’s Shabaab leaders were killing off dissenters in the ranks and in particular foreign fighters supporting Shabaab.

However, Omar’s initial biography left out some key details and only when he resurfaced via his Twitter account (@abumamerican) did we learn from his Arabic biography how Godane adeptly played the game of Somalia’s “Game of Thrones” securing his leadership position by killing off foreign fighters and excluding Robow from key meetings such as the oath of allegiance to al Qaeda.  In January’s Arabic supplement, Omar dropped all the dirty details of the rift between local fighters and foreign fighters and the pseudo-imprisonment of he and his band of banished foreign fighters.  Omar hit the Twittersphere again in January to both bash Godane’s Shabaab and sustain his public presence making it more difficult for Godane to rub out Hammami – a messy situation for a Shabaab in decline and an al Qaeda that has overreached.

Shabaab initially tried to ignore Hammami’s chatter.  When Omar continued the public bashing, Shabaab took to discrediting him via a glossy product. This only emboldened Omar and finally opened the flood gates for Shabaab haters and Shabaab supporters to go full force into battle on Twitter ending and subverting the censorship imposed on al Qaeda forums when Omar defected a year ago.  Two months ago, Omar appeared alone and isolated in his fight against Shabaab’s stalwart supporters.  However, Shabaab dissenters have grown publicly in recent weeks and Omar appears to be fully engaged in a four-language Twitter battle against Shabaab (English, Swahili, Arabic, Somali).

Here’s my quick recap of recent proceedings.  This is a quick and dirty breakdown, not all encompassing.

Team Omar’s Position:

  • Omar claims to be living with the Rahanweyn clan and living somewhere in Bay & Bakool provinces.
  • Omar and his allies on Twitter chief complaints with Godane and Shabaab are:
    • Godane has taken Shabaab off the path of true jihad and created divisions between the local Shabaab (Ansar) and the foreign fighters (mujahidin).
    • Permitting of qat usage and sale are against the tenets of Sharia; Shabaab apparently does this for the purpose of taxation and revenue generation.
    • Godane forces taxation on people that should be exempt.
    • Godane mismanages Shabaab politically, militarily and economically and is responsible for the group’s retreat.
    • Godane doesn’t take the input of other key Somali jihadi leaders like Robow and Aweys into account when he governs.
    • Godane imprisons those that challenge his decisions (often times foreign fighters) and those with money that potentially could challenge Godane’s authority.
    • Godane has a henchmen, maybe named Dahir, who does Godane’s dirty work acting as the internal policeman snuffing Screen Shot 2013-04-03 at 11.22.04 AMout dissent.
    • Omar uses the reasons cited on Twitter to justify pausing his violent jihad. Omar cites Koranic and historical justifications for quitting jihad when its not pursued justly.  Team Omar claims that Robow and Aweys would share this view – although this may not be evident publicly.
    • Omar has gained support from others on Twitter, enough that he is taking questions for debate on a second tier jihadi forum aljihad.com.  Two months ago this would seem inconceivable, but in some weird way, Omar’s banter has rallied some that share his feelings.
    • In conclusion, Omar insists that there will soon be a revolution underway internally and that the right leadership will come back to take control of the situation in Somalia and return Shabaab to prominence – or something like this.  This seems to be more bravado and wishful thinking than concrete plan but we’ll see.

On the Team Godane/al Shabaab side, they continue to attack Omar and his disciples.  Their chief lines of attack and allies are:

  • Omar is a narcissist that cannot stay in line because of his own glory seeking.
  • Omar exaggerates his battle prowess, importance in Shabaab, skills as a military tactician and took credit for a rap he did not write (the last one Omar admits to) – see this post here for summary.
  • Omar and anyone that uses Twitter is a CIA or MI-6 spy and should be imprisoned or killed.
  • Shabaab’s key allies on Twitter seem to be fellow members of Godane’s Isaaq clan, the Muslim Youth Center (MYC) in Kenya and a handful of ethnic Somali foreign fighters from abroad.
  • When Shabaab can’t get traction attacking Omar on his points about jihad, they go after his Americanism and family – yeah that’s right, they go with “Yo Mama” jokes, a key tactic of hardcore terrorists – I guess.

Omar has been boasting about an impending revolution in Somalia where the Mujahidin take back control of jihad from Godane’s influence.  And today, Omar posted this:

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Does this tweet represent more bolstering and bragging or an actual coup in Shabaab’s ranks?  One of the reasons Omar’s support as grown is that Shabaab under Godane has been in retreat.  If Shabaab were ascending rather than descending, Omar would likely be alone in his complaints.

I’ve also wondered some other things:

  • Did al Qaeda, either Central or in Yemen, intervene to quell this divide?  After a year of disaster in their relationship with Shabaab, maybe some key AQ folks stepped in to mend this public dispute.
  • Has Robow re-established his own communications channel back into al Qaeda?  A communication sufficient to gain their support for overtaking Godane?
  • Is Hammami really just the public spokesman for a Robow coup in Shabaab?   This is a “Game of Thrones” after all.  Maybe Hammami is just the public mouthpiece eroding Godane’s credibility in return for protection provided by the Rahanweyn clan?

Stay tuned for the next season in Shabaab’s “Game of Thrones”.

Insightful new al Qaeda document (Talked about) in Germany

I meant to post on this last week, but for those that might have missed it @abususu has some details on a new al Qaeda document that has been declassified talked about in Germany (Sorry, a modification as of 1200 EST. @abususu says its not publicly available but people have seen it).  The U.S. provided the document to the Germans in support of their prosecution of Abdeladim el-K. Yassin Musharbash always provides excellent analysis of al Qaeda and his post here is one of the most informative things I’ve read in a while.  Great reporting by Yassin – he has been out in front on the story of German prosecutions for several months.

Here are some of the pertinent details Yassin describes (but please check out the original post as it is worth the read):

-The document is a letter by Junis al-Mauretani to Osama Bin Laden, dated March 2010. It is 17 pages in the original Arabic.

-The reason the US shared this particular document with the Germans is that in it, al-Mauretani refers to a Moroccan recruit whose date of birth he gives – and which is the same as the date of birth of one of the defendants in said trial.

-In essence, the letter is a sketch or rather a vision of a comprehensive plot against the West, including maritime, economical and other sensitive targets. There is a certain emphasis on critical infrastructure, as al-Mauretani singles out water dams, underwater gaspipelines, bridges between cities and tunnels connecting countries, as well as internet cables as potential targets.

- He also claims that there is a process in place by which followers would be asked to enter into sensitive jobs, e.g. in the transport business for oil and gas. By this, he suggests, it could become easier to attack targets like airports, love parades (sic!) and highly frequented tunnels.

This document sheds light on the cause for concern in 2010 when there were numerous news reports about a potential attack.  From Yassin’s notes, it would seem that al Qaeda was also a bit afraid to create many civilian casualties.

Here are some of the more fascinating bits Yassin mentions in his analysis:

-There is also an interesting passage in which he claims that AQIM has enough funds to help finance his ideas and that the cadres there trust him personally.

So in 2010, the word on the street was that AQIM, of all affiliates, had the money to finance operations.  Sure, the kidnapping ransoms were significant, but maybe we should be asking where else they were getting their money from in 2010? and now?

 2.- AQ during that time actively recruited Westerners - even from among other Jihadist groups like the IMU. I think this means that they wanted this to be large and comprehensive effort – probably sending all of them back around the same time but not striking immediately but rather asking them to recruit even more people and then lie down until told to act. Al-Mauretani in several cases made sure there would be secure means of communications.

One of the notions I’ve heard repeated in analysis on al Qaeda is the group’s supposed conduct of wide-scale direct recruitment.  I disagree with this notion (as I discussed in 2007).  While al Qaeda does direct recruit specific individuals at times, more routinely they use feeder affiliates and other terror groups to parse out many of their most promising recruits.  This system of minor league terrorist farm teams allows mauretanial Qaeda to keep their distance from new recruits that appear too eager or potentially risky and provides a method for assessing the recruit’s abilities before assigning them a role.  Likewise, it provides al Qaeda a larger set of recruitment options from which to choose better talent. This system flourishes when the group situates securely behind an insurgent safe haven allowing them to pluck key people ideally suited for certain roles from pseudo-terror/definite-insurgent groups like IMU, Shabaaab, Ansar al-Sharia, etc.

Essentially, insurgencies allow for the development of terrorist farm teams where recruits then arrive in al Qaeda’s camp with some training, experience and vetting minimizing al Qaeda’s costs and exposure while maximizing their options.  Two things sustain al Qaeda’s position in this hierarchy as the major league team: ideology & money.  While the West is ill-equipped to erode the ideology of zealots, in the future, the West could work to stifle AQ’s resource allocation - something that proved decisive (but lightly discussed) during al Qaeda’s more recent setbacks in Waziristan.

Lastly, this document points to why the U.S. will always need to maintain an aggressive CT posture despite the recent successes against al Qaeda.  Either al Qaeda, or some group like them, will continue to plot terrorist attacks against the U.S.  The U.S. will be attacked, and we will be attacked less if we maintain a persistent eye on the plethora of threats that might emerge from more than a dozen recruitment portals around the world.

Overall, a great post from Yassin and I hope everyone takes a read.

Americans: If you join Shabaab/AQ in Somalia, you’ll probably go to jail…Shabaab jail that is!

Young American aficionados of al Shabaab and al Qaeda (Europeans too): Listen up! You probably thought that if you joined Shabaab/al Qaeda you might eventually get thrown in jail.  That’s a good bet.  However, you probably also thought when you got thrown in jail it would be a U.S. jail or even worse a foreign jail of a U.S. counterterrorism partner.  But, you would be wrong.  The two most likely results of joining al Shabaab are:

  1. Shabaab will eventually betray you and kill you.
  2. Shabaab will throw you in Shabaab jail…(Even worse than being in a U.S. or foreign partner prison.)

Shabaab thought Omar Hammami was being a showboat narcissist refuting them on Twitter and YouTube.  But, it increasingly seems like Omar is not the only foreign fighter to be disavowed and imprisoned by Shabaab.  Omar’s talk of a rift between local Shabaab members and the foreign fighter (“Muj”) seems more and more genuine each day.  And, Omar is not the only foreign fighter or even American being imprisoned by Shabaab.  Today, Omar revealed that the other American foreign fighter imprisoned by Shabaab may be Said Fidhin – an American from Seattle, Washington who was an essential conduit for the recruitment of Americans to Shabaab and from the Isaaq clan. Here’s a note on Fidhin from the Star Tribune:

Those who worked on the receiving end of the pipeline in Somalia, according to witnesses, are: Abshir’s uncle, Said Fidhin, a former resident of the Seattle area known as “Samatar” or “Adair,” and a taxi driver in Somalia known as “Uncle Barre.”

Here’s Omar’s update on Twitter:

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So there you go foreign fighters!  Head off to Somalia, join the call for Shabaab’s jihad.  If the environment, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Somali government, or the West don’t kill you, Shabaab may, and if they don’t kill you they’ll at least throw you in jail.  Wow, jihad sounds so appealing.  You might go to a meeting in Barowe, find out its a set up and get thrown in Shabaab jail.  As I mentioned in a previous post on Omar and the movie The Godfatherif Shabaab calls you to a private meeting, don’t show up!

Also note above that Shabaab now says that, “anyone who writes on twitter is a spy.”  Too funny, Shabaab, once heralded for being groundbreaking in their use of new media, now just as scared as Western governments about leaks and trying to do information control.  Shabaab claims to be boasting a pure form of Islam right?  What is there to hide Shabaab – your tweets make it seem like everything is wonderful?

Update: Omar Hammami ‘Wanted’ – worth 1/5 of a “Bin Laden”

Wow, just when I thought the Omar Hammami saga was turning boring, the U.S. State Department issued an announcement of a $5 million reward for information leading to the arrest or conviction of Omar.  CNN reports that:

Posters and matchbooks in Somali and English emblazoned with the names and pictures of Omar Shafik Hammami and Jehad Serwan Mostafa tout rewards up to $5 million each for information leading to their arrest or conviction. Both men are on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists List.

Omar, dude, what do you think about this?  As has been detailed at length in these blog posts (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10), Omar has been on the run for about a year now – on the run from Shabaab that is.  Now, Omar has apparently really gotten the attention of the U.S. government.  Omar has lots of enemies hunting him, but to be honest he has also rallied a bit of support amongst the Shabaab defector crowd lately so he may not be so alone.  What a mess for the Alabaman!  Omar has said on Twitter many times that he would not be taken alive.  So we’ll see.  Will the Somalis protecting him turn him over for the money?  Or will there be a full on battle between Shabaab and “Omar Hammami & the Muj”?  I guess only time will tell.

Screen Shot 2013-03-20 at 6.07.15 PMAt $5 million, Omar is now the highest valued American on the Most Wanted List surpassing Adam Gadahn at $1 million.  As Omar said, who is more important in the world of terrorists?  Those that do or those that talk?  I wonder if Adam is jealous?  For comparison, Omar Hammami, I guess, is worth about 1/5 of a “Bin Laden” ($25 million reward).

On a separate note, I’m glad that CNN pointed out that the Rewards for Justice program is being used in this initiative – a tool that I think has been underutilized in recent years.  Good for the State Department for using this tool and I point this out to the anti-drone advocates.  The Obama Administration has done and arrest-extradition and a Rewards for Justice pursuit recently.  Here’s a note I wrote a few weeks back about the program.

Additionally, I think the U.S. should look to bring back and further promote the “Rewards-for-Justice” program, especially in Africa, along with drone campaigns.  The program wasn’t that successful after 9/11 in Pakistan (Pashtunwali, tribal protection, etc.), but some of the new CT battefields are not like the Pakistan safe haven al Qaeda enjoyed.  An increase in programs like “Rewards-for-Justice” might ease the need for drone strikes, particularly in those places where resources often trump ideology – like Africa.

So has their “Disposition Matrix” changed in recent weeks?  Do you really think the reward will grab Omar from interior Somalia?  If it doesn’t, then what should we do in the absence of partners in Southern Somalia?

Both officials said the Rewards for Justice Program – administered by the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security – is not involved in drone programs and the intent of the reward is to obtain information that will lead to the men’s apprehension and prosecution.

By the way, I’m pretty sure Jehad Mostafa fixed my air conditioning last summer or installed my cable box, can’t remember which.

Shabaab Twitter Stalking “Omar Hammami & the Muj” in Somalia

In recent years, Somalia’s al Shabaab has been an early adopter of Twitter and been known in the terrorist world as a leading user of openly available social media rather than closed forums to spread its message. Many analysts saw this as a worrying sign; Shabaab tweets could radicalize previously uninfected young minds.  However, Twitter, unlike other platforms, allowed for the open countering of Shabaab by the Kenyan military and the censorship of Shabaab as the group was kicked off the platform for violating terms of service (as described by @intelwire).

More recently Twitter has again undermined Shabaab as the group’s defectors, realizing the hypocrisy of the Shabaab’s words when compared to Shabaab’s actions, have taken to the social media platform to voice their frustrations.  Apparently Shabaab struggles with the same problems as the U.S. government and other open democracies – controlling message.

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Omar Hammami’s persistent countering of Shabaab on Twitter has likely eroded the group’s appeal amongst foreign fighters seeking to join the struggling group.  Now, Hammami’s band of Twitter dissenters appears to have expanded and the “Muhajir” in Somalia have taken to the Twitterverse to express their resentment to Abu Zubayr (Godane) – Shabaab’s leader.  The “Muhajir” (foreign fighters) continue exposing the rift between local Somali Shabaab members and the global foreign fighters that have joined the group only to be treated as second class.  Here, @jawshan7, a Shabaab loyalist, and @abuu_haajir, a Muj dissenter, illuminate the divisions in Shabaab – in awful Twitter English.

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So what does Shabaab do when foreign fighters in their midst behave badly on Twitter?  The same thing American parents do to their teenagers – They take away their cell phones!

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So the mighty Shabaab, rather than taking care of business on the front lines, is instead Twitter stalking its former “Muj” trying to control their speech. Ahhh, the double edged sword of Twitter.

Counterterrorism Policy (Drones) And Hot Dogs: Don’t tell us how they are made!

Last week saw Rand Paul of Kentucky perform a 13 or so hour filibuster of the nomination of John Brennan to the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.  Paul’s filibuster surprised many because he actually advocated for a cause he believed in while also bizarrely focusing on domestic drone targeting above all other aspects of the program.  After Paul’s filibuster theater, the nomination cleared Congress last week and Brennan has assumed his role as Director – a good thing in my opinion.  So after all the emotion, has anything really been accomplished in the drone debate?  Will any changes in policy arise?

Drone policy changes can occur in a few ways.  First, Congress could make laws limiting their use.  I doubt this will happen because the greatest irony of the Paul filibuster is that he comes from the political party that is naturally more supportive of drone use. Second, the executive branch could self-regulate and it appears they have been trying to do this over the years.  The latest New York Times article “How a U.S. citizen came to be in America’s cross hairs“ provides even more details and clarity on the lengths the Obama administration went to find legal justification for their use of drones to pursue Anwar al-Awlaki.  As I noted in months past, the DOJ memo, in my opinion, didn’t provide endless powers to the President but instead developed specific authorities for the pursuit of Awlaki – a policy built on a unique case. This may or may not be a good idea.

The article provides the chronology for why the U.S. became so alarmed by Awlaki.

By 2008, said Philip Mudd, then a top F.B.I. counterterrorism official, Mr. Awlaki “was cropping up as a radicalizer — not in just a few investigations, but in what seemed to be every investigation.”

However, this evidence represented protected First Amendment speech so did not justify lethal action.  It wasn’t until the Abdulmutallab interrogation that the Obama administration changed course.

“He had been on the radar all along, but it was Abdulmutallab’s testimony that really sealed it in my mind that this guy was dangerous and that we needed to go after him,” said Dennis C. Blair, then director of national intelligence.

and then more attacks emerged….

Meanwhile, attacks linked in various ways to Mr. Awlaki continued to mount, including the attempted car bombing of Times Square in May 2010 by Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized American citizen who had reached out to the preacher on the Internet, and the attempted bombing by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula of cargo planes bound for the United States that October.

I recommend that everyone check out the New York Times article as it provides real depth in reporting. The article also briefly mentions the revelations from Morten Storm – an alleged Danish agent that supposedly helped track Awlaki in Yemen.  I’m not so sure I buy into the whole Morten Storm story, but here is one interesting note from The Daily Beast that caught my eye. Storm claims Awlaki:

“He [Awlaki] wanted to attack the big shopping centers in the West … by using biological weapons. But I said that I didn’t want to take part in killing civilians—I could only agree to attacking military targets,” Storm says. “Of course I wouldn’t have helped him carry out any kind of terrorist actions. But I had to let him think that I was on his side.”

Well, if true, I’m sure the idea of a ‘biological weapons attack in a shopping mall’ certainly got the administration’s attention and hurried along the justification.

So will the executive branch continue to check itself? I think so, but will it be enough.  The debates may have at least sent a message to the administration.  Unfortunately, it will be entirely up to the Obama administration to check itself as I doubt Congress has the ability to do much of anything. BTW, did anyone catch that John Brennan was sworn in on an original draft of the Constitution? I assume he hears everyone’s concerns, good for him.

In conclusion, Americans continue to struggle with how best to conduct counterterrorism more than ten years after the 9/11 attacks.  For the most part, Americans want their counterterrorism strategy to be like hot dogs – it should taste good but don’t tell them how its made.  As time passes from the trauma of the 9/11 attacks, the American stomach for killing terrorists lessens – when the hot dogs get cold, no one wants to eat them.  Thus by advocating only one solution (law enforcement only – no drones), Americans would be choosing 1) either inaction and eventual attack or 2) counterterrorism by proxy where Americans temporarily enjoy a “Hear No Evil, See No Evil” approach likely to render long term negative consequences such as the backing of corrupt dictators, repression of freedom and the empowering of future non-state threats (like al Qaeda).  On the flip side, the Obama administration will continue to be able to use drone strikes until innocent people are killed again by an errant shot based on poor intelligence – a roughly 100% chance this will happen.

For many opposed to targeted killing by drone, they would prefer all enemies in a new asymmetric world be adapted such they can be mitigated through legal processes created in a more than 200 year old document. They like their threats to be either criminals or enemy nations; not a blend of the two.  Unfortunately, America’s adversaries have adapted as threats as a direct result of the U.S. system.  As America is successful in law enforcement and military operations, enemies morph straddling the lines of sovereignty, exploiting weak states, using disruptive technology, riding ideologies that rally the disenfranchised and hitting seams between bureaucracies and nations.  Protecting America’s values and effectively deterring terrorists and other threat actors (like cyber) requires new laws and new processes.  Barring another major attack, the momentum to make change appears too weak – status quo will likely reign.

As for Awlaki, from my perspective, there’s only two differences between him and Bin Laden.  Bin Laden’s attacks 1) succeeded and 2) were of a far greater magnitude than Awlaki’s.  Bin Laden, like Awlaki, never personally executed attacks on the U.S. – he advocated them, approved of them and helped finance them, but he didn’t personally execute the attacks. Likewise, both Bin Laden and Awlaki were only partially involved in the design of actual attacks (KSM largely played that role for UBL and presumably Asiri for Awlaki). Yet, no one thought twice about the elimination of Bin Laden which was seen as an act of warfare more than law enforcement action.  If the biological attacks on a shopping mall threats were true, one might even argue that Awlaki was more personally involved in attacking the U.S. than Bin Laden. If Abdulmutallab had detonated his device over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, I doubt many Americans would be too squeamish about Awlaki getting smacked by a drone.  I realize Bin Laden was indicted in a U.S. court, but that still wasn’t sufficient for two different administrations to aggressively pursue him through a targeted killing.  It was debated, but only committed to post-9/11.

So should the U.S. kill Awlaki before a plane blows up over Detroit or before a biological attack hits a mall? Or should the U.S. wait until after an attack and engage in a ten year war to root out an amorphous enemy and spend a fortune to rebuild a failed state?  Without new laws and new processes, the U.S. will always be in limbo riding a pendulum swinging back and forth between inaction and overextension.