The New York Times released another article this weekend again questioning the ideological commitment of so called “al Qaeda linked” groups in Mali. The post “Algeria Sowed Seeds Of Hostage Crisis as it Nurtured Warlord” describes how Ansar Dine leader, Iyad Ag Ghali, used religion as a means to reassert himself amongst his secular Tuareg rivals.
In late 2011, scholars say, he made a bid to become head of his Tuareg tribe — a position that would have put him at the forefront of northern Mali’s struggle for autonomy. When he was rebuffed, Mr. Ag Ghali struck out on his own and formed Ansar Dine, branding it as a religiously inspired alternative to the more secular Tuaregs.
A common mantra of Western CT pundits remains the argument that the U.S. will never be safe unless the evil ideology of Bin Laden has been removed from the planet forever. This briefs well in DC as it makes Americans believe that terrorism can be eliminated if we simply solve one problem – that of bad ideology. However, this article rightly points out how this “hedgehog – one big thing” type thinking quickly falls apart when placed in local contexts.
Chasing a few hundred foreign fighters inspired by religious zeal from the vast, trackless area would be challenge enough. But the forces shaping the conflict are far more complicated than that, driven by personal ambitions, old rivalries, tribal politics, the relationship between militants and states, and even the fight for control of the lucrative drug trade.
Some gather from my blog posts and Twitter sarcasm that I believe ideology has no importance with regards to terrorism. This is not the case. I believe al Qaeda’s ideology is important at different levels for each group and individual based on their own context. The combination of incentives groups and individuals receive from pursuing al Qaeda’s ideology varies considerably based on physical, economic and social contexts. (See here and here.) I use a labor economics approach when I analyze terrorism because it allows for factors other than ideology to contribute to a recruit’s decision to work as a terrorist. For Westerners, like Omar, joining al Qaeda groups rests largely on their belief in al Qaeda’s ideology and probably a host of psychological factors. However, for African groups and individuals (much of what I blog about here), there are many factors contributing to a wavering allegiance to al Qaeda’s ideology (See Chapter 2). In Africa, survival often trumps ideology resulting in malleable interpretations of al Qaeda’s ideology and Sharia. A recent example is Omar Hammami’s complaints over Shabaab’s passive allowance of Qat under Sharia – largely for the purpose of taxing the drug trade for revenue.
Oh Omar, calling me a “kuffar”. Thank you, you are too kind.
In conclusion, I do believe ideology matters but I don’t believe it should be overstated. The importance of al Qaeda’s ideology in Africa, at least for the West, remains the targets it designates. If AQIM/Ansar Dine/MUJWA, etc. didn’t support an ideology where the West was the primary target, I doubt the West would care much about African conflict in the Sahel. Genocide has occurred in Darfur for years, yet the West never seriously mobilized to intervene. However, nine months of perceived “al Qaeda linked” strength in the Sahel brought on a French intervention and Western support. If militant groups like Ansar Dine didn’t support an ideology directly targeting the West, the West would probably ignore them and their issues – such is one of the motivations for pursuing terrorism according to Dr. Bruce Hoffman.
Last point of interest from this latest article on Algeria and Ansar Dine. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS everywhere please listen: 1) when you adversary’s ideology believes that your government should not exist (i.e. al Qaeda, its affiliates) and 2) they offer to negotiate for peace (i.e. Ansar Dine with Algeria, Pakistani Taliban with Pakistan), what the militant group is really saying is, “We want to negotiate with you, government, so that you will not interfere with us while we consolidate our resources and develop a plan to attack you!”
his men were in Algiers negotiating with the government, promising peace and signing agreements. This continued despite ample evidence that Mr. Ag Ghali had become a committed ally of Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb — Algeria’s sworn enemy — receiving arms, weapons, men and other material from the group.