AQAP Archives - Selected Wisdom

May 21, 2013 by Clint

Will there be “blowback” from U.S. drone use?

After a few weeks of quiet, the drone debate has surfaced again in the U.S.

The past week has seen at least two drone strikes in Yemen. One reportedly killed the Ansar al-Sharia leader of Abyan province and the Long War Journal claims the latest attack , launched missiles at,

“two fighters “as they left a farm on a motorbike” in the Khobza area of Baydah province”

A year ago, all the talk of terrorism, counterterrorism and drones centered on Yemen. The media has lost interest in Yemen over the past year and while the pace of drone strikes appears to have decreased; their use has not gone away.

More interesting, an article from the Huffington Post I read yesterday that was published in 2010 entitled “Drones over Pakistan: Menace or Best Viable Option?”. This article is a must read. Dr. C. Christine Fair had spent months in Pakistan researching the drone issue and, similar to Christopher Swift’s take on Yemen last year, found a very different perspective on the drone debate inside Pakistan. She spoke with a senior Pakistani officer and:

This senior officer himself attested to Pakistan’s own inability to eliminate key threats and the necessity of the drones to eliminate terrorists in a way that most effectively minimizes the loss of innocent lives.

As for those stories that recount the psychological damage placed on populations by the buzz of drones, Fair contrasts with this anecdote:

“Another interlocutor explained that when children hear the buzz of the drones, they go their roofs to watch the spectacle of precision rather than cowering in fear of random “death from above.”

While I’m sure there have been mistakes in the use of drones in Pakistan, Fair says in Pakistan,

This antipathy towards the program is due in large measure to the collaboration of Pakistan’s media to sustain tenacious criticism of the program by spreading suspect civilian casualty reports planted by the militants themselves or various “agencies.”

Well, what should we think? As readers of this blog, you likely know my stance, “Go Drone With Some Modifications” (See here and here). However, the debate often centers around one’s perception of innocence and a which is more noble: means or ends. This is where it all gets really tricky.

COIN proponents like the notion of winning “hearts and minds” and this sells well to the public as the means ‘feel’ just. But in actuality, COIN in Pakistan means Pakistani army and militia invasion, which creates immeasurable casualties over time. Drones, on the other hand, ‘feel’ evil, but I believe kill more precisely than any other tool and if I had to choose between a drone strike or sending in a tribal militia – I’ll go drone every time. (Did you see above, we just hit two dudes on a motorbike! it doesn’t get much more precise than that.) Again, both parties, drone critics and drone advocates, will swing the number of civilian casualties in their favor because there is no clear definition of the enemy and the U.S. isn’t overly clear about its use of the tool. Would Osama Bin Laden’s wife be considered a militant or a civilian? Were the people in an AQAP member’s house hit by a drone strike militants or civilians? What about the house across the street from where the missile strikes, militants or civilians?

Drone critics have made some progress, I believe, in curbing the use of drones. The pace of attacks has decreased overall it seems. I assume this is either due to public pressure or that the U.S. may be running out of targets. However, critics of drones are unlikely to make much more progress in reducing drone use unless they can provide a viable counterterrorism alternative to drones – America’s most effective and efficient counterterrorism tool. While critics protested publicly during the hearings, I’ve heard little from them since Brennan’s confirmation. If drone critics remain concerned about their use, they must sustain a real campaign against their use and provide plausible alternatives. The truth is: both political parties and most Americans are big fans of drones as long as they aren’t aimed at them.

The mantra I’ve seen repeated amongst drone critics has been that the U.S. use of drones will result in “blowback” against the U.S. While I agree this is conceivable, this repeated “you just wait, this is going to come back to haunt you” argument needs to come with some specific predictions if it is to be treated seriously. I’ve listened to this argument against drone use for more than two years now. (See here and here) If there is going to be “blowback” for the U.S. use of drones, when will there be “blowback” and where will there be “blowback”? Be specific. To say there will be a terrorist attack from Yemen again, or from Pakistan again, will surely be correct, but these attacks may have only some or no relation to U.S. drone use.

Conversely, the option “to not use drones” over the past several years must be discussed by those that criticize drone use. For example, I believe if the U.S. had not developed and implemented the use of drones in Pakistan, al Qaeda would be stronger today than it currently is, the U.S. would be further engaged in Afghanistan providing more troops for a longer period, and the TTP and al Qaeda would maintain a strong foothold in Pakistan’s frontier that would further destabilize Pakistan and yield more terrorist attacks against the West. Likewise, I also believe the success of drones in Pakistan has sent al Qaeda to seek alternative safe havens – one of which is Yemen. In Yemen, without the use of drones, I believe the U.S. would be committed to a larger ground presence and further entanglement with dubious allies in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Additionally, I believe the U.S. would have suffered more attacks from an AQAP whose external operations, led by Awlaki, would have continued, increased and improved with time. While my assessment, due to the course of history, cannot be proven right or wrong, I can see the logic for why the U.S. chose to pursue drone strikes and I believe it outweighs the arguments for not using drones. For drone critics, they must qualify their prophecy about the long-run effects of drone use. I’ve heard the drone “blowback” argument for at least three consecutive years now and, while I respect it, I’m not convinced.

April 3, 2013 by Clint

New Season of Shabaab’s Game of Thrones in Somalia: Hammami’s re-ascension?

A little over a year ago, Andrew Lebovich and I published a short article detailing the plight of Omar Hammami amongst al Shabaab’s Game of Thrones in Somalia. In this March 2012 piece Lebovich and I made several hypotheses:

Hammami’s plea reflected serious divisions inside Shabaab with Ahmed Godane (Abu Zubeyr) on one side and Mukhtar Robow on the other, likely supported by Sheikh Hassan Aweys.
AQAP was an important conduit to Shabaab.
Shabaab’s leader Godane killed off old Al Qaeda members, namely Fazul, in his attempts to consolidate power in Somalia and become the single conduit with al Qaeda.
Zawahiri overreached officially aligning with Shabaab and entangled al Qaeda with an ally plagued with internal dissension.

Thanks to the revelations published by Omar Hammami, these hypotheses all seem to have some merit, although some evidence is suspect or unconfirmed.

Beginning last May, Omar Hammami began a public campaign to keep himself alive in Somalia. Unable to leave Somalia and suppressed by Godane, Omar’s long-winded initial English biography revealed his belief that Godane’s Shabaab leaders were killing off dissenters in the ranks and in particular foreign fighters supporting Shabaab.

However, Omar’s initial biography left out some key details and only when he resurfaced via his Twitter account (@abumamerican) did we learn from his Arabic biography how Godane adeptly played the game of Somalia’s “Game of Thrones” securing his leadership position by killing off foreign fighters and excluding Robow from key meetings such as the oath of allegiance to al Qaeda. In January’s Arabic supplement, Omar dropped all the dirty details of the rift between local fighters and foreign fighters and the pseudo-imprisonment of he and his band of banished foreign fighters. Omar hit the Twittersphere again in January to both bash Godane’s Shabaab and sustain his public presence making it more difficult for Godane to rub out Hammami – a messy situation for a Shabaab in decline and an al Qaeda that has overreached.

Shabaab initially tried to ignore Hammami’s chatter. When Omar continued the public bashing, Shabaab took to discrediting him via a glossy product. This only emboldened Omar and finally opened the flood gates for Shabaab haters and Shabaab supporters to go full force into battle on Twitter ending and subverting the censorship imposed on al Qaeda forums when Omar defected a year ago. Two months ago, Omar appeared alone and isolated in his fight against Shabaab’s stalwart supporters. However, Shabaab dissenters have grown publicly in recent weeks and Omar appears to be fully engaged in a four-language Twitter battle against Shabaab (English, Swahili, Arabic, Somali).

Here’s my quick recap of recent proceedings. This is a quick and dirty breakdown, not all encompassing.

Team Omar’s Position:

Omar claims to be living with the Rahanweyn clan and living somewhere in Bay & Bakool provinces.
Omar and his allies on Twitter chief complaints with Godane and Shabaab are:
- Godane has taken Shabaab off the path of true jihad and created divisions between the local Shabaab (Ansar) and the foreign fighters (mujahidin).
- Permitting of qat usage and sale are against the tenets of Sharia; Shabaab apparently does this for the purpose of taxation and revenue generation.
- Godane forces taxation on people that should be exempt.
- Godane mismanages Shabaab politically, militarily and economically and is responsible for the group’s retreat.
- Godane doesn’t take the input of other key Somali jihadi leaders like Robow and Aweys into account when he governs.
- Godane imprisons those that challenge his decisions (often times foreign fighters) and those with money that potentially could challenge Godane’s authority.
- Godane has a henchmen, maybe named Dahir, who does Godane’s dirty work acting as the internal policeman snuffing out dissent.
- Omar uses the reasons cited on Twitter to justify pausing his violent jihad. Omar cites Koranic and historical justifications for quitting jihad when its not pursued justly. Team Omar claims that Robow and Aweys would share this view – although this may not be evident publicly.
- Omar has gained support from others on Twitter, enough that he is taking questions for debate on a second tier jihadi forum aljihad.com. Two months ago this would seem inconceivable, but in some weird way, Omar’s banter has rallied some that share his feelings.
- In conclusion, Omar insists that there will soon be a revolution underway internally and that the right leadership will come back to take control of the situation in Somalia and return Shabaab to prominence – or something like this. This seems to be more bravado and wishful thinking than concrete plan but we’ll see.

On the Team Godane/al Shabaab side, they continue to attack Omar and his disciples. Their chief lines of attack and allies are:

Omar is a narcissist that cannot stay in line because of his own glory seeking.
Omar exaggerates his battle prowess, importance in Shabaab, skills as a military tactician and took credit for a rap he did not write (the last one Omar admits to) – see this post here for summary.
Omar and anyone that uses Twitter is a CIA or MI-6 spy and should be imprisoned or killed.
Shabaab’s key allies on Twitter seem to be fellow members of Godane’s Isaaq clan, the Muslim Youth Center (MYC) in Kenya and a handful of ethnic Somali foreign fighters from abroad.
When Shabaab can’t get traction attacking Omar on his points about jihad, they go after his Americanism and family – yeah that’s right, they go with “Yo Mama” jokes, a key tactic of hardcore terrorists – I guess.

Omar has been boasting about an impending revolution in Somalia where the Mujahidin take back control of jihad from Godane’s influence. And today, Omar posted this:

Does this tweet represent more bolstering and bragging or an actual coup in Shabaab’s ranks? One of the reasons Omar’s support as grown is that Shabaab under Godane has been in retreat. If Shabaab were ascending rather than descending, Omar would likely be alone in his complaints.

I’ve also wondered some other things:

Did al Qaeda, either Central or in Yemen, intervene to quell this divide? After a year of disaster in their relationship with Shabaab, maybe some key AQ folks stepped in to mend this public dispute.
Has Robow re-established his own communications channel back into al Qaeda? A communication sufficient to gain their support for overtaking Godane?
Is Hammami really just the public spokesman for a Robow coup in Shabaab? This is a “Game of Thrones” after all. Maybe Hammami is just the public mouthpiece eroding Godane’s credibility in return for protection provided by the Rahanweyn clan?

Stay tuned for the next season in Shabaab’s “Game of Thrones”.

March 14, 2013 by Clint

Counterterrorism Policy (Drones) And Hot Dogs: Don’t tell us how they are made!

Last week saw Rand Paul of Kentucky perform a 13 or so hour filibuster of the nomination of John Brennan to the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Paul’s filibuster surprised many because he actually advocated for a cause he believed in while also bizarrely focusing on domestic drone targeting above all other aspects of the program. After Paul’s filibuster theater, the nomination cleared Congress last week and Brennan has assumed his role as Director – a good thing in my opinion. So after all the emotion, has anything really been accomplished in the drone debate? Will any changes in policy arise?

Drone policy changes can occur in a few ways. First, Congress could make laws limiting their use. I doubt this will happen because the greatest irony of the Paul filibuster is that he comes from the political party that is naturally more supportive of drone use. Second, the executive branch could self-regulate and it appears they have been trying to do this over the years. The latest New York Times article “How a U.S. citizen came to be in America’s cross hairs“ provides even more details and clarity on the lengths the Obama administration went to find legal justification for their use of drones to pursue Anwar al-Awlaki. As I noted in months past, the DOJ memo, in my opinion, didn’t provide endless powers to the President but instead developed specific authorities for the pursuit of Awlaki – a policy built on a unique case. This may or may not be a good idea.

The article provides the chronology for why the U.S. became so alarmed by Awlaki.

By 2008, said Philip Mudd, then a top F.B.I. counterterrorism official, Mr. Awlaki “was cropping up as a radicalizer — not in just a few investigations, but in what seemed to be every investigation.”

However, this evidence represented protected First Amendment speech so did not justify lethal action. It wasn’t until the Abdulmutallab interrogation that the Obama administration changed course.

“He had been on the radar all along, but it was Abdulmutallab’s testimony that really sealed it in my mind that this guy was dangerous and that we needed to go after him,” said Dennis C. Blair, then director of national intelligence.

and then more attacks emerged….

Meanwhile, attacks linked in various ways to Mr. Awlaki continued to mount, including the attempted car bombing of Times Square in May 2010 by Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized American citizen who had reached out to the preacher on the Internet, and the attempted bombing by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula of cargo planes bound for the United States that October.

I recommend that everyone check out the New York Times article as it provides real depth in reporting. The article also briefly mentions the revelations from Morten Storm – an alleged Danish agent that supposedly helped track Awlaki in Yemen. I’m not so sure I buy into the whole Morten Storm story, but here is one interesting note from The Daily Beast that caught my eye. Storm claims Awlaki:

“He [Awlaki] wanted to attack the big shopping centers in the West … by using biological weapons. But I said that I didn’t want to take part in killing civilians—I could only agree to attacking military targets,” Storm says. “Of course I wouldn’t have helped him carry out any kind of terrorist actions. But I had to let him think that I was on his side.”

Well, if true, I’m sure the idea of a ‘biological weapons attack in a shopping mall’ certainly got the administration’s attention and hurried along the justification.

So will the executive branch continue to check itself? I think so, but will it be enough. The debates may have at least sent a message to the administration. Unfortunately, it will be entirely up to the Obama administration to check itself as I doubt Congress has the ability to do much of anything. BTW, did anyone catch that John Brennan was sworn in on an original draft of the Constitution? I assume he hears everyone’s concerns, good for him.

In conclusion, Americans continue to struggle with how best to conduct counterterrorism more than ten years after the 9/11 attacks. For the most part, Americans want their counterterrorism strategy to be like hot dogs – it should taste good but don’t tell them how its made. As time passes from the trauma of the 9/11 attacks, the American stomach for killing terrorists lessens – when the hot dogs get cold, no one wants to eat them. Thus by advocating only one solution (law enforcement only – no drones), Americans would be choosing 1) either inaction and eventual attack or 2) counterterrorism by proxy where Americans temporarily enjoy a “Hear No Evil, See No Evil” approach likely to render long term negative consequences such as the backing of corrupt dictators, repression of freedom and the empowering of future non-state threats (like al Qaeda). On the flip side, the Obama administration will continue to be able to use drone strikes until innocent people are killed again by an errant shot based on poor intelligence – a roughly 100% chance this will happen.

For many opposed to targeted killing by drone, they would prefer all enemies in a new asymmetric world be adapted such they can be mitigated through legal processes created in a more than 200 year old document. They like their threats to be either criminals or enemy nations; not a blend of the two. Unfortunately, America’s adversaries have adapted as threats as a direct result of the U.S. system. As America is successful in law enforcement and military operations, enemies morph straddling the lines of sovereignty, exploiting weak states, using disruptive technology, riding ideologies that rally the disenfranchised and hitting seams between bureaucracies and nations. Protecting America’s values and effectively deterring terrorists and other threat actors (like cyber) requires new laws and new processes. Barring another major attack, the momentum to make change appears too weak – status quo will likely reign.

As for Awlaki, from my perspective, there’s only two differences between him and Bin Laden. Bin Laden’s attacks 1) succeeded and 2) were of a far greater magnitude than Awlaki’s. Bin Laden, like Awlaki, never personally executed attacks on the U.S. – he advocated them, approved of them and helped finance them, but he didn’t personally execute the attacks. Likewise, both Bin Laden and Awlaki were only partially involved in the design of actual attacks (KSM largely played that role for UBL and presumably Asiri for Awlaki). Yet, no one thought twice about the elimination of Bin Laden which was seen as an act of warfare more than law enforcement action. If the biological attacks on a shopping mall threats were true, one might even argue that Awlaki was more personally involved in attacking the U.S. than Bin Laden. If Abdulmutallab had detonated his device over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, I doubt many Americans would be too squeamish about Awlaki getting smacked by a drone. I realize Bin Laden was indicted in a U.S. court, but that still wasn’t sufficient for two different administrations to aggressively pursue him through a targeted killing. It was debated, but only committed to post-9/11.

So should the U.S. kill Awlaki before a plane blows up over Detroit or before a biological attack hits a mall? Or should the U.S. wait until after an attack and engage in a ten year war to root out an amorphous enemy and spend a fortune to rebuild a failed state? Without new laws and new processes, the U.S. will always be in limbo riding a pendulum swinging back and forth between inaction and overextension.

February 13, 2013 by Clint

Kidnapping: Why Al Qaeda Needs Donations More Than Ransoms

Yesterday, the Foreign Policy Research Institute provided me another opportunity to post on their blog Geopoliticus. For this post, I did an extended discussion and update to a series of posts I did with Alex Thurston several years back regarding AQIM’s use of kidnapping in the Sahel. For the old discussions of AQIM & others’ kidnapping operations see these posts and Alex’s excellent insights at these posts – #1, #2, #3, #4 and #5.

In this new post, entitled “Why al Qaeda Needs Donations More Than Ransoms,” I discuss the trade offs and disadvantages for al Qaeda affiliates such as AQIM that are dependent on illicit funding schemes, namely kidnapping, to sustain their operations. I conclude with the opinion that al Qaeda needs donations more than ransoms if they intend to orchestrate a comeback. Here’s an excerpt of the post below and for the entire post, visit this link at FPRI.

“On the surface, kidnapping and smuggling appears an ideal financial engine for terror groups like al Qaeda and its affiliates. This assertion, however, ignores the inherent challenges encountered when any organization, whether terrorist group to criminal enterprise, undertakes illicit funding schemes. Kidnapping and ransom operations introduce significant transaction costs which significantly devalue the gross sum of revenues. Kidnapping operations create a series of internal costs for terror groups:

Networks Of Intermediaries - Negotiations and payments for kidnapping operations require layers of middlemen with each network extracting a percentage of the overall take.
Transaction Time - The time between hostage taking and ransom payments can be significant requiring the terror group to maintain a solid reserve of capital to sustain its operations between transactions. Essentially, time is money, and in the case of kidnapping operations, a cost to the terror group.
Hostage Deaths - The trauma of kidnapping and the harsh environments in which terrorist groups operate often result in the death of hostages. The death of a hostage hurts the terror group directly in terms of loss revenues. But, even more damage occurs indirectly as the hostage death erodes trust for future ransom negotiations.
Infighting - In any business, transactions often lead to conflict. This is particularly true in illicit industries where trust is constantly being questioned. Kidnapping negotiations naturally generate friction between intermediaries and when negotiations become protracted parties may turn to open conflict.
Declines in Hostage Availability - As groups like AQIM continue to kidnap hostages, the availability of hostages naturally declines requiring the terror group to operate at longer distances to acquire captives. This distance imposes significant logistical costs.
Undermines Terror Group’s Ideology - Inevitably, in illicit schemes and even licit enterprises, business gets messy and the terror group must make choices with regards to sustaining its resource flow. Often times, these choices result in alienation of a terror group’s local base of popular support or hypocritical conflicts of interest between the terror group’s deeds and its words. The recent accusations of Omar Hammami, an American foreign fighter who has fallen out of favor with al Shabaab, demonstrate how al Shabaab’s turning a blind eye to Qat distribution in Somalia for the purpose of taxation has called into question the group’s committment to al Qaeda’s ideology and Sharia law.
Opportunity Costs - When al Qaeda is dedicating more time, manpower and resources to illicit fund generation, they are spending less time recruiting and training new operatives, planning operations and executing attacks.”

Also, @el_Grillo1 made a point which I overlooked in the FPRI post. Another detractor of illicit revenue generation for al Qaeda groups is the scrutiny brought on terrorists by law enforcement and the military when they conduct illegal activities like kidnapping and drug smuggling. An important point that I overlooked in the FPRI post. Here is a quick chart I put together showing the relative value of illicit funds to donor provided dollars.

January 8, 2013 by Clint

Hammami’s Latest Call Reveals Deceit, Dissension and Death in Shabaab & al Qaeda

Yesterday, I posted about a Twitter account I believed to be that of Omar Hammami or his close associate (here and here). Well, Hammami didn’t disappoint and returned this morning with some tweets and this afternoon with all the real dirt about the al Shabaab fractures and al Qaeda merger/fiasco. Omar, thanks for sending all the details on al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s infighting and how you got pushed out by Godane (Abu Zubayr). You confirmed many of my suspicions from last winter. @Aynte was also thinking along the same lines as well. And for those that were claiming there was no evidence of splits in al-Shabaab, stop being foolish.
Here’s where the morning started off.

First, a tweet from Omar. I’m not sure how Omar’s mission in Somalia relates to Martin Luther King. Last time I checked, Martin Luther King was about non-violence and Omar and the Somalia jihad is very much about violence. I believe MLK had a dream and Omar is having a nightmare.

But, then came this tweet.

Now we are talking. Omar seems to think the splits and fractures he is experiencing with al Shabaab are occurring with al Qaeda as well. Omar, we’d all love to know more so please expand. I realize you don’t want to put yourself in jeopardy, but I think you’ve already shot one of your feet, so no need to hold back.

Things were quiet for most of the day and then @azelin sent out the links to a new Hammami video showing a tired and gaunt Hammami (See below). This video link at his YouTube channel was accompanied with two documents in Arabic (Here’s #1 and #2). Previously, Omar had posted his biography, in english, which was ignored by the e-jihadi crowd. This time he wrote two Arabic documents, which detail his trials and tribulations in Somalia. I’m assuming he chose Arabic to make sure word got out in the jihadi crowd. While I don’t read Arabic, I’ve gone through the Google translate and talked to a knowledgeable scholar, Dr. Will McCants, about what I think are key passages.

Omar names “names” and illustrates in great detail conflict between different factions in al Shabaab, conflict between al Qaeda and al Shabaab, and even disagreements between different al Qaeda elements in Somalia. Great stuff all around and for those that believe al Qaeda is unified and operates in lock step based on the rules of an all powerful ideology – you need to stop what you are doing and read Omar’s notes.

Again, I’m not an Arabic speaker, but I’ll do some quick paraphrasing here of what I interpreted (could be some mistakes) and the implications. For Arabic speakers out there, if you do an english translation of these documents, please post and send me the link and I’ll do a post on them here.

Connections between al Shabaab and al Qaeda in Yemen – In one section, Omar describes how members of al Qaeda in Yemen (AQAP) showed up in Somalia and were the communication conduit with al Qaeda Central in Afghanistan/Pakistan. The AQAP members were trying to coordinate the official merger of al Shabaab with al Qaeda. At the time, Ahmed Godane (Abu Zubayr) was against the merger as he thought the conditions in Somalia were not right yet. It seems at the point of the AQAP visit, Shabaab thought local public support for an Islamic state was sufficient but that the local populace would reject an alliance with al Qaeda. However, the foreign fighters present, in principle, did agree to be affiliated with al Qaeda. (My question: Did Godane balk at unity with al Qaeda at this point because he did not have firm control of al Shabaab and wanted to shore up loose ends before a formal merger?)
Desire to conduct external operations in Kenya – Throughout the second document, Hammami consistently discusses the desire by many within al Shabaab and particularly al Qaeda elements to begin conducting foreign operations and a deliberate campaign in Kenya. However, it appears certain leaders within Shabaab, particularly Godane I think, wanted to keep a lid on the foreign fighters and keep them focused on internal fighting in Somalia. (My question: Does the recent uptick in al Shabaab activity in Kenya represent a loss of control by Godane over Shabaab? I would assume with Shabaab’s losses and Godane likely fleeing north to Galgala, his control on those wanting to operate in Kenya is limited.)
Fazul’s return to Somalia, his conflict with Godane and resulting death – Omar describes in one section that legendary al Qaeda operative Harun Fazul returned with trainers to Somalia with the intent of establishing an external operations capability to project al Qaeda attacks from Somalia. Fazul told one of the commanders of foreign fighters, going by the name of A’sar Yusr, that he wanted to establish a training camp in the mountains of Puntland (probably Galgala). From what I understand, A’sar Yusr let Fazul’s plans slip to Godane (Abu Zubayr). Godane apparently didn’t like Fazul’s plan because 1) Godane, being from Hargeisa, didn’t want Fazul playing on his turf in Puntland (probably Galgala) and 2) Godane believed Fazul to be aligned with Mukhtar Robow (Abu Mansur) – Godane’s Southern Somalia rival for control of al Shabaab. As I understand it, this led Godane to plot Fazul’s demise setting Fazul up to approach a checkpoint in Mogadishu that was awaiting his arrival and prepared to kill him. (My note: This passage confirms Nelly Lahoud’s theory that Fazul was betrayed. This section also describes al Qaeda’s intent to conduct external operations from Somalia and matches the reporting of Michelle Shepard where she details how Fazul had plans for attacking London when he was killed.)
Conflicts between local Somali clan fighters (Ansar) and foreign fighters (Muhajir)- Hammami describes how many of the trainers that came with Fazul left Somalia. When they departed, many foreign fighters to Somalia left the country with the trainers to join al Qaeda’s ranks outside of Somalia. Hammami says the foreign fighters were frustrated because the fighting in Somalia was not a real jihad. Omar suggests foreign fighters were treated poorly in a variety of ways. As mentioned in his biography, he notes that there were constant tensions about how foreign fighters desired to be separated into their own cadres similar to how its done with Taliban/al Qaeda in Pakistan. There are also some comparisons to how foreign fighters are used in Iraq but I didn’t understand all of this. (My note: Omar, this is an exact replay of al Qaeda’s experience in Somalia from 1992-1994. The clans didn’t like being bossed around by outsiders and they always wanted to focus on local battles over global issues.)
Hammami overstepped with Godane and got punished – In one passage, Hammami describes his rift with Godane and how this has likely put him in his current predicament. Hammami had pledged at some point to stay out of Shabaab politics. Godane, at some point, wants to know why the foreign fighters are leaving Somalia. Hammami volunteers to explain the circumstances under which foreign fighters are frustrated over the local focus of clan fighters. Hammami suggests that a way to alleviate this frustration is for Godane to step aside and let Mukhtar Robow (Abu Mansur) take a bigger leadership role in Shabaab as he is well respected by the local Shabaab fighters and also has good rapport with the foreign fighters. Godane sees this as a challenge to his leadership and believes Hammami is partaking in politics again (breaking his promise to abstain) and joining the side of his rival Robow. This overstep later leads to Godane having angst with Hammami. (My notes: Omar needs a class in how to win friends and influence people. Sounds like he directly questioned Godane’s leadership and it wasn’t received well.)
Disastrous merger between al Shabaab and al Qaeda – My interpretation is that Godane calls a meeting for all of al Shabaab’s shura. Once everyone arrives, Godane announces that al Shabaab is going to officially join al Qaeda. Those in attendance, I believe, were caught a little off guard but were amenable. Then, Godane’s deputy (Guessing this might be Ibrahim al-Afghani) compels everyone to swear bayat (oath of allegiance) to al Qaeda and Godane. Those at the meeting think they have been fooled because there is no immediate formal recognition of this merger by al Qaeda Central and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Those that swore allegiance have a bad taste in their mouth about how this meeting went down as they have been told before they were going to be officially part of al Qaeda only to find out later that this was not true. Instead they would usually find out that a Somali leader had used the claim only as a political ploy to consolidate power. Also, Robow (Abu Mansur) is not at the meeting, which makes people nervous, and it is weeks (if I remember correctly) before Zawahiri formally and publicly recognizes the merger. (My note: It appears that Godane is a total Machiavelli in Somalia. Over many months, he systematically kills or pushes out those al Qaeda operatives in the country with connection to al Qaeda global, particularly after Bin Laden’s death. Once all connections to al Qaeda Central are removed, he uses his remaining connection to al Qaeda to push the merger forward and secure loyalty of other Shabaab leaders and establish sole communication and control with al Qaeda, which I imagine included resources. Total Game of Thrones going on with Godane, he sounds like a real dick! An additional note for all those that believe an oath to al Qaeda’s is a rigid everlasting and binding agreement that cements loyalty of al Qaeda members forever, please read this section. This totally undermines such a notion.)
Omar asserts that Godane killed off al Qaeda members and foreign fighters such as abu Talha, Fazul, Sudani and detained other foreign fighters – After the al Qaeda merger, Godane gave Hammami a figurehead position on a Shura but ultimately Hammami pushed back on the strategic direction of Shabaab landing him in his current predicament. Essentially, Godane used his linkage with al Qaeda to take firm control over foreign fighters in Somalia, focus all efforts on local power plays and suppress dissent. (My note: Bin Laden would not go with a Shabaab merger because he knew better and he had his aides in Somalia – Fazul. Zawahiri fell for the alliance with Godane, and in doing so is now aligned with a leader, Godane, and an affiliate, Shabaab, that killed off core members of al Qaeda. While I don’t think Zawahiri called for the killing of old al Qaeda vets like Fazul, he is negligent for not doing better intel in preparation for the merger.)

There are many other things in these documents and I just haven’t had time to go through it.

Other small things I picked up on:

Omar used his own money at some point to hire his own security and car to protect himself against Godane- Shabaab. (My note: this is when I would have broken with the group probably, like when they are trying to kill me.)
Omar explains how Shabaab deliberately discussed shifting back to Phase 1 guerilla warfare once Ethiopia and Kenya had fully invaded.

I’ll stop for now. And Omar, thanks for the information and feel free to send more. It appears you have resigned yourself to Shabaab and what appears to be a confrontation that will likely lead to your death. You don’t have to go that way. You’ve been betrayed by the group you joined. You could always turn yourself in and encourage those that might be considering a similar path to rethink their choice to join a terrorist group.

December 26, 2012 by Clint

What is the primary affiliate of al Qaeda a year after Bin Laden’s death? Poll Results #10

From May 2, 2012 through July 2012, I asked a related question with respect to the relative strength of al Qaeda (AQ) affiliates. After asking each respondent whether al Qaeda affiliates were ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’ (see the results here), I asked respondents:

Which affiliate is the primary node of al Qaeda globally?

In total, 165 respondents selected a primary node of al Qaeda. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was the clear favorite on the anniversary of Bin Laden’s death. This seems unsurprising as AQAP was discussed profusely in the U.S. media during the May/June 2012 timeframe.

Here’s a chart showing the selections of voters this past summer.

Again, consistent with my break down of previous questions, I have shown the votes based on different demographic categories. Here are some that caught my eye.

’Government Non-Military’ voters were less likely to select AQAP and appear to believe AQ Central in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains the central node of al Qaeda.
Those selecting ‘Television’ as their primary source (note – a small group of voters), were more likely than any other demographic to select an ‘Emerging AQ in North Africa’ as the primary node.
Travel played an interesting dynamic in this vote. Those who have traveled outside the U.S./EU more than 2 years were evenly split between AQAP and AQ Central being the primary node of AQ. However, those that have traveled less than 2 years outside the U.S./EU selected AQAP at the same rate as the majority but were more diffuse in their selections beyond AQAP including the selection of al Shabaab at a rate of almost 10%.

Here are the results of all voters broken down by demographic group.

December 18, 2012 by Clint

Are al Qaeda affiliates getting ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’? Poll results #9

On May 2, 2012, one year after the death of Osama Bin Laden, I asked the following question here at this blog:

Do you think the following al Qaeda (AQ) affiliates have become stronger or weaker over the past year? (Select ‘Stronger’ or ‘Weaker’ for each affiliate)

AQIM
AQ in East Africa/al Shabaab
AQAP in Yemen
AQ Central in Pakistan/Afghanistan
Emerging AQ affiliate in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia
AQ in Iraq
AQ in the Caucasus

In total, roughly 175 respondents answered this question between May 2, 2012 and the end of July 2012. The results of this question are really seven-fold as each al Qaeda affiliate was assessed independently. Below are the results of respondents’ collective assessments of each al Qaeda affiliate. I’ve showed an aggregated comparison of all respondent votes below in a chart. This compares the percentage of all votes for each al Qaeda affiliate.

Below this chart, I’ve compiled the votes of respondents into a table showing the break out of votes for each al Qaeda affiliate stratified across different demographic attributes. During this past summer, respondents clearly rated AQAP in Yemen as ‘stronger’ at higher rates than any other affiliate. However, I wonder how they would rate AQAP in Yemen now, 6 months later?

Here are some points that I found interesting in the deeper examination of respondents’ votes across each al Qaeda affiliate.

AQIM

- ‘Government Non-Military’ voters and ‘Private Sector’ voters rated AQIM ‘stronger’ at lower levels then other professional groups.

- Again, those preferring ‘Social Media’ as their primary information source were the most likely to select AQIM as ‘stronger’.

AQ in East Africa/al Shabaab

- Again, ‘Government Non-Military’ voters were the least likely to select al Qaeda threats from the Horn of Africa as ‘stronger’. Meanwhile, ‘Private Sector’ voters switched and were more likely than most to select Shabaab as getting ‘stronger’. Is that the effect of lots of television news reports about the Shabaab merger with AQ Central during the February 2012 timeframe?

AQAP in Yemen

- During this survey, all groups thought AQAP was ‘stronger’. Students and Academics were most convinced that AQAP was ‘stronger’ while ‘Government Non-Military’ were the most skeptical of AQAP’s strength.

AQ Central in Pakistan/Afghanistan

- All groups seemed to think AQ Central was weaker a year after Bin Laden’s death. Academia is particularly down on AQ Central. But here’s where it gets weird, ‘Government Non-Military’ voters were more likely than other voters to believe that AQ Central is ‘stronger’ a year after Bin Laden’s death. The same group that was skeptical about AQIM, AQAP, and Shabaab is less skeptical about AQ Central.

- Television viewers were most likely of from information source to believe that AQ Central was ‘stronger’, although they were still less than 50% in this assessment.

Emerging AQ affiliate in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia

- Voters were most undecided about the strength of al Qaeda in North Africa. 51% thought this emerging affiliate was ‘stronger’ and 49% thought this emerging affiliate was ‘weaker’. I wonder what the vote would be if I ran this in the week after the Benghazi attacks?

- A strange breakdown of this affiliate occurs with regards to information sources. Those preferring intelligence reports and newspapers believe this affiliate is ‘weaker’ but magazine readers were more likely to say ‘stronger’.

AQ in Iraq

- Overall, AQ in Iraq was assessed as ‘weaker’, but academics and those with PHD’s were more likely to select AQ in Iraq as ‘stronger’ a year after Bin Laden’s death.

AQ in the Caucasus

- The threat of al Qaeda in the Caucasus – does anyone really know anything about this threat – appears to be ‘weaker’ based on all votes, but social media watchers were the group most likely to select ‘stronger’.

Here are the breakdown charts by demographic group for each AQ affiliate assessed by voters.

November 20, 2012 by Clint

For al Qaeda: More ‘Unity’ or ‘Conflict’ One Year After Bin Laden? – Results #8

On May 2, 2012, the “1 Year After Bin Laden” survey asked the following question:

Since Usama Bin Laden’s death, has there been more …?

Conflict and competition between al Qaeda leaders and affiliates over strategic direction, or
Unity between al Qaeda leaders and affiliates seeking to exploit recent uprisings

I found this question particularly interesting in light of the recent debate over the Benghazi attacks. Some have asserted the attacks were the work of “al Qaeda”. Other reports suggest the death of U.S. Ambassador Stevens as the work of an “al Qaeda affiliate”. Yet others say the Consulate attack came from an emerging local militant group “Ansar al Sharia“.

If one were to believe the attack were the work of a centrally directed al Qaeda, then I would assume there would be more unity between al Qaeda leaders than conflict. Likewise, a sense of unity in terms of central direction may mesh with an AQIM link to the Benghazi Consulate attack. However, the notion of unity appears undermined by the recent revelations that Ansar al Din maybe breaking with AQIM, while the MNLA also takes its own course in the Sahel. Meanwhile, General Ham, the U.S. AFRICOM commander, has noted that AQIM has become a central node for coordination with Boko Haram in Nigeria. It appears there are linkages between AQAP and al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. But for AQAP in Yemen, seen by many as being the strongest AQ affiliate, are they really coordinating their operations with AQIM, AQ in Iraq or jihadi groups amongst the Syrian uprising? Probably not. And what about Zawahiri? It appears the crowd doesn’t believe he is in charge of al Qaeda globally the way Bin Laden was. So which is it, more “Unity” or ”Conflict” amongst AQ members after the death of Bin Laden?

In total, 197 respondents cast their opinions on this question and the vast majority believe al Qaeda’s members are more in conflict (77%) than in unity (23%) after the death of their founder. The below graph shows the breakout of raw votes by professional group. Most all professional groups voted in roughly the same proportions as the total. However, military voters were more likely than other large sample size groups to believe AQ was showing ‘unity’ after Bin Laden’s death. Meanwhile, ‘Private Sector’ voters were the least likely to believe AQ is cohesive – across most all questions ‘Private Sector’ voters appear to believe AQ is in a state of disarray.

The below table shows a breakdown of the votes based on different characteristics. I highlighted in green those results reflecting a larger than average selection of ‘Conflict’ while highlighting in yellow those demographic breakdowns that chose ‘Unity’ at a higher rate than other groups. Overall,

‘Private Sector’ and ‘Government – Non Military’ selected ‘Conflict’ at higher rates.
All information sources appear to reflect a proportion similar to the overall average. There was no apparent lean by ‘Social Media’ voters for this question.
Those ‘Residing Outside the U.S.’ were the group most likely to select AQ has had more ‘unity’. While still only at a rate of 33%, it is interesting that those outside the U.S. may believe AQ is more organized.

Lastly, if you are confused by the term “al Qaeda” or what “al Qaeda linkages mean”, you are not alone. The media and your Congressmen don’t know either. For a good laugh and to enjoy the confusion, watch this clip between Anderson Cooper and Congressman Rohrabacher. Absolutely baffling! Another one of my favorite terms – “Radical Islamic Threat” – is in here.

November 12, 2012 by Clint

Strongly Recommend Johnsen’s Book “The Last Refuge” on AQAP in Yemen

This week, Gregory Johnsen’s new book The Last Refuge arrives in bookstores detailing the rise, fall and reemergence of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. It is clearly the best book available on AQAP in Yemen.

Having spent the past decade in, out and around the U.S. government and academia in a variety of counterterrorism roles, I’ve read endless reams of paper on al Qaeda and their tribulations – so I consider myself a tough critic of al Qaeda works. But, I was given an advance copy of Gregory’s book, The Last Refuge, and it is undoubtedly one of the best books on al Qaeda I’ve read. I strongly encourage anyone interested in al Qaeda, terrorism and Yemen to give this text a read as the manuscript provides a much needed update to al Qaeda’s manifestations in the ten years since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Also, for those lucky enough to be in the New York City area today, November 12, you can see Greg present his work at the Overseas Press Club of America at 6 p.m. at 40 West 45^th Street, Club Quarters, NYC.

Regular readers of this blog might be surprised that I would provide such a strong endorsement of Greg’s book as he and I have been quite the rivals on the use of drones in Yemen. (See here, here, here and pretty much anywhere on Twitter.) However, I have relied on Greg’s research on Yemen for years as he provides me needed perspective on a country I’ve never visited and with regards to a language I don’t speak (Arabic). His book continues in this vein instructing me further on the nuances of the Yemeni culture and the tribulations of America’s intermittent engagement with a country critical to its counterterrorism fight. Where Greg and I usually diverge is on our interpretation of how al Qaeda has come to roost in Yemen and, even further, what the U.S. should do to uproot the most threatening al Qaeda affiliate to the U.S. homeland. Here’s what I’ve learned from The Last Refuge.

Gregory Johnsen is a fantastic writer! – The Last Refuge is the best-written book on al Qaeda I’ve read since Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower. The vast majority of al Qaeda books I’ve read are academically written extensions of PhD dissertations where my eyes struggle to stay focused on highly linear theoretical writing. Not so with The Last Refuge! Gregory paints a fascinating picture of al Qaeda’s journey in Yemen intertwining an updated history of al Qaeda’s global battles since 9/11 with new details of U.S. involvement in what was a peripheral counterterrorism fight up until 2009. I’m jealous that Gregory is so much better at writing than I am and I hope he continues to write books after this installment.
Persistent commitment of young Yemeni’s to jihad – My favorite sections of the book were the initial chapters. I’ve read many accounts of young foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia and even the U.S., but Gregory recounts the recruitment of young men from Yemen to the Afghan jihad which I truly value as a reference for my research on foreign fighters.
Centralized decision making, decentralized execution – Greg adequately notes an important distinction with regards to al Qaeda’s affiliates that seems to have been lost in recent discussions about the terror group. When outlining al Qaeda’s early operations in Yemen, Greg notes (on Page 30), “Already bin Laden knew the dangers of micromanaging his men, preferring what he would later call a philosophy of ‘centralization of decision and decentralization of execution.’ Bin Laden ordered the attack, but the details were up to the operatives on the ground.” For bin Laden, this approach worked well when he personally knew the operatives under his command. Bin Laden’s close associates implicitly knew his intent having known the man. Yet years later, we see this approach backfiring on al Qaeda. As al Qaeda’s central leadership became more isolated in Pakistan and membership in al Qaeda became more fluid, centralized decision-making occurred, often delayed significantly at times, but execution post-decision routinely went awry. This drift resulted in the likes of al–Zarqawi aggressively attacking Shia in Iraq and isolating his base of support, foolish self-recruits to al Qaeda around the globe executed bumbling attacks of dubious significance and new emerging militant groups like Ansar al-Sharia striking a U.S. Consulate before laying the needed ground work to secure popular support. Greg’s narrative describes how Nasir al-Wihayshi, while still remaining loyal to bin Laden, helped regenerate AQAP by taking on a leadership role in decision-making and execution at a time when al Qaeda needed leaders to rejuvenate the force. How did he take on this role? Al-Wihayshi was previously bin Laden’s personal secretary, understood al Qaeda’s intent and could execute a strategy in line with al Qaeda’s objectives. This is one reason why today AQAP remains the most serious organized threat to the U.S. homeland.
The First Drone Strike – With regards to drones, Greg and I routinely debate the merits of such a counterterrorism tactic in Yemen. I’m relatively pro-drone (with caveats) and Greg relatively against (with caveats). But, I found Chapter 9 quite interesting as he notes the first openly reported drone strike (that I’m familiar with) occurred on November 3, 2002 in Yemen – not Afghanistan or Pakistan – eliminating Abu Ali al-Harithi, head of AQAP as of 2002. Greg notes this single drone strike truly decimated al Qaeda’s first installment in Yemen. His subsequent discussion of U.S. Ambassador Hull’s actions to quell AQAP are instructive as Hull artfully used a blend of policy and counterterrorism options to eliminate AQAP’s safe haven. Yet, when I arrive at the end of this section, I wonder how any of these solutions might be implemented to counter Yemen’s current wave of AQAP? I’m not too optimistic, though the section is well worth reading for those seeking alternatives to drones and military occupation.
Rehab – Chapter 10 provided me some particularly valuable background on Yemen’s once touted al Qaeda rehabilitation program. I’d heard for many years tales of reformed terrorists being deprogrammed in Yemen. Greg’s account confirms my suspicions from years’ past. Yemen’s rehab process was never likely to work on a large scale and was completely unviable for ensuring al Qaeda operatives would not revert. Thus, as President Obama begins another term pledging to close Guantanamo Bay, what do we do with those remaining detainees? Rehabilitation?
Prisons as incubators – I found the most value in Greg’s discussion of the galvanizing effect of Yemen’s PSO prisons. For AQAP, these PSO prisons on the outskirts of Sana’a essentially assumed the place of Peshawar’s Services Bureau during the Afghan jihad. Al-Wihayshi and Fawaz al-Rabi’i “recreated with scraps of paper and imagination what bin laden and Zawahiri had built with books and computers in Afghanistan.” An excellent chapter 12 illustrates how prisons regenerated AQAP.

Greg’s new book provides the best available account of AQAP in Yemen. However, recent years have been particularly tough for researching AQAP as access and continued conflict have made reporting tough. For this, the book’s details prove thin in the final chapters detailing AQAP from 2009 on. Some of the sections I looked most forward to reading, those discussing U.S. drone use and Anwar al-Awlaki, were more brief than I expected. He does discuss AQAP’s decision to push for governance in Jaar – a particularly interesting move by AQAP. Unfortunately for Greg’s first book, events in Yemen have unfolded rapidly in recent months and many of AQAP’s gains have been reduced. I’m hoping for a second installment from Greg in the coming years that flushes out AQAP’s more recent trajectory.

My critiques of the book are more differences in opinion than debates over reporting. I completely respect Greg’s presentation of the AQAP in Yemen story and have no doubt it is the most accurate account of the terror group available today. But as he and I have debated before, I arrive at very different conclusions based on his presentation of the evidence describing AQAP’s recent rise. Here are a few points I’d add.

Yemen is not the center of al Qaeda’s universe – For those not particularly familiar with al Qaeda, Greg’s book might convince one that Yemen has always been the center of al Qaeda’s thinking. Greg doesn’t portray it that way necessarily, but his excellent writing and consistent blending of AQAP’s tribulations with the gyrations of global al Qaeda may convince those just coming onto the topic that Yemen is the center of gravity for al Qaeda. AQAP and Yemen are clearly an important affiliate, but they are not what Afghanistan and Pakistan have always been for al Qaeda – the epicenter for global jihad.
The Saudi influx, not drones, has brought about AQAP’s resurgence – Going into this book, I expected to be convinced that drones were more central to AQAP’s rise. However, having read the manuscript, I actually am more confident in my assessment from this past summer that it is a combination of external and internal factors that have led to AQAP’s regeneration with the most important enabler being the Saudi purge of AQ members in 2006-2007. Greg does discuss this Saudi purge in the book and I believe it is critical to understanding where and when AQ grows and ebbs. Young Saudi foreign fighters have been the largest portions of recruits and leaders for years supplying one jihad after another. With the decline of Iraq, Saudi foreign fighters flowed into Yemen and today I imagine AQAP in Yemen is now competing with Syria for the collection of fresh recruits. Having read Greg’s book, I see the influx of Saudi foreign fighters, the failures of rehabilitation programs and repeated prison escapes as the driving factors in AQAP’s recent heights. Drones didn’t generate AQAP’s growth, drones responded to AQAP’s growth.
Beyond al Qaeda, Yemen is not a national security interest for the U.S. – Greg’s book notes Ambassador Hull’s multi-layered development approach for combating AQAP and Yemen’s ills. I once would have agreed that the U.S. should focus on development to undermine support for AQ. However, time has shown this a costly and ineffective endeavor where the U.S. rewards countries for hosting people with bad behavior. Without AQAP, Yemen doesn’t really hold much strategic interest for the U.S. So how many resources should the U.S. devote to Yemen? I’m not entirely sure, but I’m more inclined to support large-scale support and development to countries where the U.S. has a more enduring national interest beyond a regional terrorist group.

I thank Greg for writing an excellent book that has helped me learn more about Yemen than anything I had read to date. I look forward to reading his next installment and hope he continues to write.

Favorite quote from the book – p.17 -

“Bin Laden talked less than others, but he planned more. And he had something no one else had: money.”

November 2, 2012 by Clint

AQAP’s Transition From Turf Taking to Sleeper Cells in Yemen

@will_mccants pointed me to an excellent article on al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), their parallel insurgent organization Ansar al-Sharia and their relinquishing of turf previously won amidst Yemen’s government mess last spring. Reuters Andrew Hammond’s article, “al Qaeda goes underground in Yemen against U.S.-driven crackdown“, provides a contrasting picture to reports just a few months ago which proclaimed AQAP/Ansar al-Sharia on the march taking, holding and governing large swathes of Yemen. As Ghaith Abdul-Ahad so adeptly covered in the May 2012 Frontline documentary, AQ was developing a new safe haven outside of Pakistan. And last week, Hammond reported:

A U.S.-backed military onslaught may have driven Islamist militants from towns in Yemen they seized last year, but many have regrouped into “sleeper cells” threatening anew the areas they vacated, security officials and analysts say.

The resilience of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), despite increased U.S. drone strikes to eliminate militants, is worrying for top oil exporter Saudi Arabia next door and the security of major shipping lanes in the seas off Yemen.

Despite being a really good article, it still does a little bit of threat hyping as I’m assuming it must do to keep audience attention. Somehow in April/May, AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia were stronger than ever, and now, despite being pushed out of their hard-won sanctuary, they are seemingly stronger by being pushed into the hills and forming sleeper cells….I guess I’m still not sure when an AQ affiliate gets weaker. No matter what the circumstances, news feeds tell me year after year that al Qaeda is on the march.

What I found particularly important was the role that local militias were taking in standing up to AQAP. When locals begin standing up to al Qaeda, the terror group finds itself in a particularly bad place.

Residents fear some militants could have infiltrated the committees, noting that the Ansar al-Sharia “emirate” in Jaar managed to negotiate a deal with the military that allowed many gunmen to leave unscathed.

Mohammed Sukain al-Jaadani, former head of a popular committee in Shuqra that helped organize tribes against the militants last year, is now trying to dissuade the region’s youth from being tempted by jihadist ideology.

“After Jaar and Zinjibar, al Qaeda turned into sleeper cells. It’s a danger for society, they are in many places. They threaten tribes and citizens,” said Jaadani.

He has set up a Tribal Social Alliance in his home region in Hadramaut province bordering Saudi Arabia.

“We did good work with tribes, and we are still doing work to save our regions from al Qaeda and unknown people to reject destructive, terrorist ideas. They created a culture of violence and extremism. We’re trying to help the authorities come back.”

Arguments in April/May centered on drones making AQAP stronger in Yemen. The debate shifted course with Christopher Swift’s article this past summer. Now, this article provides more anecdotes about drone effects.

Nasser al-Noba, a former army officer who helped relaunch the southern separatist movement, says militants have hunkered down in the Mahfad, Marakisha and Hatat mountains, inland from the flat coastal areas of Jaar, Zinjibar and Shuqra.

“They sometimes appear in the streets, they suddenly appear and disappear as if by remote control. They go around in landcruisers, with the stickers of al Qaeda on the doors. But since Saleh’s fall, the drones have started to have an effect.”

In conclusion, Bin Laden’s caution with AQAP in Yemen appears correct. As noted in the Harmony documents released on the first anniversary of his death, Bin Laden thought Yemen would be helpful as a safe haven in the future, but he didn’t see the necessary conditions for a formal push in Yemen. In a letter to Atiyah, Harmony Document SOCOM-2012-0000019, Bin Laden wrote:

“I reviewed your opinions regarding the issue of establishing an Islamic state before the elements of success have been completed and the issue of escalation in Yemen. I wanted to share with you my opinion on these two matters in order to establish a fruitful and constructive discussion, God willing. However, the matter is complex…To begin I would say that Yemen is the Arab country most ready for the establishment of an Islamic state, but this does not mean that the necessary fundamental elements for success for such a project have yet been realized.”

Bin Laden cautioned, as noted in this piece by Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, that AQAP should not jump too quickly to form an Islamic state. But, I guess with Bin Laden dead and Saleh in retreat, the temptation became too great - see pg. 28.

“Not declaring a truce does not mean that we escalate against the government in the south and enter into an immediate fight against the military, as it would not bring the desired outcome. This is because the sons of the northern tribes will be targeted in the fight [i.e., tribesmen who are members of the Yemeni military would inevitably go to fight in the south and would be attacked by AQAP]. Some of these tribesmen do not realize that the military are apostates. So the tribes will think that we increased the bloodshed, and people will talk among the tribes saying that al-Qa`ida kills a lot. This would distance many people from us and might lead to a tribal uprising to fight against us in revenge for their sons. This also means that we do not jump to establish an Islamic state in the south at the first chance of the government losing control in the south. The reason for this is what we mentioned earlier, that we are not yet ready to cover the people with the umbrella of Islamic rule.”

So, many argued Bin Laden was not really important for al Qaeda’s direction at the time of his death. However, Bin Laden knew not to jump into a formal alliance with Shabaab in Somalia (unlike Zawahiri, see here and here) and felt an Islamic state in Yemen should wait. Now both of these blunders might be realized in only the first year after his death…..so did Bin Laden matter, I think so!