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by Clint

Shabaab’s betrayal of Omar Hammami – In English this time!

After being frustrated by the Arab world ignoring his revelations about the bad behavior of Shabaab in Somalia, Omar Hammami posted an English version of his demise via a Twitter link today.  In January, I suffered through some miserable Arabic translation nightmares to write the post “Hammami Reveals Deceit, Dissension and Death in Shabaab and al Qaeda!“, but now all can read of his demise and betrayal by al Shabaab in the English version at this link.

Back in January, Omar hoped to reach the Muslim world and maybe al Qaeda by publishing his latest troubles in Arabic hoping to appeal to that audience – since his previous YouTube calls for help broadcast in a mix of English and Arabic fell on deaf ears in the Arab World.  Again, it appears Omar’s Arabic revelations from January didn’t find much audience amongst al Qaeda’s mainstream.  However, Omar’s American audience, despite this being Omar’s home country which he despises, has read and paid attention to Omar’s plight.  In January, Omar didn’t seem thrilled about myself and others in the West reading his Arabic pronouncements.

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But today, it appears Omar has changed his tune, reaching out in English this time.  Omar so desperately wants an Arab audience, but maybe he’s realized his biggest audience is in his native country.  Here’s some clips from Omar’s English version of the document.

On Godane (Abu Zubayr):

As for Abu Zubayr’s entrance into the whole affair, well, his background is a bit unclear because he was in Pakistan during the days of the Russian occupation and no one knows with certainty if he really participated in the Jihaad or if he just sat in Peshawar.

On Somalis and their distrust of al Qaeda:

history has proven that the Somalis generally do not want any influence from al-Qaa’idah or foreigners in their internal affairs.

On al Qaeda fomenting fractures with Shabaab as much as Shabaab creating fractures between local Somali (Ansar) vs. Foreign Fighters (Muhajirs)

It is here that I blame the brother s from al-Qaa’idah to some degree (and I mean Abu Talhah as-Sudaani, Abu ‘Abdallaah, Fazul, and an-Nabhaan) because, despite have pure intentions (as we see it, but Allaah is their Reckoner), there developed a sense of competition between them and the brothers of the Salaah ad-Diin camp.

Al Qaeda’s shift to focus on Kenya as anticipated in this document here in 2007:

Eventually, and probably because of such divisiveness, the brothers from al-Qaa’idah went to Ras Chiamboni to focus on training Kenyan Somalis to do outside operations.

On al Qaeda’s lack of strategy in Somalia:

Here I don’t know what to say about the actions of the brothers from al-Qaa’idah. They split up amongst themselves without executing any real strategy.

and on this one, I have nothing to add.  See the closing of the document….

And it seems I was duped by the slogans and the pretty words, and I hadn’t yet learned the realities,

by Clint

Foreign Fighters: How are they being recruited?

Tonight I was invited to participate in 16 x 9′s live blog for their upcoming news program “Why North Americans Are Joining Terrorist Organizations?”  I believe the documentary will be online Sunday night.  While the live blog was fun, it was difficult to summarize my thoughts on al Qaeda recruitment processes, which I believe vary considerably between Western countries and the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia.  So for those interested in some discussion on foreign fighter recruitment processes, here’s some analysis I did in 2008 entitled “Foreign Fighters: How are they being recruited?”  You can get the entire pdf at this link and here’s a brief summary from the conclusion:

Certainly, official AQ members at times directly initiate recruitment in North African and Middle Eastern countries. Occasionally, individuals self-radicalize and independently seek out the greater jihad, possibly using the Internet for ideological indoctrination and communication with facilitators. However, both of these scenarios represent only a portion of foreign fighter recruitment. Most North African and Middle Eastern foreign fighters are instead recruited through social, family and religious networks empowered by former foreign fighters who catalyze the radicalization process. These local networks are efficient, built for the community and adaptable to local conditions. Such networks are difficult to create in either a hierarchical AQ Central (top-down) or a self-selecting (bottom-up) system.

An alternative foreign fighter recruitment model might reflect all three patterns described above. My hypothesis for future research estimates that global foreign fighter flow consists of roughly the following:

–Self-selecting (bottom-up) recruitment accounts for 10 -15 percent of global foreign fighter recruitment. These self-recruits consist largely of second and third generation Muslims and converts to Jihadi doctrine based in Western countries, the majority of which reside in the EU. Their increased Internet access and propensity for militancy help radicalize them locally before moving through select intermediaries to more formal networks. These individuals are inexperienced, untrained and often a liability to the larger AQ movement as their conduct may stray from AQ’s global message, and their operational and security mishaps endanger the group. However, their access to Western targets and their propaganda value remain a coveted prize for AQ and a worthwhile risk.

–AQ hierarchical (top-down) recruitment accounts for an additional 10 – 15 percent of global foreign fighter recruitment. AQ, under intense pressure from Western military and intelligence, expends effort to specifically recruit individuals that maintain valuable skills in weaponry, media, operational planning, finance and logistics. These recruits pose the greatest threat globally as their knowledge, skills, and experience create hallmark AQ attacks and maintain organizational coherence. While self-recruits are dangerous due to their access, these direct recruits are dangerous due to their ability.

–Former foreign fighters embedded in family, religious and social networks in flashpoint North African and Middle Eastern cities produce between 60 and 80 percent of global foreign fighter recruitment. Jihadi veterans and their networks are the center of gravity not only for al-Qa’ida but also for decades of Jihadi militancy. These communities are motivated not only by militant ideology but by their perceived oppression from the West economically and politically, frustration over Palestinean-Israeli conflict, and the influence of Western values on their culture. High foreign fighter producing communities sustained the Afghan jihad during the 1980’s, provide for current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will be the thread for future militant efforts at the close of current conflicts.

 

by Clint

Ansar al Sharia’s Overt Support For Foreign Fighters in Iraq

Last night @azelin made an interesting discovery linking Ansar al Sharia in Libya with foreign fighters to al Qaeda in Iraq.  See the post here.  Aaron spotted some Ansar al Sharia propaganda calling for the release of Libyan foreign fighters currently detained in Iraq.

A month ago, Ansar al-Shari’ah in Benghazi (The Supporters of Islamic Law; ASB), on its official Facebook page via its official media outlet al-Rayyah Foundation for Media Production uploaded a poster (see above) promoting a demonstration on Sunday December 16 in Tripoli and Benghazi

Aaron, with the help of Green Mountain, thought to compare the names and pictures of the detained Libyans with the Sinjar records of foreign fighters to Iraq.  Here’s what he found.

Two of the individuals also contained pictures in their Sinjar application for the Islamic State of Iraq. Below, you can see a comparison of the application photo from 2006 on the left and what I am assuming is a relatively recent photo of the same individual in Iraqi custody, which is from the above flier. There are slight differences due to aging and likely poor conditions in Iraqi prisons and the second picture looks closer in similarity to the before and after than the first one. For those reading, what do you think (leave a comment below)?

Check out his post and the pictures and see what you think.  Are these the same people?

Also of note this morning, Asher Berman of Syria Survey said there are other groups in Libya also supporting the release of these Libyan foreign fighters to Iraq.

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So what does all this mean?  Some will say this shows these Libyan groups are al Qaeda. Others will say just that it shows definitive support for global jihad. For me, I’ll wait and see what happens over the next few months.

If interested in looking at the translated foreign fighter records from Sinjar, see this link.  And if you want to just look at the coded names from this data, see this spreadsheet here.

 

by Clint

Frontline reporting on foreign fighters in Syria

Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, who has done two amazing documentaries on AQAP in Yemen and the revolution in Syria, recently published a piece in The Guardian describing the foreign fighters infiltrating the fighting in Syria.  Having spent many years researching why people travel from one country to join the fighting of an unknown group in another conflict (See here, here, and here), I found this article enlightening and consistent with other foreign fighter accounts.

Ghaith’s article is excellent and I encourage all those interested in the debate over whether al Qaeda is infiltrating the Syrian rebellion to check out his article.  Here’s some of the quotes I focused on:

Hundreds of international fighters have flocked to Syria to join the war against Bashar al-Assad’s government. Some are fresh-faced idealists driven by a romantic notion of revolution or a hatred for the Assads. Others are jihadi veterans of Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan.

The disparate levels of fighting ability among the men was immediately clear. The Chechens were older, taller, stronger and wore hiking boots and combat trousers. They carried their weapons with confidence and distanced themselves from the rest, moving around in a tight-knit unit-within-a-unit. One of the Turks was a former soldier who wore western-style webbing and equipment, while the three Tajiks and the Pakistani were evidently poor. Their trousers were too short, their shoes old and torn.

  • Jihadi veterans are invaluable.  Ghaith notes the presence of one former fighter from Iraq, Abu Salam al Faluji, who had some harsh words for his comrades in arms.

One Syrian, breathing hard, said that he had fired three times at the tank and the RPG didn’t go off.

“Don’t say it didn’t go off,” Abu Salam admonished him. “Say you don’t know how to fire it. We used to shoot these same RPGs at the Americans and destroy Abrams tanks. What’s a T72 to an Abrams?

“Our work has to focus on IEDs and snipers,” he told the gathering. “All these roofs need fighters on top and IEDs on the ground. You hunt them in the alleyways and then use machine-guns and RPGs around corners.

“The problem is not ammunition, it’s experience,” he told me out of earshot of the rebels. “If we were fighting Americans we would all have been killed by now. They would have killed us with their drone without even needing to send a tank.

“The rebels are brave but they don’t even know the difference between a Kalashnikov bullet and a sniper bullet. That weakens the morale of the men.”

  • Casualties are mounting in Syria and especially for foreign fighters.  While its not unusual for foreign fighters to expire, they usually stick around long enough to make a significant impact.  However, a band of Chechens led by Abu Omar have already taken 25% casualties in merely two days.

But Abu Omar was angry. There had been 40 muhajiroun few days earlier but by the end of fighting that day they were down to 30. They had lost 10 men in two days.

  • Not all foreign fighters are welcome in Syria.  While Ghaith’s NPR interview noted that while there is a common enemy, the Assad Regime, the FSA is inclined to work with jihadi types.  However, the seeds of a post Assad battle between foreign fighters and the FSA already appear to be planted.

I spoke to the regional commander of the Farouq brigade, a muscular young lieutenant from the southern province of Dara’a called Abdulah Abu Zaid. “I will not allow the spread of Takfiri [the act of accusing other Muslims of apostasy] ideology,” he told me in his military compound a few kilometres from the border post. “Not now, not later. The Islam we had during the regime was disfigured Islam and what they are bringing us is also disfigured. The Islam we need is a civil Islam and not the takfiri Islam.”

The jihadis, he said, had looted and stolen from the local people and demanded protection money from local businesses in order not to steal their merchandise. “I managed to stop them,” he said, “and I won’t let them spread here.”

Later that day he issued an ultimatum to their commander, a Syrian called Abu Mohamad al Abssi, to leave the area with his foreign jihadis or he would be killed.

 

by Clint

New GITMO Recidivism Report

The Office of the Director for National Intelligence (ODNI) today released an updated report on the percentage of detainees released from Guantanamo Bay that return to terrorist activities.  The report attests:

“to the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.”

Here’s a snapshot of the table in the report:

Based on my back of the envelope calculation, this puts the combined rate of suspected and combined terrorist recidivists at just under 28%. After posting the rate on Twitter, @AlexOlesker noted that the recidivism rate for criminals is often quite higher.  He estimated about 60%-70%.  He also wondered if, in general, the U.S. is still underestimating the number that have returned to terrorism.  Good points by @AlexOlesker and here’s my take.

  • While the recidivism rate of terrorists may be only half of that of criminals, unfortunately, the acts of terrorists versus criminals tends to be far more catastrophic.  So while 30% is considerably less, the implications of these 30% returning to terrorism are quite a bit more severe than the average criminal.
  • I don’t think the report necessarily underestimates the number of terrorists known or suspected of returning to terrorism (the numerator).  However, I’m more wondering if we overestimate the denominator, i.e. the total pool of detainees returned to their home countries that could potentially return to terrorism.  Not all those that leave GITMO, have an equal opportunity to return to terrorism.  So there may actually be a smaller number of total detainees released that even have the possibility of returning to terrorism due to the scrutiny placed upon them after arriving back in their home country.
  • My last thought is that the recidivist rate likely varies considerably based on the home country of the detainees.  Essentially, some countries will have few recidivists and other countries will have many.  As a big focus of my research several years back, I focused not only on countries, but cities where foreign fighter recruits were coming from.  For those interested in terrorist recidivism, I’d estimate those returning to terrorism occurs in clusters based on social and environmental factors.  See this report for some background perspective.  See this for the data by country.
by Clint

Foreign Fighters Migrate to Aleppo, Syria

An interesting video from al Jazeera discussing foreign fighters joining FSA ranks in Aleppo. The video notes the amorphous structure of the FSA and the integration of Saudi foreign fighters. It will be interesting to see if the foreign fighter flow is predominately from the Gulf, North Africa or both. Check out the video here:

And I’m still running the Syria support survey:

Should the West back the Syrian opposition if 95% of all support is gained by fighters with no connection to or affinity for al Qaeda?

Vote here

by Clint

When did Hammami encounter Fazul in Somalia?

Last week’s Omar Hammami autobiography describes his integration into the Islamic Courts Union and reads much like any other account detailing a foreign fighters arrival in a far off land.  The insights are limited and sprinkled irregularly throughout the winding document that only describes Omar’s Somalia time up until the formation of al-Shabaab.  Personally, my interests centered on if, when and how Hammami encountered true al Qaeda members in Somalia as there has been persistent debate about the role of al Qaeda, if any, in Somalia.  Well, in this respect, Hammami does provide a glimpse of when a foreign fighter traveling to Somalia might encounter an al Qaeda member – immediately upon arrival.

Based on the Hammami autobiography found at MyPetJawa, Hammami encountered none other than Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (aka Fazul) upon his arrival at the Mogadishu airport.  On page 40-41, Hammami describes his interrogation at the Mogadishu airport after arriving in Somalia in 2006.

I went back to the interrogator after praying and I told him that a very good idea had come to me. I told him that if he sends me back I will be jailed so the best thing for him to do is to just put me in jail here in the land of the Muslims. It was around that time that an SUV pulled up and inside was another interrogator. I was told to enter the SUV and I did so a bit hesitantly (partly because I thought I was being sent back, and partly because I thought I could just be killed at any moment). I saw an AK next to the man and I figured I was being treated as a spy or something. They told me to bring evidence that someone knows me. I told them that I’m coming to visit my wife’s grandmother. At one point they asked for a visa and I told them that the Prophet (S) never asked for visas. People who make Hijrah must only say the testimony of faith and I am a Muslim. They couldn’t debate with that but they didn’t accept it. I finally told them that I came for Jihaad but they did not accept my proof of identity. Finally they told me to call my wife and to have her call her grandmother and prove that I’m here to visit them. The only problem with that was that I hadn’t told anyone that I was coming due to security reasons. She was surprised about the whole thing, but she called her grandmother anyway and they came to the airport to get me. The interrogators accepted this but it was clear that they were still very suspicious of me.

I later realized that the good cop in that scenario was none other than the famed terrorist

Fazul, may Allaah accept him as a martyr.

This is one of the only really interesting parts of Hammami’s initial dribble.  First, Hammami encounters one of al Qaeda’s most elusive members within hours of landing in Mogadishu.  Second, Fazul meets Hammami but doesn’t appear to really pursue Hammami during a time when al Qaeda was allegedly seeking out Western recruits that could infiltrate back into the U.S. as clean operatives with access to soft targets.  Hammami would seem like a ripe opportunity for an AQ operator, but Hammami only mentions encountering Fazul one other time.  On page 60, Hammami wonders if Fazul thought him to be a spy.

It would also be during this short stay in Jilib that I would get my last glimpse of two dear brothers. Fazul had appeared along with almost everyone else from the “Shabaab” (to the great dismay of Abu Talxah who had hoped that the Mogadishu branch of “Shabaab” would put up a fight long enough to buy his branch some time in Kismaayu). When he saw me he remembered our encounter in the airport and said through a big smile: “So you’re still here?” I think he half expected me to really be a spy or something. I wouldn’t see him again despite living within meters of him during his last days in Somaalia.

Fazul rapidly descended on Hammami upon his arrival illustrating how smoothly he maintained trusted sources and layers of protection throughout the Horn of Africa.  It again makes me wonder how he would ultimately meet his demise by stumbling into a checkpoint.  I imagine, Fazul routinely went through checkpoints, airports and government offices without much concern.  Why did Fazul get caught this time last year?  Maybe someone did betray him, or maybe his luck ran out.  For other accounts of Fazul being caught and escaping in Kenya, see this post.

by Clint

al-Qaeda Revelations from Germany

With my head down reading about Shabaab’s fractures, I had missed some of the al-Qaeda primary source material emerging from recent trials in Germany.  Yassin Musharbash of AbuSuSu provides an excellent summary of the key insights of alleged internal al-Qaeda documents, which I encourage readers to check out.  @abususu notes:

According to German security services they were written up by high ranking members of core al-Qaeda in 2009 and/or 2008. The documents concern themselves with

  • Lessons learned from past operations
  • Reports on three past operations (7/7 London; 21/7 London; Airliner Plot)
  • a sketch for a terror campaign in the West

He goes on to point out several of the most interesting contents of these documents.

  • One of the documents is of particular interest as it discusses ideas for terrorist activities in the West. Here is a number of ideas that are being floated:
  • More attention should be given to operations designed to free prisoners. One idea is to “hijack a passenger ship” as a mass hostage taking should impress Western public
  • Generally, militant Jihad should also be taken to the Seas: attacking maritime transport would be a good way to hurt Western economic interest.
  • Also generally, a double strategy of regular small scale and rare big scale attacks in the West is advised. The author maintains that both concepts are needed.
  • Foreign fighters from the West should not be kept for too long but rather trained swiftly and sent back a.s.a.p. so as to enhance the capability to attack on a more regular level. Recruits who are considered known to the security services should try and deceive these services so as to relief the actual plotters by distracting attention

Lots to discuss from these four points.  Here are my general thoughts:

  • The AQ authors in these documents lack experience.  AQ has limited resources, operatives and operational space.  The “double strategy” notion would require more than double the amount of planning time as the two foci, “regular small scale and rare big scale attacks” would demand excessive amount of coordination, planning, resources and skill.  For a struggling terrorist organization, maintaining the pace of regular small scale attacks requires efficiency in operation and routine processes unimpeded by CT adversaries.  Research has shown that only high performing terror organizations can maintain the pace of attacks whereas groups of almost any level can pull off the occasional big attack.  See the work of Aaron Clauset and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch.
  • The effect of drone operations and overall intelligence pressure against AQ in their Pakistan safe haven seems clear.  Drones have not only decapitated AQ leaders, but have drastically limited the training time provided to foreign fighters for delivering attacks against the West.  Before 9/11, foreign fighters could train indefinitely for an attack.  From 2001 through 2006, foreign fighters could still gain the necessary training resources and time to prepare for an attack in the West.  Today, foreign fighters to AFPAK have merely days or hours to learn and prepare for their attack on the West – if they can get there at all.

Abu Susu added three other important notes:

  • The documents also contain passages about problems that the terrorists face:
  • They have little money and say that this decreases their operational capabilities
  • The fact that they didn’t manage to perpetrate an attack in the West for such a long time is said to frustrate a lot of cadres — to a degree that some of them allegedly have given up plotting altogether
  • Western intelligence and security services are credited with being effective and very hurtful for them

These three points follow closely with other open source reporting on the region.  For those still believing that terrorism is cheap and AQ operates on almost no money, these documents again show the importance of resources for AQ and reiterates the depleted state of their operations.

Next, AQ’s above quote reinforces my argument related to AQ’s “put up or shut up problem” I noted in January:

While they are just as likely today as much as in the past to execute a mass casualty attack, evidence suggests their pace of attack has slowed dramatically and thus their organization is likely shrinking in size exponentially with each delay in attacks.  For al Qaeda to inspire new recruits and rejuvenate their movement, they need to execute a successful attack.  Likewise, executing successful attacks requires persistent recruitment and talent development through training – two constrained inputs to al Qaeda’s operations in 2012. AQ’s propaganda becomes less effective every year they fail to execute a major attack against the West in the West.  Their rhetoric is talk with no action.

My last point from Abu SuSu’s excellent post – virtual training is no substitute for real in-person physical training.  As he notes:

According to one of the documents, the 21/7 London cell had lost contact to its handler in Pakistan. This is why a) when the attempt took place, the author wasn’t even sure whether it was “their guy”s. He b) also claims that the 21/7 cell may have run into the very same problem in the process of cooking their explosives that the 7/7 cell encountered. But while the 7/7 cell still was in touch with their handler and were able to consult him, the 21/7 cell could not solve their allegedly identical problem.

by Clint

Countering the Violent Extremism of Fickled Fighters

Today, I wanted to follow up with respect to my post a few days back on terrorist motivation and recruitment and relate it to my earlier discussion of Hanif, the AQ foreign fighter from Pakistan, who recently relayed news of al Qaeda’s struggles in Pakistan.  I closed the last post stating:

Before choosing a CVE approach, a community/government/nation must first determine which type of extremist they want to counter.  If this assessment isn’t done, one will find a CVE approach, for example, where a government seeks to counter the the extremist narrative in an attempt to deter young people from joining al Qaeda, only later to find out that recruits weren’t particularly knowledgeable of AQ’s ideology, joined for the adventure, and enjoy group membership more than radical sermons.

I’ve often heard that the U.S. should place top priority on countering AQ’s message in order to prevent young boys from being radicalized and recruited overseas.  While this may be important in certain cases, I’d like to return to the case of Hanif, the source for Newsweek’s article “Al Qaeda on the Ropes: One Fighter’s Inside Story”.  Hanif, lacking an al Qaeda cell to join, recently decided to join the Haqqani Network:

Hanif says he spent the next five months with the Haqqanis and took part in several cross-border raids into Afghanistan—“picnics,” his fellow fighters called them. “We’d cross the border on operations of one, two, or three days; make short, sharp attacks; and then return,” he says. “Crossing into Afghanistan is easier than ever. There’s no one to stop us.” When Haqqani fighters run into Pakistani troops, they just keep going, Hanif says; they’re never challenged. “I think there’s an understanding,” he says.

Hanif compares his time with AQ and the Haqqani Network where he says:

the network’s fighters are brave, but they’re not as disciplined and pious as al Qaeda fighters were. “Fifty percent of these young mujahedin are looking for something to do,” Hanif says. “They’re not really fighting for Islam.” Even so, he likes their fighting spirit. “They may be careless and not religiously motivated, but they are good jihadis.”

Hanif does note that his religious beliefs are important but not decisive in his terrorist participation.

He isn’t sure what he’ll do next. At present he’s taking time off from the war, staying with relatives in Afghanistan. He says he’s still determined to rid Afghanistan of Americans and foreign influence and to reestablish Mullah Mohammed Omar’s Islamic Emirate, although he’s disappointed that al Qaeda can no longer help him achieve those goals. He stays in touch with his parents by phone, and they keep urging him to return home to Karachi, get married, and perhaps go into business. Hanif hates the idea. To do so, he says, would be a betrayal of his political and religious beliefs. Still, he says, he’s thinking of going home—just for a little while.

So, how does the U.S. do CVE to disrupt the violence of Hanif and his comrades?  Counter al Qaeda’s narrative?

It seems like his ideological justifications for fighting in Afghanistan change frequently while his violence remains constant.

What about community engagement with elders and parents? 

His parents only appear to have a minor influence on his decision.

I don’t have an answer for what the right CVE package is for young Pakistani recruits but I do wonder what combination of CVE actions will be most fruitful for keeping young boys from seeking adventure in Pakistan’s frontier.

by Clint

Al Qaeda’s Foreign Fighter Recruitment – Not Dead, but Dying

In the days when I spent a lot of timing researching foreign fighters (Parts 1,2,3), I began to gauge AQ’s strength by their ability to persistently recruit new members.  AQ’s success arises from its manpower far more than technology.  Their ability to recruit, train and deploy foreign fighters and changes in the rate at which they are recruited provide an excellent bellweather of the terror group’s strength.  Thus foreign fighter recruitment trends provide a singular measure of AQ’s relative strength.  Growth in foreign fighters indicates the resonance of AQ’s ideology, the commitment of resources by benefactors, and the presence of safe havens facilitating operational security.

The tipping point for defeating AQ lies in the elimination of foreign fighters at a rate equal to or greater than the rate at which foreign fighters are recruited.

The recent Guardian article suggests that both sides of this equation are being met.  The U.S. steadily eliminates AQ members in AFPAK and globally.  But more importantly, foreign fighter recruitment appears down.  This dive in recruitment includes a downturn in German recruits who were a particularly troublesome spike in the 2009 time frame.

Continuing from Part 1 and the discussion of The Guardian article, “Al-Qaida leadership almost wiped out in Pakistan, British officials believe“, I noted the quotes about foreign fighter flow into Afghanistan.

The problems for al-Qaida in west Asia have been compounded by a smaller flow of volunteers reaching makeshift bases in Pakistan’s tribal zones. “I think they are really very much weakened,” said the official. “You can’t say they don’t pose a threat – they do – but it’s a much lesser one.”

British and US intelligence sources have told the Guardian they estimate that there are less than 100 “al-Qaida or al-Qaida-affiliated” militants in Afghanistan, of whom only “a handful” were seen to pose a threat internationally to the UK or other western nations.

and this quote;

In Europe, security services say levels of radicalisation have stabilised. Analysis of a list of “recent martyrs” published by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which shares al-Qaida’s ideology and is also based in Pakistan’s tribal areas, appears to show that fewer number of Europeans than feared reached the group, previously been favoured by German-based extremists. Of the near 100 listed, only one was German and most appeared to be local men.

Al Qaeda’s not dead, but they are dying.  Foreign fighter recruits still exist, but they are far fewer in number compared to their peak.  For young men in North Africa and the Middle East, there are too many opportunities at home amongst the Arab revolutions.  AQ is being out paced ideologically, financially and operationally by other competing groups.  More to follow on this, but keep an eye on the foreign fighter flow.  Without it, AQ will become just one of many groups rather than the group.