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by Clint

Shabaab’s betrayal of Omar Hammami – In English this time!

After being frustrated by the Arab world ignoring his revelations about the bad behavior of Shabaab in Somalia, Omar Hammami posted an English version of his demise via a Twitter link today.  In January, I suffered through some miserable Arabic translation nightmares to write the post “Hammami Reveals Deceit, Dissension and Death in Shabaab and al Qaeda!“, but now all can read of his demise and betrayal by al Shabaab in the English version at this link.

Back in January, Omar hoped to reach the Muslim world and maybe al Qaeda by publishing his latest troubles in Arabic hoping to appeal to that audience – since his previous YouTube calls for help broadcast in a mix of English and Arabic fell on deaf ears in the Arab World.  Again, it appears Omar’s Arabic revelations from January didn’t find much audience amongst al Qaeda’s mainstream.  However, Omar’s American audience, despite this being Omar’s home country which he despises, has read and paid attention to Omar’s plight.  In January, Omar didn’t seem thrilled about myself and others in the West reading his Arabic pronouncements.

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But today, it appears Omar has changed his tune, reaching out in English this time.  Omar so desperately wants an Arab audience, but maybe he’s realized his biggest audience is in his native country.  Here’s some clips from Omar’s English version of the document.

On Godane (Abu Zubayr):

As for Abu Zubayr’s entrance into the whole affair, well, his background is a bit unclear because he was in Pakistan during the days of the Russian occupation and no one knows with certainty if he really participated in the Jihaad or if he just sat in Peshawar.

On Somalis and their distrust of al Qaeda:

history has proven that the Somalis generally do not want any influence from al-Qaa’idah or foreigners in their internal affairs.

On al Qaeda fomenting fractures with Shabaab as much as Shabaab creating fractures between local Somali (Ansar) vs. Foreign Fighters (Muhajirs)

It is here that I blame the brother s from al-Qaa’idah to some degree (and I mean Abu Talhah as-Sudaani, Abu ‘Abdallaah, Fazul, and an-Nabhaan) because, despite have pure intentions (as we see it, but Allaah is their Reckoner), there developed a sense of competition between them and the brothers of the Salaah ad-Diin camp.

Al Qaeda’s shift to focus on Kenya as anticipated in this document here in 2007:

Eventually, and probably because of such divisiveness, the brothers from al-Qaa’idah went to Ras Chiamboni to focus on training Kenyan Somalis to do outside operations.

On al Qaeda’s lack of strategy in Somalia:

Here I don’t know what to say about the actions of the brothers from al-Qaa’idah. They split up amongst themselves without executing any real strategy.

and on this one, I have nothing to add.  See the closing of the document….

And it seems I was duped by the slogans and the pretty words, and I hadn’t yet learned the realities,

by Clint

Hammami’s Twitter War with Shabaab & MYC in Somalia & Kenya

This weekend saw the full scale escalation of a Twitter war between Omar Hammami (or at least the Twitter account associated with him) and most of the Muslim world.  Here’s a quick recap of events.

On Friday, I left off with this note reference Hammami’s claims that he had gained some defenders from the Raxanweyn clan.

This account may not be Hammami and is just a propaganda machine uploading old pictures of Hammami and bashing Shabaab. (I don’t think so, but maybe)

Well Saturday morning U.S. time, Hammami answered this question posting this photo on the @abumamerican Twitter account.

Maya

Well, I guess that clears it up a bit.  Hammami’s tweet after this picture says he is with other foreign fighters who have been outcast from Shabaab.  This makes sense and may also suggest his Twitter account has been operated by a team of people with whom he is detained or closely affiliated. This might potentially explain the tendency to speak in the third person, occasionally tweet in Somali and Swahili languages, etc.  What’s also interesting is the pattern of Hammami tweets.  They come in bursts and endure only for a few hours before dropping off. This could mean several things such as only having limited power for communication before having to recharge, only being able to communicate before or after a guard shift, operating the tweets on a delay through a relay point, or only having cell coverage for certain periods of the day. Overall, I think Omar’s speaking in third person stuff is a bit ridiculous at this point.  Lastly, who let Ali G join Hammami?  He’s got some nice gear and a tough look. Nice!

Hammami suggests in his Twitter feed that he recently received some visitors and now may have some more folks to protect him.  It also seems he may have been visited by a ‘Sheikh’, potentially form Kenya, who was trying to negotiate some sort of settlement or something.  I may be confused on this. (I’m not sure why I would be confused since understanding terrorist infighting in 140 characters or less is so easy.)

Here’s a quick O.T.R. (Omar Tweet Rundown), noting where there is something interesting, significant or just generally funny.

Omar doesn’t like Godane - What’s glaringly obvious is that he does not like Ahmed Godane (Abu Zubayr) the head of al Shabaab. Omar claims on many occasions that Godane’s takfiri ways led to him excommunicating Omar & friends.  In addition, Omar believes Godane is a sissy who never fights in battles and thus is not a true jihadi. (Tell me this is not typical Game of Thrones stuff!)

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Screen Shot 2013-01-13 at 10.09.24 PMOmar says that Fazul and old al Qaeda dudes never liked Shabaab – I’ve contended for a while that it was old al Qaeda guys aligned with Bin Laden, namely Fazul, that prevented the merger of al Qaeda and al Shabaab.  Omar seems to suggest the same.  I’m not sure how he would know this, but it’s interesting nonetheless.
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Omar doesn’t like e-jihadi’s who talk the talk but don’t walk the walk – Omar displayed his frustration in the past about not getting much attention from al Qaeda’s online community.  Omar amplified his view of al Qaeda’s online-only supporters this weekend and I imagine he will continue bashing e-jihadi’s until he gets their attention.

Screen Shot 2013-01-13 at 10.12.01 PM Omar thinks Omar is a big deal – Shabaab contended in December that Omar was a narcissist.  Well, some of these tweets seem to suggest he is quite a diva. It also appears that he might have liked the show In Living Color as a kid, homie!

Screen Shot 2013-01-13 at 10.11.04 PMScreen Shot 2013-01-13 at 10.12.41 PMOmar says he escaped to Bay and Bakool region – As I assumed from his previous tweets about the Rahanweyn clan, Omar is in Sheikh Robow’s territory in Bay and Bakool.
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Omar isn’t getting along with the MYC in Kenya – The Muslim Youth Center, a younger Kenyan extremist group aligned with al Shabaab, have really been sticking it to Omar on Twitter.  Despite sticking up for Kenyans a good bit and warning Kenyans not to join Shabaab, Omar has been getting a lashing from those guys.  (BTW, the MYC Twitter feed is way better than the Shabaab feed. Whomever mans the MYC Twitter account is using it way more effectively than @HSMPress – Shabaab account)

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Lastly, Omar seems to be re-directing any of his supporters away from Shabaab and to other jihadi conflicts – namely Syria.  One of the questions posed is here below.  It seems Omar mistakenly believes that the infighting and conflict he’s found in Shabaab would be absent from the front in Syria.  I think he needs to do some research.

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My last point is for those analysts that maintain that al Qaeda Central or al Qaeda as a collective organization is ‘stronger‘.  In light of the Hammami diatribes, how can this be?  Do you believe a Bin Laden led al Qaeda would allow such a damaging, public dispute occur within its ranks?  I know there have been rifts in al Qaeda before, but they were private and settled without tainting the organization’s foreign fighter pipelines.  While I understand the perspective that certain al Qaeda affiliates may be getting relatively stronger, I do not understand, in light of the recent musings of Omar Hammami on social media, how one can believe that al Qaeda as a whole is stronger.  As Omar suggested in previous tweets, al Qaeda may be having a schism of its own at the highest levels. At the lower ranks, where foreign fighters reside, Hammami’s enduring public bashing shows a loss of centralized control and awareness on the part of al Qaeda globally.

by Clint

Hammami’s Latest Call Reveals Deceit, Dissension and Death in Shabaab & al Qaeda

Yesterday, I posted about a Twitter account I believed to be that of Omar Hammami or his close associate (here and here). Well, Hammami didn’t disappoint and returned this morning with some tweets and this afternoon with all the real dirt about the al Shabaab fractures and al Qaeda merger/fiasco. Omar, thanks for sending all the details on al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s infighting and how you got pushed out by Godane (Abu Zubayr). You confirmed many of my suspicions from last winter. @Aynte was also thinking along the same lines as well. And for those that were claiming there was no evidence of splits in al-Shabaab, stop being foolish.
Here’s where the morning started off.

Screen Shot 2013-01-07 at 10.20.38 PMFirst, a tweet from Omar. I’m not sure how Omar’s mission in Somalia relates to Martin Luther King.  Last time I checked, Martin Luther King was about non-violence and Omar and the Somalia jihad is very much about violence.  I believe MLK had a dream and Omar is having a nightmare.

But, then came this tweet.

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Now we are talking.  Omar seems to think the splits and fractures he is experiencing with al Shabaab are occurring with al Qaeda as well.  Omar, we’d all love to know more so please expand.  I realize you don’t want to put yourself in jeopardy, but I think you’ve already shot one of your feet, so no need to hold back.

Things were quiet for most of the day and then @azelin sent out the links to a new Hammami video showing a tired and gaunt Hammami (See below).  This video link at his YouTube channel was accompanied with two documents in Arabic (Here’s #1 and #2).  Previously, Omar had posted his biography, in english, which was ignored by the e-jihadi crowd.  This time he wrote two Arabic documents, which detail his trials and tribulations in Somalia. I’m assuming he chose Arabic to make sure word got out in the jihadi crowd. While I don’t read Arabic, I’ve gone through the Google translate and talked to a knowledgeable scholar, Dr. Will McCants, about what I think are key passages.

Omar names “names” and illustrates in great detail conflict between different factions in al Shabaab, conflict between al Qaeda and al Shabaab, and even disagreements between different al Qaeda elements in Somalia. Great stuff all around and for those that believe al Qaeda is unified and operates in lock step based on the rules of an all powerful ideology – you need to stop what you are doing and read Omar’s notes.

Again, I’m not an Arabic speaker, but I’ll do some quick paraphrasing here of what I interpreted (could be some mistakes) and the implications.  For Arabic speakers out there, if you do an english translation of these documents, please post and send me the link and I’ll do a post on them here.

  • Connections between al Shabaab and al Qaeda in Yemen – In one section, Omar describes how members of al Qaeda in Yemen (AQAP) showed up in Somalia and were the communication conduit with al Qaeda Central in Afghanistan/Pakistan.  The AQAP members were trying to coordinate the official merger of al Shabaab with al Qaeda.  At the time, Ahmed Godane (Abu Zubayr) was against the merger as he thought the conditions in Somalia were not right yet.  It seems at the point of the AQAP visit, Shabaab thought local public support for an Islamic state was sufficient but that the local populace would reject an alliance with al Qaeda.  However, the foreign fighters present, in principle, did agree to be affiliated with al Qaeda.  (My question: Did Godane balk at unity with al Qaeda at this point because he did not have firm control of al Shabaab and wanted to shore up loose ends before a formal merger?)
  • Desire to conduct external operations in Kenya – Throughout the second document, Hammami consistently discusses the desire by many within al Shabaab and particularly al Qaeda elements to begin conducting foreign operations and a deliberate campaign in Kenya.  However, it appears certain leaders within Shabaab, particularly Godane I think, wanted to keep a lid on the foreign fighters and keep them focused on internal fighting in Somalia.  (My question: Does the recent uptick in al Shabaab activity in Kenya represent a loss of control by Godane over Shabaab?  I would assume with Shabaab’s losses and Godane likely fleeing north to Galgala, his control on those wanting to operate in Kenya is limited.)
  • Fazul’s return to Somalia, his conflict with Godane and resulting death – Omar describes in one section that legendary al Qaeda operative Harun Fazul returned with trainers to Somalia with the intent of establishing an external operations capability to project al Qaeda attacks from Somalia.  Fazul told one of the commanders of foreign fighters, going by the name of A’sar Yusr, that he wanted to establish a training camp in the mountains of Puntland (probably Galgala). From what I understand, A’sar Yusr let Fazul’s plans slip to Godane (Abu Zubayr).  Godane apparently didn’t like Fazul’s plan because 1)  Godane, being from Hargeisa, didn’t want Fazul playing on his turf in Puntland (probably Galgala) and 2) Godane believed Fazul to be aligned with Mukhtar Robow (Abu Mansur) – Godane’s Southern Somalia rival for control of al Shabaab. As I understand it, this led Godane to plot Fazul’s demise setting Fazul up to approach a checkpoint in Mogadishu that was awaiting his arrival and prepared to kill him.  (My note: This passage confirms Nelly Lahoud’s theory that Fazul was betrayed. This section also describes al Qaeda’s intent to conduct external operations from Somalia and matches the reporting of Michelle Shepard where she details how Fazul had plans for attacking London when he was killed.)
  • Conflicts between local Somali clan fighters (Ansar) and foreign fighters (Muhajir)- Hammami describes how many of the trainers that came with Fazul left Somalia.  When they departed, many foreign fighters to Somalia left the country with the trainers to join al Qaeda’s ranks outside of Somalia.  Hammami says the foreign fighters were frustrated because the fighting in Somalia was not a real jihad.  Omar suggests foreign fighters were treated poorly in a variety of ways. As mentioned in his biography, he notes that there were constant tensions about how foreign fighters desired to be separated into their own cadres similar to how its done with Taliban/al Qaeda in Pakistan. There are also some comparisons to how foreign fighters are used in Iraq but I didn’t understand all of this. (My note: Omar, this is an exact replay of al Qaeda’s experience in Somalia from 1992-1994.  The clans didn’t like being bossed around by outsiders and they always wanted to focus on local battles over global issues.)
  • Hammami overstepped with Godane and got punished – In one passage, Hammami describes his rift with Godane and how this has likely put him in his current predicament.  Hammami had pledged at some point to stay out of Shabaab politics.  Godane, at some point, wants to know why the foreign fighters are leaving Somalia.  Hammami volunteers to explain the circumstances under which foreign fighters are frustrated over the local focus of clan fighters. Hammami suggests that a way to alleviate this frustration is for Godane to step aside and let Mukhtar Robow (Abu Mansur) take a bigger leadership role in Shabaab as he is well respected by the local Shabaab fighters and also has good rapport with the foreign fighters.  Godane sees this as a challenge to his leadership and believes Hammami is partaking in politics again (breaking his promise to abstain) and joining the side of his rival Robow.  This overstep later leads to Godane having angst with Hammami. (My notes: Omar needs a class in how to win friends and influence people.  Sounds like he directly questioned Godane’s leadership and it wasn’t received well.)
  • Disastrous merger between al Shabaab and al Qaeda – My interpretation is that Godane calls a meeting for all of al Shabaab’s shura.  Once everyone arrives, Godane announces that al Shabaab is going to officially join al Qaeda. Those in attendance, I believe, were caught a little off guard but were amenable.  Then, Godane’s deputy (Guessing this might be Ibrahim al-Afghani) compels everyone to swear bayat (oath of allegiance) to al Qaeda and Godane.  Those at the meeting think they have been fooled because there is no immediate formal recognition of this merger by al Qaeda Central and Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Those that swore allegiance have a bad taste in their mouth about how this meeting went down as they have been told before they were going to be officially part of al Qaeda only to find out later that this was not true. Instead they would usually find out that a Somali leader had used the claim only as a political ploy to consolidate power.  Also, Robow (Abu Mansur) is not at the meeting, which makes people nervous, and it is weeks (if I remember correctly) before Zawahiri formally and publicly recognizes the merger. (My note: It appears that Godane is a total Machiavelli in Somalia.  Over many months, he systematically kills or pushes out those al Qaeda operatives in the country with connection to al Qaeda global, particularly after Bin Laden’s death.  Once all connections to al Qaeda Central are removed, he uses his remaining connection to al Qaeda to push the merger forward and secure loyalty of other Shabaab leaders and establish sole communication and control with al Qaeda, which I imagine included resources.  Total Game of Thrones going on with Godane, he sounds like a real dick! An additional note for all those that believe an oath to al Qaeda’s is a rigid everlasting and binding agreement that cements loyalty of al Qaeda members forever, please read this section.  This totally undermines such a notion.)
  • Omar asserts that Godane killed off al Qaeda members and foreign fighters such as abu Talha, Fazul, Sudani and detained other foreign fighters – After the al Qaeda merger, Godane gave Hammami a figurehead position on a Shura but ultimately Hammami pushed back on the strategic direction of Shabaab landing him in his current predicament.  Essentially, Godane used his linkage with al Qaeda to take firm control over foreign fighters in Somalia, focus all efforts on local power plays and suppress dissent. (My note: Bin Laden would not go with a Shabaab merger because he knew better and he had his aides in Somalia – Fazul.  Zawahiri fell for the alliance with Godane, and in doing so is now aligned with a leader, Godane, and an affiliate, Shabaab, that killed off core members of al Qaeda. While I don’t think Zawahiri called for the killing of old al Qaeda vets like Fazul, he is negligent for not doing better intel in preparation for the merger.)

There are many other things in these documents and I just haven’t had time to go through it.

Other small things I picked up on:

  • Omar used his own money at some point to hire his own security and car to protect himself against Godane- Shabaab.  (My note: this is when I would have broken with the group probably, like when they are trying to kill me.)
  • Omar explains how Shabaab deliberately discussed shifting back to Phase 1 guerilla warfare once Ethiopia and Kenya had fully invaded.

I’ll stop for now. And Omar, thanks for the information and feel free to send more.  It appears you have resigned yourself to Shabaab and what appears to be a confrontation that will likely lead to your death.  You don’t have to go that way.  You’ve been betrayed by the group you joined.  You could always turn yourself in and encourage those that might be considering a similar path to rethink their choice to join a terrorist group.

 

by Clint

al-Shabaab & al-Qaeda Merger: An AQAP-Yemen Exit Strategy for Godane?

Two months ago, some were calling Somalia’s al-Shabaab merger with al-Qaeda a sign of both groups’ growing resurgence. I and many others felt the merger represented the relative weakness of both groups over their history.

Some assertions made after the merger appear true.  Al-Shabaab, or at least elements of the group loyal to Godane, has shifted away from a broad based insurgency and retreated to safe havens in Somalia pursuing a guerilla warfare strategy using pinpoint terrorist attacks on high profile targets (e.g. National Theater attack in Mogadishu).

Likewise, the merger may have resulted (as forecasted) in certain elements of al-Shabaab expanding external operations outside of Somalia to include potential low effect grenade attacks in Kenya (alleged Shabaab attacks).  Al-Shabaab’s renewed focus on external operations mirrors the practices of other AQ affiliates in the region, specifically AQAP.  Last week:

The Al Qaeda-allied group in Somalia of Al Shabab has published the first magazine in Kiswahili language which analysts say is a media war against Kenyan media and to attract youth in East Africa.

While  advances in guerrilla warfare tactics and expansion of external operations may appear ominous at a distance, al-Shabaab’s internal structure appears in shambles after the merger with al-Qaeda. The merger may end up bringing the group’s end.

The Shabaab-AQ Merger: An exit strategy for Godane to AQAP?

Two weeks ago, I put forth an outlying scenario for the AQ-Shabaab merger which I’m increasingly researching.  Here’s a recap of scenario #4 from deciphering the Hammami situation weeks back:

An outlier notion- alternate scenario #4: The AQ-Shabaab merger was nothing more than an exit strategy for Shabaab from Somalia.  Maybe the impetus for the merger came from both Godane and Robow recognizing Shabaab’s eventual defeat under the combined squeeze of TFG, Kenyan, Ethiopian and U.S. military pressure.  Godane orchestrated the merger to facilitate the safe harbor of remaining Shabaab members to Yemen once it becomes necessary.

The hypothesis (only a hypothesis at this point): Godane’s faction of Shabaab sought the AQ merger and a defined relationship with AQAP because:

  1. TFG, Kenyan and Ethiopian Forces were squeezing al-Shabaab.
  2. Fracturing from Robow and Aweys was imminent (Robow had allegedly been reaching out to the TFG and Aweys has already declared his desire to break).
  3. Godane needed a stream of operational resources independent of al-Shabaab.  As a member of the Isaaq clan and from Somaliland, Godane’s clan affiliation and background results in him controlling no territory in South-Central Somalia and depending on other Shabaab members for operational resources.
  4. Godane, in the event of an al-Shabaab breakup, needed an operational safe haven.  Again, not a member of a clan controlling territory, Godane saw the merger as a means for potentially retreating to Yemen with those Shabaab fighters most devoted to al-Qaeda’s ideology and least tied to clans holding strong positions in Somalia (minority, weak clan members).  The necessity of a safe haven is likely seen with the rapid announcement of a merger between al-Shabaab and the Galgala Militia.  The merger with the Galgala Militia, influenced by the installation of a new Godane allied leader (Kilwe), provides Godane’s hardline Shabaab faction a Golis mountain safe haven bordering Godane’s home of Somaliland and more proxiamate logistics, communication and retreat avenues to Yemen.

The evidence for this hypothesis remains scant but continues to emerge.  As I mentioned in a previous post, the connections between al-Shabaab and AQAP in Yemen continue to grow:

What should we expect?

If the AQAP-Shabaab connection were to be true, what should we expect? Remember, this is all a hypothesis and is tough to anticipate, but I would expect the following:

Assuming Kenyan, Ethiopian and TFG pressure remains constant:

  • Aweys will break completely with Shabaab in the coming 2-3 months and form his own group (Hizbul Islam) and negotiate with the TFG for peace.
  • Robow will be in a tough spot.  Robow will want to keep control of his turf and will also negotiate through back channels with the TFG.  But can anyone legitimately negotiate with Robow (and Aweys) as designated terrorists and members of Shabaab?   A tough position for all parties, but the TFG has already hinted at an amnesty program for Shabaab members.
  • Shabaab will see defectors in many sectors. The defectors will form their own militias or fall under other warlords as fighters.
  • Godane and hardline members of Shabaab will first retreat to the Golis Mountains and join with remaining members of Kilwe’s Galgala Militia where they’ll stage terror attacks in Somalia.
  • If the TFG pushes into the Golis, I’d expect increased exfiltration of Godane faction Shabaab members fleeing Somalia for Yemen.
  • In Yemen, I’d look for an increased number of Shabaab fighters crossing from Puntland/Somaliland into Yemen.  This will be difficult to assess as there is natural migration occurring frequently.
  • I’d expect to see more AQAP or Ansar al-Sharia casualties of Somali background over the next 6 months.
  • The ultimate sign will be if Godane or Ibrahim al-Afghani end up in Yemen. They’ll hold out in Somalia as long as possible but if the pressure gets too great, they’ll have to move. I think this would outright confirm this scenario.

Again, only a hypothesis at this point and only time will tell, and for the rest of this week, more on the Hammami situation and Shabaab’s decline.

by Clint

Fazul’s AQ Attacks on the Kenya Coast – 2002

Nelly Lahoud’s article, The Merger of al-Shabaab and Qa’idat al Jihad, discusses many curiosities about al-Qaeda’s presence in Somalia and their relationship with al-Shabaab. The question I’ve always had was why didn’t al-Qaeda establish a formal operation in Somalia with either AIAI, the ICU or al Shabaab at any time over the past 20 years?  AQ always had some operatives in the region; could have established a formal relationship at any time. But, AQ didn’t do it despite having contact and cooperation with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the former head of AIAI and current member of al-Shabaab, going back to at least 1993.

An issue I’ve always been curious about was Fazul and AQ’s attacks on the Kenyan coast in 2002.  In 2007, I traveled to Kenya for some research and compared the terrorist attacks orchestrated by Fazul in 2002 with AQ’s early operations in Kenya in the 1992-1994. Fazul floated through Kenya for years living just off Lamu (Siyu Island) before the 2002 attacks and what he pulled on in 2002 was quite elaborate compared to many other AQ attacks (Assuming this was AQ behind this attack).

On 28 November 2002, Fazul and a group of operatives executed two attacks on Israeli targets.  Both of these were lightly covered in the press despite them involving a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) on a hotel and the launch of a surface-to-air (SAM) missile at Mombasa airport. (Analysts rarely discuss this SAM missile case study when pondering whether AQ will conduct a SAM attack using missiles from Libya, it already happened – 10 years ago!)

Here’s a new recap of these attacks I just stumbled on from Jonathan Fighel:

On the morning of November 28, 2002, Al-Qaeda launched coordinated attacks in Mombassa, Kenya against the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel and an Israeli passenger jet. The near simultaneous attacks involved Al-Qaeda operatives supported by a local infrastructure. In the first attack, the terrorists fired two SA-7 surface-to-air missiles at a departing Israeli Arkia charter Boeing 757 passenger aircraft, carrying 261 passengers and crew, both missiles missed. The second occurred twenty minutes later, when an explosives laden vehicle driven by two suicide attackers, blew up in front of the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel. The attack was timed just as the hotel’s Israeli guests arrived—having traveled aboard the same Arkia plane that had embarked on the return flight to Israel. As a result of the Paradise Hotel attack, 15 people were killed (12 Kenyan nationals and three Israeli tourists) and approximately 80 other people were injured.

The Paradise Hotel and the Arkia jet were both specifically Israeli targets.

  • Why did AQ and Fazul choose this time to directly attack an Israeli target?  AQ is always noted as being brilliantly strategic by analysts, but this attack killed and injured mostly Kenyans.  It also didn’t seem to draw great international attention.
  • Were there specifically people on this plane that Fazul and AQ wanted to target?
  • And why hasn’t the counterterrorism analysis community spent much energy trying to figure out where the SAM missiles came from when we have all seemed very concerned about where Libyan missiles have gone?

I hope Nelly Lahoud’s upcoming biographical analysis of Fazul will shed some light on these questions.  In the meantime, if you are considering a stay at the Paradise Hotel and wonder if they’ve made security improvements, feel confident that any future attack will be deterred by the two impenetrable potted plants now protecting the hotel entrance from a potential VBIED. See picture below:

I’m guessing the ripple in the roof running directly above the second potted plant is left over from the 2002 VBIED blast.

by Clint

Briton Kidnapping Update: Kenya, Shabab & Pirates

Earlier this month, one Briton was kidnapped and another murdered by what appears to be either Somali pirates or Shabaab members.  The debate still seems to be up in there.

Kenyan authorities are seeking the arrest of Famau Kahale- a Kenyan fugitive that’s been on the run for more than seven years.  The Daily Nation article noted that Kahale:

“defected to the other side of Somalia in 2006 and joined the former Somalia Islamic Courts and later al Shabaab. He is now a ring leader of a small group of pirates,”

It appears local Kenyan resort staff helped kidnappers abduct Judith Tebbutt.  These kidnappers are believed to have sold her to pirates based in Kismayo, Somalia.  It remains unclear whether these pirates are connected to al Shabab. British authorities appear to be negotiating for her ransom.

This chain of events continues to be troubling.  Somali pirates up until this event had largely targeted ships in the open sea.  I wonder if the increased protection of merchant ships and changes in their routes have led the pirates to seek other forms of revenue further from home- resulting in this recent kidnapping across the border in Kenya.  The kidnapping will have a serious effect on Kenyan tourism; one of the few economic engines for Kenya’s coast.  Additionally, if the pirates ultimately have connections with Shabab, this would suggest that Shabab likely controls the most resources in the region and can sufficiently pay for hostages and then negotiate a higher ransom.  The kidnapping supply chain issue is one Alex Thurston and I discussed many months ago with regard to the Sahel.

Please let me know if you find any credible updates on this issue.

by Clint

British Tourist Kidnapping in Kenya: Shabab or Criminals?

One British tourist was reportedly killed and another British tourist kidnapped on Kiwayu Island, Lamu District, Kenya this past Sunday.  The details still appear unclear and hostage and kidnapping teams are trying to make contact with whomever is holding the hostage.  Some accounts suggest it was al Shabab that kidnapped the woman while others say it was merely a criminal gang.  In either case, the assumption appears to be the hostage was taken into Somalia.

So many questions immediately come to mind:

  • Was this Shabab?  If so, I think this would indicate they are hurting for resources or believe they need to aggressively demonstrate their capability with an attack on Westerners.
  • Was this a criminal gang?  If so, is this reflective of increased counter-piracy efforts limiting other illicit options for criminal gangs?  Or is this a side effect of the famine increasing insecurity and lawlessness south of Somalia’s border into coastal Kenya?
  • Was this a criminal gang that captured a Western tourist knowing that Shabab would pay for one?  I have no idea if this is the case, but this is also not good as it would indicate that Shabab has more resources than everyone in the area- thus significant influence financially to spread their militant ideology.  This also reminds me of a debate months ago I had with Alex Thurston of Sahelblog.

Either way I’m very interested in this case study and will look to @ibnsiqili, @sahelblog and Dr. Menkhaus to fill me in on the details.

In the meantime, here is a quick map I put together which shows

  1. Lamu- The last sizable Kenyan town on the Kenyan coast before arriving in Somalia.  It was a key location for AQ movement during the ’90′s and Harun Fazul for two decades.
  2. Siyu- Island home of recently killed AQ operative Harun Fazul around 2002 and staging ground for attacks on the Paradise Hotel and the Mombasa airport.
  3. Ras Khamboni- A Shabab stronghold and base of militant activity going back more than a decade.
  4. Kiwayu Island- The location of this past weekend’s abduction.

by Clint

Terrorist Safe Havens: Weak States vs. Failed States

During last week’s Somalia discussions, I argued:

“1- Weak states support terrorism better than failed states- As Dr. Ken Menkhaus has noted many times, failed states like Somalia are hard for everyone. It doesn’t matter if your AQ or Western peacekeepers. The cost of operating in chaos makes terrorism tough.”

In the comments, Petr posted some counterarguments noting:

You are basing this statement on more or less intuitive logic and two case studies (Somalia 92-94, Kenya 92-98). But if you see the broader picture (i.e. more case studies) it gets more complicated.
- it is problematic, even though not unsolvable to treat those countries as one entity and then classify the strength of the statehood.
- in my research it came out that not the strength of a given state but presence of a strategic ally (or radical islamist subculture) is the key variable when it comes to success of al-Qa´ida. I do not want to bother you with details, but simply to say al-Ittihaad could not provide AQ with the safe haven, unlike ash-Shabaab, which in my understanding is a good case of al-Qa´ida success.

The ‘weak state vs. failed state’ debate is one of my favorites (this makes me incredibly dull by the way).  I originally went into the HOA research following the “failed states equals terrorism” equation.  Having read the Harmony documents, spent some time in Kenya, and did some further research, I came to agree strongly with the claim that weak states support terrorism better than failed states thereby following the Menkhaus doctrine :

The case of Somalia suggests that external observers may have been mistaken
in our assumptions about the relationship between terrorism and collapsed
states. The reality is that, at least up to now, transnational criminals and terrorists have found zones of complete state collapse to be relatively inhospitable territory out of which to operate. There are certainly exceptions – the fiefdoms of
drug-lords and radicals in parts of Colombia, for instance. But in general, terrorist networks have instead found safety in weak, corrupted, quasi-states –
Pakistan, Yemen, Kenya, the Philippines, Guinea, Indonesia. Terrorist networks,
like mafias, appear to flourish where states are governed badly rather than not at
all.

Here are my reasons and I’ll address Petr’s notes above.

  1. Case Studies- I actually don’t see my case studies as two fold and defined to the dates mentioned.  I use Somalia (Failed) and Kenya (Weak) as two case studies extending from 1992 to the present.  Somalia’s safe haven support for AQ through the present day has been relatively weak and chaotic.  Sure, AQ has smuggled weapons, done some financing, etc.  But, major terrorist attacks on the West stemming from Somalia have not occurred.  Instead, Kenya has hosted a string of terrorist attacks and provided safe haven for AQ terrorists throughout the past 18 years.  During ’92-’94, AQ members transited through Nairobi airports, drove along the coast, and trafficked through ports in Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu.  The embassy bombings (’98) provide an obvious example of AQ action in Kenya.  AQ members did travel in and out of Somalia from ’94-’98, but they actually lived in Nairobi where they ran front charities and targeted the embassy.  After a brief departure from HOA, Harun Fazul, AQ’s East African commander, didn’t move back to Somalia.  In 2002, Fazul settled near Lamu, Kenya, built his own mosque, developed a fishing business and prepared for two more plots in Kenya: the 2002 Paradise Hotel bombing and the failed SAM missile attack on an El Al jet departing Mombasa.  Fazul has been seen in and out of Kenya for almost 20 years.  He might briefly stop in Somalia to move arms try to influence local groups, etc.  But the longer he stays there, the greater the chance CT folks or a rival clan will identify and interdict him.  The best example of AQ’s freedom of movement in Kenya is seen in the confessions of Omar Said Omar while in Kenyan custody.
  2. Three party problem in Kenya- Petr’s comments above approach only the terrorist side of the failed state story. Weak states provide greater safe haven than failed states because they impede counterterrorists.  In Kenya, there are three parties: AQ, Western CT forces, and the Kenyan government.  Kenya’s weak capacity permits AQ operations and limits Western CT efforts.  In Kenya, Western CT forces can’t interdict AQ and its affiliates militarily, use drones, or build intelligence without restrictions.  Weak state sovereignty requires the U.S. to use partners.  In Somalia, Western CT forces can act without restraint.  Individual AQ training camps or AQ leaders can be targeted.  Indigenous militias can be co-opted to counter AQ.
  3. Predictable Graft is better than Chaotic Graft- In Kenya, AQ operatives can navigate corruption fairly well. Graft is routine and predictable.  Legitimate businesses and charities can be established to generate revenue and augment illicit funding.  In Somalia, AQ’s costs are variable.  As seen in the Somalia Harmony records, operating costs in an austere environment, void of any legitimate transportation and exchange mechanisms, quickly soared to unsustainable levels.  Clan leaders extracted rents haphazardly and often.  Rarely did these clan payments result in AQ accomplishing its goals.

I’ll stop with these three large reasons.  To clarify, I think AQ operates in both Somalia and Kenya.  But, similar weak state issues can be seen in Yemen, Pakistan, and the Sahel today.  Meanwhile, the U.S. has dismantled terrorist operations in Afghanistan and Iraq where it has freedom of movement and no weak state limitations.  Although Iraq may be entering a weak state era soon.

Lastly, Vahid Brown wrote a great biography of Harun Fazul which provides an excellent account of terrorists taking advantage of weak states.  Also, I encourage all interested in the “Failed vs. Weak” state debate to read Dr. Ken Menkhaus article in The Journal of Conflict Studies entitled “Quasi-State, Nation-Building, and Terrorist Safe Havens.”  He explains this much better than I.

I’m taking sometime off for Festivus but I’ll chime in later in the week reference new Somali clan alliances.

by Clint

Busy Week in Counter Terrorism

Counterterrorism efforts around the world hit peak levels this past week. The flurry began with reports last week of potential “Mumbai Style” (not to be confused with “Hunan Style” which would be breaded and deep-fried) terrorist attacks in Britain, France, Germany and maybe the U.S.  The pace thickened with several significant counterterrorism actions.  Here is a quick recap. I may be missing some events so chime in if I left something out.

  1. Background: July 2010: A German citizen of Afghan origin from Hamburg was captured in Afghanistan.  Prior to his capture, Ahmed Sidiqi had traveled to Waziristan and received weapons training.
  2. Wednesday, Sept. 29, 2010: German officials believe up to 70 Germans had undergone training in Pakistan and up to 40 fought in Afghanistan.  German nationals have been reported leaving Europe to join the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
  3. Saturday, Oct. 2, 2010: A French citizen of Algerian origin, Ryan Hannouni, was arrested in Italy near the Naples train station allegedly carrying bomb-making materials.
  4. Saturday, Oct. 2, 2010:  Kenyan anti-terrorism units detain a German convert to Islam near Mombasa.  The German, Sascha Alessadro Bottcher, penned a letter to his mother saying he “would never return alive” and allegedly wanted to join al Shabaab in Somalia. Kenyans deported him back to Germany on Tuesday, October 5.  (This one’s probably unrelated but still interesting)
  5. Sunday, Oct. 3, 2010: U.S. State Department issues a travel advisory for Europe warning of potential terror attacks in European cities.
  6. Monday, Oct. 4, 2010:  Between three and eight German Nationals were killed in a drone stike in the town of Mir Ali, FATA, Pakistan. “The militants were said to be members of Jehad al-Islami and their deaths follow reports that a group of jihadists from Hamburg is at the center of an al Qaeda plot for coordinated terrorist attacks in European cities.”
  7. Tuesday, Oct. 5, 2010: French police arrest 12 people in two separate raids.  Three are suspected of providing false papers for jihadists returning from Afghanistan, while eight are being held for trafficking firearms and explosives.  The contact information for three of the arrested men came from the cell phone of Ryan Hannouni, caught in Naples on Saturday, Oct. 2.
  8. Wednesday, Oct. 6, 2010:  French authorities issue a travel warning to their citizens that the risk of a terrorist attack in Britain is high. (Ohh the French, nothing hurts worse than a retaliatory travel warning, take that Britain.)

Wow, so what do we make of this?  Here are some of my thoughts and questions.

1)    Significantly improved counterterrorism efforts

Yes, I believe recent events illustrate massive improvement in counter terrorism.  I know, I should stay with the “Terrorism Fear Posse” (TFP for short). But, this week’s actions represent a global disruption effort across at least seven or more countries; hitting operational safe havens with drone strikes, rolling up known al Qaeda logisticians, and preemptively arresting those that can facilitate foreign fighter returnees from AFPAK.  This past week, effective information sharing between multiple countries produced rapid action against a decentralized al Qaeda related threat.  Finally, we are getting there.

True, there could still be an attack (in fact, there will ultimately be another attack in the West, we need to accept that). But deliberate, simultaneous CT actions in Pakistan, France, Britain, and Germany will put any terrorist plot that might be in motion into disarray.  I see this recent counter terrorism flurry as a positive sign.  We’re much closer to defeating al Qaeda.  However, one last step remains, the most challenging one; derailing al Qaeda recruitment.

2)    Lessons learned in countering violent extremism

Al Qaeda and affiliated groups will survive as long as they can replenish their recruitment pool.  Countering violent extremism (CVE) and disrupting al Qaeda recruitment remains the biggest challenge. German national villages emerging in Pakistan.  German nationals training and fighting in Afghanistan to then return and attack in Europe.   Big problems!

Why German nationals? Some are radical converts but most are of Turkish descent from what I’ve read.  The UK, Germany and France provide forces to ISAF in Afghanistan.  Does this really radicalize such a large number of European recruits?  If so, why so many Germans; more than Brits and French it seems?

I don’t know the answer to these questions but I do wonder how each country’s approach to CVE has affected their indigenous recruitment to al Qaeda.  From my limited knowledge, it appears each country chose a different CVE strategy post 9/11.  The Brits established relationships, funded organizations, allowed open dialogue and tried to work with Muslim groups to build bridges.  France constructed an organized council of Muslim groups tied directly into the government.  Meanwhile, Germany appears to have rejected any and all dialogue; banning entire Muslim groups from the country and disengaging from vulnerable populations.

I don’t know enough to accurately gauge how Germany’s CVE approach relates to the current surge in German recruitment, but I do believe the U.S. should examine these three countries to identify the risks and rewards of utilizing different CVE techniques in the States.

3)    The government had to issue travel warnings

Stop crying! The media and public bashing of the U.S. government for issuing a European travel warning is ridiculous.  They have to issue a warning.  If they don’t issue the warning and an attack occurs, then the American public would be outraged that the government wasn’t “doing anything” or “wasn’t aware” of the terrorist threat.

“Well, it was too vague, what should I do, wawawawa…”

Look if the U.S. government knew there was a terrorist plot at a specific place, on a specific day, at a specific time, they wouldn’t issue a warning.  They would just go stop the plot.

So, stop crying about the warnings, the government is doing the best they can, and they are getting a lot better at counterterrorism.  So be happy, not angry!