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by Clint

What is the state of al Qaeda & terrorism two years after Bin Laden? Vote Now!

Two years ago, Osama Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan marking one of the most significant milestones in the history of terrorism and counterterrorism. Two and a half years ago, I began conducting surveys to assess what the impact might be if Osama Bin Laden ever met his demise.  These surveys have since become an annual assessment I generate to gauge public perceptions of the threat of al Qaeda and terrorism in general.  While Bin Laden may be gone, terrorism continues and the past year has demonstrated how terrorist attacks might manifest themselves in a variety of ways from Benghazi to the Boston Marathon bombing.

Today, I’m launching the fifth iteration of the al Qaeda Strategy/Post Bin Laden Survey.  Thanks to those that have participated in versions #1 – Does Bin Laden Matter - Jan.2, 2011, #2 – AQ Strategy 2011-2012 - April 27. 2011, #3 – Terrorism Post-Bin Laden – May 2, 2011, #4 One Year After Bin Laden- May 2, 2012. You can find the results at this link which hosts the results of past surveys.

This poll is shorter and a bit different than past surveys.  Realizing there have been changes in terrorism, I opened the questions up a bit to include new emerging trends.  However, I did repeat some questions verbatim so we can see how our collective thinking has changed over time.

Thanks in advance for contributing to the survey. And anyone is welcome to participate – the more votes the better the results. I’ll begin posting the results and comparisons with past data sets in a few weeks.  Here is the link to the survey if you would like to open it in a separate window: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/2yearsafterBinLaden

And if you would like to just take the survey here, I’ve embedded it in this post.  Thanks for taking the survey!

Create your free online surveys with SurveyMonkey , the world’s leading questionnaire tool.

 

 

by Clint

Shabaab in Somalia publicly fractures & pressures al Qaeda

Well, I’ve been waiting for a year to see the outcome of Shabaab’s “Game of Thrones” and today a surprising public fracture emerged on the aljihad.com website.  Ibrahim al-Afghani, a once senior leader of al Shabaab, close associate of Ahmed Godane and fellow member of Godane’s Isaaq clan, posted a public and direct call to Ayman al-Zawahiri asking him to intervene in Somalia and remove Godane as leader of al Shabaab.

Ibrahim al-Afghani’s public posting finally discloses the fractures I’ve been discussing for the past year.  Omar Hammami, the American public relations arm for Team Robow (maybe should be renamed Task Force Robow/Aweys/Afghani), has provided ten reasons for Afghani’s public denouncement of Godane – a major development in Somalia.  These are quotes from Omar’s tweets so if you don’t like the language, complain to Omar on Twitter.

  1.  ”Dr. Ayman has to act fast and decisively b4 the jihad is destroyed and enters a deep dark tunnel”
  2. “2 scholars are being threatened.”
  3. “Muhajirs are being expelled and misused/mistreated.”
  4. “Secret jails are off limits to observers.”
  5. “Scholars and leaders can’t check on claims of torture.”
  6. “Opportunities to open new outside fronts are purposefully neglected.”
  7. “The wealth of islam is squandered by the amir.”
  8. “There is no real shura and all the real actors are kept from benifitting the jihad.”
  9. “kids w/good intentions are put in charge of op.s that go wrong and have negative fall out, &they are in charge of policing elders”
  10. “the leader is responsible for the recent defeats and the loss of the previously unprecedented public/tribal support”

Interesting that Omar wrote these tweets in English.  Why not Arabic?  I’m guessing its to get word out to the West, but the solution he is seeking is not likely to come from the West.   I love it that he calls some of the Shabaab members “kids”. Oh wise twenty-something Omar who joined terrorist group that betrayed him. Omar continued immediately after the above posts to assert why everyone should listen to Ibrahim al-Afghani:

Screen Shot 2013-04-06 at 5.20.17 PMScreen Shot 2013-04-06 at 5.20.06 PM

 

Essentially, Omar explains why it must be Afghani and potentially not Robow that engages Zawahiri and brings the injustices of Godane to Zawahiri’s attention. Afghani was a Godane ally at one time, fought in Afghanistan, and comes from the same clan as Godane.  Also of note, there were rumors of Afghani once replacing Godane as Emir of Shabaab.  See this Critical Threats article for a longer but still short description about Afghani.

When reviewing my scenarios from last year, Scenario #1 appears to have flushed out as most accurate:

“Scenario #1: Godane kills off old AQ members & Robow affiliated foreign fighters”

Also of note are the two forces over the past year that signaled which scenario would prove most accurate:

  1. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys who showed movement towards scenario #1 last summer , and
  2. Ibrahim al-Afghani who showed his hand today.

Here is an update to my crazy Powerpoint chart from last year. I haven’t been tracking Raage so don’t know his status or position.  I’ve put “X’s” over the scenarios that no longer make sense from last year and noted the migration of Afghani to the Aweys and Robow side.  In yellow is what I anticipate as the coalition against Godane as of today.

Slide1

Here are some thoughts for today and I’ll have another update in the next day or so:

  • What does Task Force Robow-Aweys-Godane want Zawahiri to do?  - Usually these things occur behind the scenes but this is a public call to Zawahiri.  Omar has suggested that communications with al Qaeda have been going through AQAP and that AQAP has gone cold on them in recent months or communicated intermittently with Godane.  This puts Zawahiri in an awkward spot.  Zawahiri went for a merger with Shabaab that Bin Laden would not pursue.  The main hope for al Qaeda now is in Syria and Somalia is a distraction.  If Zawahiri leaves Godane in, he confirms his negligence in not dealing with the Hammami situation the past year and demonstrates his naivety about formally merging with Shabaab in the first place. Dr. Z must be scratching his turbin.  
  • A public plea at this time isn’t such a brave move -  If this public call from Afghani had come last summer, it would have been a brave move.  But the Afghani call coming now, after Shabaab has gotten their ass kicked incessantly since the merger, isn’t particularly brave.  Shabaab lost its most important city of Kismayo, which Afghani once commanded, and I imagine he and many others have little to command under Godane at this point.  Loss of turf has also likely brought folks like Afghani, Hammami, and Robow closer together as they get squeezed into Bay & Bakool.  Bottom line: If Shabaab were winning, how Godane governs would not matter.
  • Source in Somalia again prove suspect – A year ago, several sources said that Ibrahim al-Afghani was chasing Omar around and trying to kill him in Somalia.  This now seems unlikely.  Again open sources from Somalia prove not credible.  No surprise.
  • The revelations of Omar Hammami – A year ago, when Omar Hammami posted his plea video, many thought it was an anomaly amongst Shabaab’s alleged rise after aligning with al Qaeda.  However, his persistent presence on Twitter has brought him supporters, probably kept him alive and turned him from goat to glamor jihadi again.  However, over the long run, Omar’s postings are a double edged sword for the jihad in Somalia and foreign fighter recruitment globally.  If a Westerner is considering joining Shabaab or any AQ affiliate and witnesses the absolute mess that is going on publicly, they must be crazy to join – and unfortunately jihadi foreign fighters usually are crazy.
  • Discussions of money - As I have mentioned in previous posts about jihad in Africa, resources and money play an important role and as Omar outlined on Twitter, how money is handed out matters a lot to these guys.  While Omar and these Shabaab splinters blanket themselves in ideological cover, underneath they are really concerned about their personal power and control of resources.  Jihad in Somalia – “Show me the money!”
by Clint

Is Zawahiri still in control of al Qaeda? – 1 Year Post UBL Poll – Results #7

On May 2, 2012, I was curious as to what people’s perceptions were of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s leadership since Bin Laden’s death.  In total, 197 people responded to the following question:

Since Usama Bin Laden’s death, has Ayman al-Zawahiri truly taken control of al Qaeda globally – i.e. exhibiting a level of command and control equal to or greater than that of his predecessor Usama Bin Laden?

Here are the results:

  • 44 of 197 respondents (22%) selected “Yes” Zawahiri has truly taken control of al Qaeda.
  • 153 of 197 respondents (78%) selected “No” Zawahiri has not truly taken control.

Of all the questions analyzed thus far from the “1 Year Post Bin Laden Survey“, respondents across all demographic breakdowns voted in roughly the same pattern with around 20% generally selecting “Yes” Zawahiri is really in charge and roughly 80% consistently selecting “No” Zawahiri is not in charge.

Below is a chart showing the breakdown of votes by raw total across each professional category.  Only two categories appeared to be different from the rest.

  • 40% of ‘Government Contractors’ selected “Yes” Zawahiri is in control – by far the highest percentage of any professional group.
  • 100% of ‘Law Enforcement’ voters (7 total) selected “No” Zawahiri is not in control.  Despite being a small sample, cops apparently don’t think Zawahiri is all that.

The below chart shows the breakdown of votes across all demographic categories.  Again, an amazing consistency across all breakdowns.  Even ‘Social Media’ users were not very bullish on Zawahiri.

In my opinion, I believe Zawahiri doesn’t command al Qaeda to the same level as Bin Laden did.  His ability to motivate young men to al Qaeda’s cause and garner donations for al Qaeda operations is limited compared to that of Bin Laden.  However, I don’t think Zawahiri should be counted out entirely.  I believe those in al Qaeda that once had a true relationship with Zawahiri, having fought with him in Pakistan or worked with him in Egypt, still maintain close ties to the leader and remain loyal to his strategic directives.  If I had to guess, these would be the veteran al Qaeda members that came with Zawahiri to Afghanistan, his followers from Egypt and a slice of former LIFG members from the late 1990′s. Essentially, I’d estimate his influence and command resides more in North Africa than in the Arabian Peninsula. I’m working on a way to try and crowdsource where Zawahiri’s influence might still reign within al Qaeda.  Stay tuned…

 

by Clint

Differing Perspectives – “Who should we call al Qaeda?” Part 3 – Conclusion

The “al Qaeda” name game will not go away anytime soon. (See here, here and here for previous parts to this discussion.)  Many different interests and perspectives drive the terminology that has dominated the U.S.’s principle adversary for more than a decade.  The most recent emergence of several jihadi-like groups (Ansar al Sharia, Ansar al Dine, many more in Syria, etc.) only further complicates this difficult and often political question. Depending on where you sit, calling an upstart jihadi group “al Qaeda” may have a variety of pros and cons.

Following up on the “Should we call this group al Qaeda?” survey question and Dr. Bruce Hoffman’s NPR discussion, I’ve put together a chart here showing some of the pros and cons in calling or not calling emerging jihadi groups “al Qaeda”.  The chart is by no means all encompassing and is meant strictly for generating discussion on the AQ name game.

In general, I’ve focused on three broad categories of perspectives shown in the left hand column: 1- Jihadi upstart groups and Existing AQ Affiliates with an AQ moniker, 2- al Qaeda Senior Leaders, both past (Bin Laden) and present (Zawahiri) and 3- U.S. government & CT pundits. For each, I tried to anticipate the Pros and Cons for calling or not calling an upstart jihadi group “al Qaeda”.  This isn’t exhaustive; just a cursory stab for discussion.

For upstart groups, Richard Barrett, Coordinator of the Al-Qaida-Taliban Monitoring Team at the United Nations, rightly noted that choosing the AQ name comes with a level of credibility.

“Al Qaeda has become a useful label for any group that essentially pursues local aims but wishes to exaggerate its reach and sophistication.”

Meanwhile, many successful insurgent groups with ties to al Qaeda have since backed away from the “al Qaeda” name and followed the wishes of Bin Laden seeking to re-brand al Qaeda as a group that cares about the issues of local Muslims.

So where does that leave Zawahiri?  If novice, unqualified and ideologically dubious groups continue to call themselves “al Qaeda” while more qualified affiliates leave the brand name, Zawahiri becomes decreasingly influential and tied to a hodge-podge of terror group misfits – something he complained about to Bin Laden.  (see al Qaeda Doesn’t Know Who Is In al Qaeda)

Most interesting of all is what the implications of the “al Qaeda” name game is to the West.  For the U.S., not having “al Qaeda” affiliates to pursue questions why the “War on Terror” continues.  Ending the “War on Terror” would vastly limit the U.S. ability to pursue al Qaeda groups and members while also putting more pressure on the Department of State to designate foreign terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations;  an important role that is bureaucratically intensive and operationally limiting further slowing the pace of pursuit.

More ironically, the discussion of the al Qaeda brand has a significant impact on the counterterrorism punditry and the media.  How does one study something that may not really exist anymore?  Who is an expert?  Who can really understand a non-cohesive, amorphous, ill-defined terror threat and communicate the risks of such an entity to the public?

For the media, this is equally troubling, stories carrying the AQ moniker were easier to cover and grabbed wider audiences than stories describing “a jihadi group that may or may not have links to al Qaeda attacked a group of armed guards in a place that you could not pick out on a map and are not likely to care about if we don’t say al Qaeda is there.”

In conclusion, the al Qaeda name game has implications for lots of different stakeholders – terrorists, counterterrorists and the media.

by Clint

Defection, Deceit & Disdain: Shabaab & AQ’s Foreign Fighters

For those that missed last week’s BBC article “Defections put militant al-Shabaab on the run in Somalia“, I encourage you to take a read through the piece and see al Qaeda’s history repeating itself in Somalia.  In the 1990′s, al Qaeda (AQ) struggled to integrate and command Somalia’s clans.  AQ thought the Somali clans were too worried about clan politics and ignoring the ‘far enemy’.  Somali clans thought the AQ operatives to be elitist and concerned with far off global matters of little importance in Somalia’s hinterlands.

Now, Zawahiri has foolishly fallen into the same predicament by merging with al Shabaab only to meet the same fate encountered by Bin Laden nearly 20 years earlier.  TFG/AMISOM advances have resulted in Shabaab retreating to safe havens and pursuing guerrilla warfare.  During their retreat, Shabaab has seen broad defections having alienated locals through harsh tactics.  Included in the motivations of defectors is the elitist nature of AQ foreign fighters.  The article notes:

Abu Khalit said he had little time for the foreign fighters who provide the Islamist group with its ideological backbone.

“They hide their faces from us. They live in safe houses, and we are not allowed inside,” he said.

It’s pretty hard to take orders from outsiders, especially those you can’t even see.  Next, the BBC story outlines other reasons locals have turned against al-Shabaab.

At a crossroads on the outskirts of Afgoye, an impromptu market had sprung up; a line of tables, from which women in brightly coloured headscarves were selling small bunches of leaves.

For many Somalis, chewing this stimulant, known as khat, is a national obsession, close to a way of life.

Al-Shabab declared it to be “haram”, forbidden, and banned it.

They would not have approved of Abu Khalit’s musical ringtone either.

I don’t expect that AQ affiliated extremism will be wiped from Somalia.  The linkages between AQ and extremism in Somalia have endured for more than 20 years so I don’t expect them to vanish anytime soon.  Instead, I would estimate the following would happen: (Note, this is shoot from the hip analysis, not a thorough review so take it with a grain or two of salt.)

  • Shabaab will break into two loosely affiliated nodes – If I had to guess, the strongest concentration of Shabaab will remain and hold the Shabelle regions for some time to come.  This would be the primary node of Shabaab and may or may not change its name to keep its local base of popular support.  The pattern will be quite similar to the evolution of AIAI to ICU to al Shabaab.  Ultimately, the group’s focus will primarily be on survival more than ideology.  A second smaller insurgent Shabaab element will endure amongst the remnants of the Galgala Militia and will continue to harass with terrorist attacks from a mountain safe haven between Puntland and Somaliland.
  • Many Shabaab defectors and sub-groups will break into other militias – Many defectors of Shabaab were coerced into joining in the first place.  Absent legitimate employment, these fighters will not truly demobilize and instead will join other local militias, the interim government or start their own militia.  Either way, these former fighters are unlikely to be a stablizing force in Somalia.
  • A handful of Shabaab members most closely affiliated with AQ will depart for Yemen – If the combined pressures of TFG, Kenya, Ethipia and U.S. become to great, I would expect small contingents of Shabaab members well connected to AQ to seek refuge in Yemen.  There are rumors of this happening already but solid proof remains hard to come by.
  • The TFG/AMISOM will not make any sustained gains in governing the south of Somalia -  Lastly, I have no real expectations that a functioning government able to control Somalia much beyond Mogadishu will emerge.  As discussed in Jeffrey Herbst’s excellent work, States and Power in Africa, rarely do fractured African states have governments that can extend authority much beyond the capital.
by Clint

Al Qaeda Doesn’t Know Who Is In Al Qaeda

In a post this past February, I compiled the results of 268 respondents who answered this question in April/May 2011: 

In two years, will regional insurgent groups and local, upstart terror groups continue to brand themselves as AQ affiliates? (See this link for the full results.)

Respondents overwhelming believed, “Yes, groups will re-brand as al Qaeda, but will have no direct connection with AQ”.  In the West, we grow concerned if this prophecy proves true as it points to the unstoppable growth of al Qaeda’s social movement and an enduring terrorist threat after more than a decade of war.

The expansive description of al Qaeda and the amorphous process for joining the organization was seen by many CT pundits as the terror group’s greatest strength – the construction of a social movement where extremists from all walks of life could join al Qaeda’s call and pursue global jihad under core ideological principles outlined by al Qaeda’s central leadership.  Some professors and pundits flocked to social movement theory promoting every AQ wannabe executing a bungled, ill-conceived plot as a symbol of al Qaeda’s strength.  These same theorists would note how al Qaeda’s flat structure makes the terror group resilient and difficult to counter.

Ironically, while social movement professors rustled through their closets searching for their wrinkled Che Guevara t-shirt from graduate school, al Qaeda became increasingly worried about their social movement – specifically their loss of operational control and dilution of their brand. Lacking a formal process for integrating all new members and affiliates joining al Qaeda, the terror group’s senior leaders could not vet the quality of new joiners. The amateurish failed plots of AQ wannabes and the expansive, reckless violence of AQ affiliates slowly began to erode popular support for AQ globally calling AQ leaders to ask, “Who are these guys in our organization?”.

The Abbottabad documents released last weak reveal that Bin Laden and his top leadership struggled with the issue of membership and control.  In document SOCOM-2012-0000006-HT, a document potentially written by Zawahiri (although unconfirmed) to Bin Laden in December 2010, Zawahiri (or some high level AQ leader) notes:

“concerning controlling the affairs in general, membership and the affiliation in particular. There is no secret to you that, in the past, there were a lot of advantages and faults. However, what I would like to emphasize in this letter is the issue of individuals, those who pledge allegiance, and the affiliates. Therefore, from the last experience it showed great figures with high quality have emerged, and also some figures have emerged did not benefit any groups by their affiliation, yet some kind of bragging and boasting appeared by joining Al-Qa’ida. And, the formulation of specific titles have been published by their owners in the network of information.”

So it appears by 2010, AQ Central was becoming increasingly concerned about its unknown “volunteers” as a liability tarnishing its brand name.  Likewise, local start-ups with little or no connection to AQ were creating their own groups and appointing themselves titles previously hard won on jihadi battlefields – annoying veteran AQ members with more experience.  I can hear it now, “Hey, How did Habis get to be an Emir?  He just joined 6 months ago and all he did was start his own group… he’s never done anything!”  So much for a flat, horizontal “let’s all get along” AQ.  Zawahiri (or some high AQ leader) continues on:

“Anyways, the important thing, honorable sir, is that the issue needs to be controlled, to know who is member of Al-Qa’ida, what his function is, what side he follows, what is the way to impeach him, so as not to increase the friends of desire and greed and seclude those friends of religion and morals.”

Contextual translation: Some of these recruits don’t deserve to be al Qaeda.  We need to determine who is in and who is out.  Zawahiri (or some senior AQ leader), concludes by recommending three standards, all quite subjective, by which membership in al Qaeda might be evaluated.

“Therefore, starting from now please think about controlling the matter with a system that deals with people, each according to his religion, piety and contribution.”

By Zawahiri’s standard, one must be subservient, prove their religious credentials, and contribute – either on the battlefield or for a certain “nominal fee” one might be able to buy their way into al Qaeda.

It appears Zawahiri (or some senior AQ leader) wanted to know who was in al Qaeda, and even within al Qaeda, who was in charge of who.  Very interesting, I wonder how Zawahiri’s desires have played out in the past year as he has assumed command – assuming he can actually communicate and command anything from his current location.   I also wonder, how Zawahiri’s desires for control and structure are being received by affiliates who appear to have had a relatively free reign to pursue objectives as they wished during Bin Laden’s rule.

Two closing notes:

Last summer, I helped J.M. Berger launch a survey asking CT enthusiasts “What is al Qaeda?”. The results (Part #1 & Part #2) were quite interesting and the conclusion was that we in the West don’t really know what organizations or individuals really constitute al Qaeda.  I wonder how al Qaeda members would answer the same survey?  I bet the results would be quite similar.

Lastly, if you haven’t voted already, please take three minutes and cast your opinions here on the fate of al Qaeda one year after the death of Bin Laden.  The questions follow up on posts from last year’s survey I linked to above and will hopefully open up some good discussion in the coming weeks about the current state of al Qaeda.

by Clint

Deciphering Hammami Scenarios & Shabaab Splits

Andrew Lebovich and I put forth in our recent paper several hypotheses with regards to the larger implications of Hammami’s plea and what it signals about al-Shabaab fractures and al-Qaeda management problems.  Many have chimed in with excellent points and added to this debate in the past three posts.  Thanks to @Aynte @marisaurgo, @ibnsiqilli @WyldDarkHeart @firefroggy92, @spacebox64, and @KatieZimmerman for their supporting thoughts and research contributions here at this blog and via their respective portals.

Last week, I focused on Hammami’s disaster as it related to larger al-Qaeda.  In my opinion, Zawahiri and those in AQ Central pushing for a merger have the blood of AQ members and foreign fighters in Somalia on their hands.  Zawahiri either deliberately knocked off some internal AQ adversaries or through poor decision making inadvertently let al-Shabaab eliminate AQ members.  One of the reasons I postulated Zawahiri agreed to an AQ-Shabaab merger was to gain access to Western foreign fighters.  Hopefully, Zawahiri’s poor judgment will undermine the recruitment of some foreign fighters to AQ – especially al-Shabaab in Somalia – and sideline one of AQ’s main purposes for merging with al-Shabaab.

With this post, I’ll try to sum up the input of those debating Hammami’s plight and how it relates to al-Shabaab’s internal dimensions. I’ve included a a quick chart outlining key players mentioned and three theories as to what Hammami’s disaster may signal inside al-Shabaab.

 

Scenario #1: Godane kills off old AQ members & Robow affiliated foreign fighters

(Represented in Red #1 above)

This scenario mirrors the arguments put forth by @Aynte and Lebovich and I last week.  Godane (Ahmed Abdi Godane, aka Mukhtar Abu Zabair), in an effort to consolidate his power in al-Shabaab and to quell old AQ member resistance to a merger, facilitates the removal of Fazul, Bilal al-Barjawi, and Barjawi’s deputy. Godane accomplishes this with a primary ally, Ibrahim al-Afghani (a fellow Ishaaq clan member). Godane proceeds to eliminate other foreign fighters (including Hammami) aligned under Robow (Sheikh Muktar Robow, AKA Abu Mansur). Godane undermines Robow because 1) Robow is from a competing clan focused on local Somali issues and is less interested in global AQ objectives and, 2) Robow is more interested in continuing a military campaign against the TFG rather than pursuing Godane’s guerilla warfare strategy.

Strengths: This theory aligns with Lahoud’s theory of Fazul rebuffing Zawahiri, Aynte’s notion that Fazul, Bilal al-Barjawi, and Barjawi’s deputy were in Team Robow’s camp &  matches with Mesoy’s mention of Godane and Robow battling for control of Shabaab and its military-vs-guerilla warfare strategy.

Weaknesses: This does not jive with @DarkWyldHeart and @firefroggy92’s assertion that AQ members and foreign fighters died amidst clan fighting between Robow and Godane.

Implications for AQ: Culpable for the killing of AQ foreign fighters; through direct orders or negligence.

Scenario #2: Robow kills off AQ fighters and dumps Hammami over Shabaab’s focus

(Represented in Blue #2 above)

In this scenario, Robow, Rahanweyn clan, is in a battle with Godane, Isaaq clan, for control and direction of al-Shabaab.  Robow seeks a locally focused direction for Shabaab, resists a merger with AQ and wants to continue a military style campaign against the TFG rather than pursue Godane’s guerilla warfare/AQ style campaign.  Robow kills off Fazul, Bilal al-Barjawi, and Sakr to rid al-Shabaab of foreign influences.  Additionally, Hammami and foreign fighters loyal to AQ get pushed out by Robow resulting in Hammami’s plea video.  Godane, possibly through al-Afghani, rescues Hammami.

Strengths: This theory adheres to @DarkWyldHeart and @firefroggy92’s assertion that Hammami and AQ’s veterans have been trapped in a Shabaab tug-of-war based on clan dynamics and strategic direction: local vs. global.

Weaknesses: This theory clashes with Lahoud’s notion that Fazul resisted a merger, Anzalone’s placing of Robow, Aweys and Hammami in Fazul’s camp, and Aynte’s tracing of Godane’s influence.

Implications for AQ:  If true, it means a Zawahiri-led AQ entered blindly into a merger with Godane, who really didn’t have control of Shabaab – leading to the death of AQ members and foreign fighters.

Scenario #3: There is no split in al-Shabaab, Godane & Robow jointly decided to push out Hammami

(Represented above in Green #3)

In this scenario, there is no split between Godane and Robow.  Both were equally amenable to joining AQ but in the public space, they preach divergent themes to maintain a local based of support (Robow) while appeasing global funders & facilitators (Godane).  Godane goes after old AQ members (Fazul, Bilal al-Barjawi, and Sakr) with Robow’s knowledge and under the radar of Hammami and other foreign fighers.  After the merger, both Godane and Robow agree to shift al-Shabaab’s focus to guerilla warfare and a closer alliance with AQ.  Hammami rebuffs Robow over this strategic shift.  Robow, Godane and al-Afghani have all had enough of Hammami (since he’s generally a pain-in-the-ass glory hound) and they decide to get rid of him.  Hammami evades them long enough to make a video.

Strengths: This theory still falls in line with Aynte’s Godane influence string and Lahoud’s Fazul offing.  This partially supports the argument of @DarkWyldHeart and @firefroggy92 that Robow was culpable in the death of Fazul & old AQ as well as recent the outing of Hammami.

Weaknesses: Theory completely ignores the implication of clan battles in Shabaab (@DarkWyldHeart and @firefroggy92) and debate over near enemy versus far enemy (Atle Mesoy).

Implications for AQ: Directly implicates AQ. Suggests at a minimum AQ passively supports al-Shabaab’s pushing out of foreign fighters like Hammami and old AQ members like Fazul.

Things to watch:

Ibrahim al-Afghani:  Afghani appears in most discussions as an ally of Godane due to clan linkages.  However, different open source media accounts place him as attacking Hammami and assisting in the offing of older AQ fighters. Some accounts, of dubious credibility, place al-Afghani with Raage and Atom.  Al-Afghani, in any of these contexts, appears to be a serious player in al-Shabaab; keeping a low profile like a serious AQ Operator (Adel, Atiyah, Fazul) rather than AQ Talker (Libi, Zawahiri).  By the way, if anyone has a picture of al-Afghani, please send it my way so I can replace the unhappy face.

Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys:  Aweys has connections with AQ dating back to the 1990’s during his time with AIAI. Yet, he never seemed to get his organization linked up with AQ preferring instead to focus on local issues.  I doubted Aweys commitment to Shabaab in the past and his Hizbul Islam focuses more on the local than the global. If Aweys breaks away from Shabaab, this may be a strong indicator of Shabaab’s increasing weakness.

Discussion of AQAP in Shabaab statements: At different times, both Rage (Ali Mohamed Rage AKA Ali Dhere) and Robow have suggested the group’s connection is directly with AQAP.  This seems logical in light of last year’s Warsame intercept by the U.S. military and recent reports of Somali foreign fighters operating in Yemen.  Thus….

An outlier notion- alternate scenario #4: The AQ-Shabaab merger was nothing more than an exit strategy for Shabaab from Somalia.  Maybe the impetus for the merger came from both Godane and Robow recognizing Shabaab’s eventual defeat under the combined squeeze of TFG, Kenyan, Ethiopian and U.S. military pressure.  Godane orchestrated the merger to facilitate the safe harbor of remaining Shabaab members to Yemen once it becomes necessary.

 My five seconds of thought as to what has happened to Hammami: A recent Somali article (of unknown reliability) says Hammami has been investigated, charged and convicted of being a CIA spy and will be deported to Yemen.  Anytime I see “CIA” in an article from Somalia I get suspicious about the report’s authenticity.  (As seen by Somalia Report’s admitted fabrication of many one reports this week, a correction on another and likely a “CIA” tinged bogus interview with Robow -See update below or read this post at LongWarJournal).  But if I had to take a wild guess based on no information, I’d make the following prediction with regards to Hammami:

  • Shabaab has to make it seem Hammami is alive for a while so foreign fighters don’t get turned off.
  • Shabaab pressures Hammami to make a follow up video where he recants his earlier fears and says everything is fine.
  • Whether he agrees to this or not, Hammami is eventually “killed in a martyrdom operation” under suspicious circumstances translation =  Shabaab gets rid of him over time but in a way that is palatable via jihadi media.  This is Shabaab’s best case scenario at this point.
  • Worst case scenario for Shabaab = they say nothing and Hammami is never heard from again.  This would put doubt in the mind of every potential foreign fighter that considers joining Shabaab.

Here’s a one question survey to see what people think about these three scenarios.

UPDATE: 3/30/12

Robert Young Pelton of Somalia Report didn’t like my statement above:

You need to suspect the interview with Robow is not based on fact. It is one of many interviews we publish with al Shabaab leadership.

Your comment: “As seen by Somalia Report’s admitted fabrication of many reports this week” is incorrect and misleading. We pulled one interview, and corrected another report in which the writer did not clarify that the NGO building, although clearly identified with their signage, was not occupied by the group.

So I updated my comment. I questioned the authenticity of three articles this week from Somalia Report; which in my opinion is many.  See Bill Roggio’s report at Long War Journal if you are really interested in this debate.

by Clint

Continued Debate on al-Qaeda in Somalia: Zawahiri, Godane, Robow

Yesterday’s al-Qaeda scenarios surrounding Omar Hammami’s plight with al-Shabaab in Somalia churned some excellent input from Marisa Urgo of Making Sense of Jihad who’s long study of al-Qaeda’s (AQ) strategic thinking provided some needed perspective from the AQ side of the debate.  Likewise, a comment to yesterday’s post put forth a fourth scenario where Robow killed off AQ’s operatives in Somalia to return al-Shabaab’s focus to local issues rather than AQ’s global agenda.  I’ll post their informative takes here and look forward to getting more perspectives on recent events amongst al-Shabaab’s chaos.

I’ll recap each of yesterday’s scenarios and then post Marisa’s response to each:

Scenario #1 – Zawahiri directly authorized the killing of Fazul and older AQ loyalists to Bin Laden based in Somalia

Courtesy of Marisa:

In Scenario #1: I agree that Zawahiri isn’t above strategic murder to achieve specific ends. However, I also believe that Zawahiri is older now, and we can’t dismiss the influence of criminal wisdom in his strategic calculus. Avoiding fitna might be very important to him right now as he tries to consolidate HIS leadership with the group’s funders and Pak caretakers. We should also consider that in the history of transnational gangs and Italian mafia, power consolidation through murders often lead to more chaos not less.

As a general comment: I believe that AQC favors commanders who are *dedicated men of the movement*; professional jihadis who are devoted to the movement and its mission. That implies a certain humility and self-control, personal self-sacrifice for fellow jihadis, and a steady, even-handed character that subsumes personal gratification for the greater good. [Granted, this is an IDEAL, but it has its source in the lessons AQC may have learned from their strategic failures: 1. al-Uyyeri was "charismatic" and was clearly a headache for Zawahiri and a strategic disaster for AQ in the AP, 2. Zarqawi was "charismatic" - loved by all - and an albatross [Zawahiri's letter to him is an excellent example of the leadership qualities he values], 3. As far as we know Bin Laden shot down the idea of Al-awlaki in a leadership position – Why? Probably Awlaki’s “charisma” was the turnoff.

Well, it does seem there is a good bit more chaos, relatively, within al-Shabaab.

Scenario #2 – Godane makes a pitch to Zawahiri for alignment with AQ, Zawahiri agrees and turns a blind eye to the implications

Response to #2, courtesy of Marisa:

In Scenario #2: I’m uncomfortable with the idea that Godane had to pitch a merger with Zawahiri. Much of AQC dedicated media time to ICU/Shabaab in 2006-2007. I doubt that was done without a strategic intention to merge with the group. This merger may have been in planning for a looong time, at least since 2006 when ICU actively recruited and raised money in diaspora communities in EU and US. My guess is that Zawahiri would probably prefer the most stable, mission-oriented leader whom he could rely on to make tactical and strategic decisions in tandem to AQ’s global vision. Zawahiri’s operational situation most likely precludes direct command and control of his client emirates. Therefore, he needs to trust the stability and dedication of the leader of that client emirate. If i’m not mistaken – The Management of Savagery has a chapter on the qualities of a leader … that may be relevant in this case

Ahh, The Management of Savagery…great read, and very good to review in light of AQAP’s recent gains.

Scenario #3 – Zawahiri agrees to a merger and is completely unaware of Godane’s shoring up of rivals

Scenario #3 analysis courtesy of Marisa. I liked all her input, but I highlighted one of her comments here I really liked.

In Scenario #3: My only comment is that we shouldn’t dismiss the “courier” factor in Zawahiri’s situational awareness. News travels slooow when its a guy driving, walking, or, hell, riding a bike, through Pakistan. It’s clear from what we know now – and I hope the Bin Laden material will make it clearer — that AQC had far more command and control in personnel and other changes than we previously thought. It turned out to be a not-so-leaderless jihad, surprising many even with years of contrarian evidence like the Zarqawi letters. Command and control that required UBL to be in ONE PLACE for a LONG TIME. That situation probably changed after UBL’s death. For how long? That’s anyone’s guess.

I recognize the “courier” factor but its been many months since Fazul died (June 2011, I think), so I’m not convinced this would apply.

Newly Proposed Scenario #4: Robow, not Godane, Kills off AQ operatives to refocus al-Shabaab on local rather than global issues

Provided by a reader yesterday in the comments section.

firefroggy92 Edit

Fazul, Bilaal, and Sakr were all killed at the behest of Muktar Rubow whose southern tribes have been screwed over by Goddane’s Isaaq. Rubbow has been killing off the foreign fighters becuase he wants HSM to focus on the local needs of the people and not the fanciful crusades of AQ.

Maybe, from the local versus global perspective, this makes a lot of sense and has been an issue I’ve pushed in the past.  It would explain why Robow potentially turned on Hammami.  However, I’m not sure this matches up with the reporting I’ve been reading from Somalia, assuming its accurate.  Here are a couple references,

Al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane, known as Mukhtar Abu Zubair, was involved in a power struggle with El Berjawi for the leadership of al Qaeda in the region.

and

Berjawi took over the leadership of al-Qaeda in Somalia last year after Harun Fazul was killed on June at a Mogadishu road block manned by Transitional Federal Government forces. Fazul had succeeded Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan who was killed by American commandos on September 14, 2009. The car bombing that killed Berjawi is suspected to be the work of the overall Emir, Ahmed Godane alias Abu Zubeyr. Berjawi and al-Shabaab Somalis opposed to Godane’s leadership made several attempts to replace Godane as the overall al-Shabaab leader but foreign fighters led by Al-Ameriki came to his rescue, threatening to pull out foreigners out of Somalia and cut off external funding.

I don’t trust this account entirely as the role of Hammami is not consistent with other discussions from @ibnSiqili at al-Wasat.

Here’s another quote reference a January meeting where Team Robow, with Omar Hammami in tow, denounced the killing of AQ operatives and placed blame on Godane.

At the assembly, al-Shabaab officials including Ali Mohamud Rage, Hassan Dahir Aweys, Mukhtar Robow, as well as a number of foreign jihadists accused other al-Shabaab officials of being behind a conspiracy that resulted in al-Barjawi’s death.  Other al-Shabaab officials in attendance included the head of preaching and information, Sheikh Fuad Mohamed Kalaf, the head of the political office, Sheikh Ali Fidow, Sheikh Fuad Shangole, and Omar Hammami (“Al-Amriki”) an American citizen raised in small-town Alabama.  One of al_shabaab’s most prominent leaders, Ahmed Godane, as well as several other foreign jihadists were absent from the meeting for unknown reasons. “

This account while not definitive or clear, does seem to undermine Scenario #4.  But, there could be all sorts of betrayal going on.

Even in Scenario #4, Zawahiri entered into a merger agreement with Godane whom he probably thought had full control of al-Shabaab.  It appears Godane did not have everyone’s buy in on the merger, and now al-Qaeda is trapped in a mess clan conflict similar to the 1990s – again, a lesson learned by Bin Laden that likely prevented the merger in recent years.  Either way, Zawahiri either engaged in a bad relationship with blowback, or is complicit in killing off old AQ fighters.  In both scenarios, AQ operatives are dying due to his decision making.

More to follow tomorrow….

by Clint

Are Zawahiri and Godane killing off al-Qaeda members?

In Andrew Lebovich and I’s HSPI article “Hammami’s Plight Amongst al-Shabaab & al-Qaeda’s Game of Throne,” we posed some hypotheses related to recent infighting amongst al-Shabaab factions and their al-Qaeda alliances.  My belief is that Hammami’s scrambling is not solely the result of a minor squabble, but instead an externality of a broad strategy by Mukhtar Abdirahman Godane to secure power within al-Shabaab by eliminating older al-Qaeda elements in Somalia and substituting key al-Shabaab leaders with loyal supporters.

The first hypothesis put forth in the paper addresses potential broader implications of Godane’s internal bullying, assuming the reports of his power play prove true.

 The first possibility is that al-Shabaab’s infighting represents a broader power struggle in al-Qaeda. Assuming the reports of Godane killing off Fazul and other al-Qaeda foreign fighters are true, this likely means Zawahiri actively or passively has permitted the removal of potential competitors to his authority in al-Qaeda. If true, what does this suggest about potentially larger rifts between al-Qaeda’s original members (Sayf al-Adel for example) and Zawahiri’s inner circle?

Evidence for this hypothesis is and will likely be hard to come by. But, I still think it’s worth investigating.  Assuming that Godane and his underlings (potentially al-Afghani) helped facilitate Fazul’s death and have eliminated other AQ foreign fighters in Somalia, what is Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Qaeda’s influence in these actions?  One of my suspected reasons for the AQ-Shabaab merger was for AQ Central to gain access to precious Western foreign fighters with access to Western targets.  I’ve been examining several scenarios related to this Zawahiri hypothesis and I’ d enjoy any thoughts from al-Qaeda or Somalia experts on any of the below scenarios related to this hypothesis.

Scenario #1 – Zawahiri directly authorized the killing of Fazul and older AQ loyalists to Bin Laden based in Somalia

With Bin Laden dead, Zawahiri sees the opportunity to 1) achieve a unification with al-Shabaab previously blocked by UBL and his “Old Guard” and 2) remove internal opposition to his supremacy from old stalwarts like Fazul (see Nelly Lahoud theory).

Zawahiri then communicates to Godane, after UBL’s death, that the path to an AQ merger arises from the elimination of Fazul, Bilal al-Barjawi, and Barjawi’s deputy – those of old AQ ranks aligned with UBL against a formal merger. Godane agrees and adds in other al-Shabaab rivals to the hit list – rivals which command other AQ foreign fighters like Hammami.

Probability of this Scenario:  1 in 4.  Unlikely, Zawahiri knows better than to give a direct order when it’s easier to imply or turn a blind eye.  Likewise, some have said that Zawahiri is above this sort of infighting and would never turn on a fellow al-Qaeda member.  I completely disagree with this notion.  While I don’t think Zawahiri gave a direct executive order to kill Fazul, I also don’t think he is above such violence – we shouldn’t forget he is a terrorist after all and an ego maniac as well.

Scenario #2 – Godane makes a pitch to Zawahiri for alignment with AQ, Zawahiri agrees and turns a blind eye to the implications

With Bin Laden dead, Godane sees an opportunity to push for a merger with AQ.  Godane pitches the merger to Zawahiri, noting that he may have to “make some personnel changes to shape the merger.”  Zawahiri agrees in principle knowing that this implies the removal of opposition like Fazul.  Zawahiri’s hands are technically clean and Godane has freedom to pursue the merger as needed.

Probability of this Scenario: 1 in 2. Likely.The outcome meets the needs of both leaders.  However, under this scenario, I’d believe that Zawahiri thought Godane had Team Shabaab in line and under his direction; not expecting the mafia style rubbing out of AQ foreign fighters not aligned with Godane’s alliances.

Scenario #3 – Zawahiri agrees to a merger and is completely unaware of Godane’s shoring up of rivals

Under this scenario, Zawahiri, desperately needing some good news and a surge in AQ interest to offset the past year’s events, blindly accepts the merger offer from Godane not realizing that Godane would use the alliance as a means to increase his local power in Shabaab and kill off AQ operatives not in line with his ambitions.  Zawahiri falls for this infighting trap having not been around AQ during its first foray into Somalia in the 1990′s – lessons Bin Laden knew and reflected on in his decision to not pursue a formal alliance with al-Shabaab or AIAI. Zawahiri’s security posture prevents him from knowing of Godane’s potential involvement in killing of veteran AQ members.

Probability of this Scenario:  1 in 16. Slim, unlikely.  Zawahiri remains constrained in terms of communications.  But, he’s not deaf.  The coordination between the merger announcements by Godane and then shortly after by Zawahiri suggest that communication channels remain open.  I strongly doubt that Zawahiri could coordinate his announcement and yet not be able to hear through his intermediaries that Godane may have been involved in killing off three AQ operatives in Somalia.  Zawahiri must have known of the Fazul conspiracies and they clearly did not stop him from accepting a formal merger with Godane and al-Shabaab.  I do think he was/is likely blind to the internal clan killings which may be resulting in AQ foreign fighters meeting their demise.

Scenario #4 – An alternative scenario I haven’t thought of

Does anyone have any thoughts on what it might be?

Probability of this Scenario: 3 in 16. (Did I just blow your mind with that fraction?) Unlikely but definitely possible.  I always assume there is something I’m missing.

I look forward to any other perspectives on this.

Any way you slice it, Zawahiri has the blood of AQ operatives and AQ foreign fighters on his hands.  He’s either directing their deaths, complicit in them, or completely unaware.  I’m not sure which is worse from his perspective.  Maybe Zawahiri does know, and made his decision right after Bin Laden’s death.

UPDATE AS OF 1400EST, 21 MARCH 2012

See interesting perspective from the comments section here from firefroggy92, asserting that it is Robow killing off AQ members and not Godane.  This seems to counter to the reporting from Somalia, that Godane has been leading the elimination of old AQ members.  But highly possible…anyone have an opinion?

Fazul, Bilaal, and Sakr were all killed at the behest of Muktar Rubow whose southern tribes have been screwed over by Goddane’s Isaaq. Rubbow has been killing off the foreign fighters becuase he wants HSM to focus on the local needs of the people and not the fanciful crusades of AQ. firefroggy92

 

by Clint

CT Survey Respondents & Zawahiri Agree: Arab Spring Is The Place to Be

This morning I posted AQ Strategy poll result #9 aggregating the responses of 266 voters who were asked “what will be most critical to AQ’s survival and resurgence over the next five years?”  While there was no consensus, the most popular voter choice was “Infiltrating Arab Revolutions.”

Zawahiri issued his 10th anniversary of 9/11 statement today and didn’t disappoint survey respondents based on Tim Lister’s CNN blog I found:

He (Zawahiri) says that contrary to what is claimed by the western media, al-Qaeda supports the revolutions in the Arab world and hopes they will establish true Islam and government based on Shariah, or Islamic law. He also claims the revolutions are a form of defeat for the United States, just as the 9/11 attacks and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were also defeats.

I think most everyone agrees that AQ missed out on the revolutions and they need to find their place amongst them for fear of becoming irrelevant.  But do we really think those in the middle of the Arab Uprisings will really give credit to late-to-the-party AQ?  I don’t think so.  I imagine those battling it out in the streets of Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria will not really be keen to listen to AQ preach its philosophy.

On a more entertaining note, how do you know AQ is losing?  When they start copying the narratives of GOP presidential candidates.  Here’s a great example from the CNN post describing the audio of Bin Laden’s video also released today:

In his message, bin Laden also recommends that Americans read the book “Obama’s Wars” by Bob Woodward, saying that they should realize that Obama’s government has not lived up to his campaign slogan, “Yes we can.”